Murray v. Supreme Court of Washington

Opinion

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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 9 10 SARA MURRAY, CASE NO. 3:25-cv-05074-DGE 11 Plaintiff, ORDER AFFIRMING DENIAL OF 12 v. RECUSAL (DKT. NO. 8) AND REFERRING MOTION et al., 14 Defendant. 15 16 I INTRODUCTION 17 This matter comes before the Court on Honorable Magistrate Judge Theresa L. Fricke’s 18 Order Denying Recusal (Dkt. No. 8) in reference to Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike (Dkt. No. 6.) 19 Local Civil Rule 3(f) provides that whenever a judge in this District declines to voluntarily 20 recuse themself from a case following a party’s motion to recuse pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144 or 21 28 U.S.C. § 455, “he or she will direct the clerk to refer the motion to the chief judge.” 22 Accordingly, this Court now reviews Judge Fricke’s decision not to recuse. Further, because 23 24 1 Plaintiff additionally requests the recusal of the undersigned judge, David G. Estudillo, the Court 2 refers this matter for consideration to Judge Tana Lin. See LCR 3(f). 3 Motions for recusal are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 144 and 28 U.S.C. § 455. Recusal is 4 required if a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned or if the judge harbors personal

5 bias or prejudice against a party. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), (b)(1). Such bias or prejudice must derive 6 from an extrajudicial source. Agha-Khan v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 2022 WL 7 501564, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 18, 2022); Mayes v. Leipziger, 729 F.2d 605, 607 (9th Cir. 8 1984). Under both 28 U.S.C. § 144 and 28 U.S.C. § 455, recusal of a federal judge is 9 appropriate if “a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the 10 judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Yagman v. Republic Ins., 987 F.2d 622, 11 626 (9th Cir. 1993). This is an objective inquiry concerned with whether there is the appearance 12 of bias, not whether there is bias in fact. Preston v. United States, 923 F.2d 731, 734 (9th Cir. 13 1992). 14 Plaintiff argues that Judge Fricke and Judge Estudillo cannot preside over matters she has

15 initiated because they have engaged in discrimination against her, in violation of the Americans 16 with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and other authorities. (See generally Dkt. 17 Nos. 6, 7.) But Plaintiff makes only conclusory statements without providing any factual basis 18 showing how she was discriminated against on the basis of disability. For instance, Plaintiff 19 cites Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2001) (see Dkt. No. 6 at 2), a case in 20 which a party with a hearing disability was not accommodated with real-time transcription 21 during a court hearing, but she does not explain how those facts apply here or warrant recusal. 22 The standard for recusal is objective, and Plaintiff has not put forward any facts that would cause 23

24 1 a reasonable person to question the impartiality of Judge Fricke or Judge Estudillo. Yagman, 987 2 F.2d at 626. 3 Further, Plaintiff argues that Judge Estudillo must be recused because she has named him 4 as a Defendant in litigation. (See Dkt. No. 7 at 7.) In fact, Plaintiff now proposes to amend her

5 complaint to name Judge Estudillo and Judge Fricke as defendants in this matter. (Dkt. No. 9 at 6 2.) However, “[a] party cannot manufacture grounds for recusal by fantastic allegations, by 7 vague accusations or by alleging in conclusory terms that a judge is biased, by filing an ethics 8 complaint against a judge, or even by suing a judge.” Royer v. Pennsylvania State Univ., No. 9 03:00-CV-290-KRG-KAP, 2012 WL 956422, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 2012), report and 10 recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 954710 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 2012) (internal citation 11 omitted).1 In Chase v. Ahuja, the court declined to recuse when a plaintiff sued the presiding 12 judge and others on the court after “receiving rulings not to her liking.” No. 5:22-CV-225-AW- 13 HTC, 2022 WL 17730878 at *1 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 16, 2022). The court noted that “[t]here is no 14 hard-and-fast rule that a judge must recuse when he is sued.” Id. (citing United States v.

15 Grismore, 564 F.2d 929, 933 (10th Cir. 1977) (“A judge is not disqualified merely because a 16 litigant sues or threatens to sue him.”)). The court reasoned that “[t]here is no reason to think 17 that if I recused, Plaintiff would not sue the next judge too, if she had not already. Recusing in 18 this circumstance would do no good and would not serve the recusal statute’s purpose.” Id. That 19 reasoning applies in full force here, where Plaintiff has argued that every judge in the Western 20 District of Washington is biased against her and has initiated this case against the Justices of the 21 Supreme Court of Washington for alleged ADA discrimination. (Dkt. Nos. 6 at 7; 1 at 7.) 22

1 This is not the first time Plaintiff has sought recusal of the undersigned or of other judges in 23 this District based on what appear to be attempts to manufacture conflicts. See Murray v. U.S. Attorney’s Office et al., Case No. 2:25-cv-00259-LK, Dkt. Nos. 14, 17, 19 (W.D. Wash. 2025). 24 1 Accordingly, the Court AFFIRMS Judge Fricke’s denial (Dkt. No. 8) of Plaintiff’s 2 motion seeking her recusal (Dkt. No. 6), the Court construes Plaintiff’s motion as seeking the 3 recusal of Judge Estudillo and DENIES that motion, and the Court REFERS this matter to Judge 4 Lin for her review per Local Civil rule 3(f).

5 Dated this 6th day of May, 2025. 6 a 7 David G. Estudillo 8 United States District Judge

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