FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS October 1, 2007 Elisabeth A. Shumaker FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
R ON A LD M U RR AY ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 06-3376 (D.C. No. 04-CV-1298-JTM ) EDW ARDS COUNTY SHERIFF’S 453 F. Supp. 2d 1280 (D. Kan. 2006) DEPARTM ENT; KEN SCHM IDT; B RY A N T K U RTH ; JU LIE LO NG; KENNETH DU PREE; M ARK FRAM E,
Defendants-Appellees.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before HA RTZ, EBEL, and T YM KOVICH, Circuit Judges.
Ronald M urray appeals pro se from the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of defendants on all of his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His
claims relate to his confinement in the Edw ards County Jail (“Jail”) as a pretrial
* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent w ith Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. detainee for a period of approximately 11 months beginning in July 2003. He
sought damages for numerous alleged violations of his constitutional rights,
including the following: (1) the Jail was poorly ventilated, not adequately cooled
or heated, unsanitary, and insect-infested; (2) lights outside of the cells remained
illuminated 24 hours a day; (3) he was not provided with appropriate clothing and
a means to wash his clothing; (4) he was denied all out-of-cell exercise or
recreation; (5) he was not provided adequate medical, dental or psychological
care; (6) he was denied visitation with friends; (7) his non-legal mail was
screened or blocked; (8) he was not allowed physical access to the law library;
(9) the phone system at the Jail was inadequate; and (10) he was prohibited from
freely practicing his chosen religion.
M r. M urray and defendants filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants and
M r. M urray filed a timely appeal. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM .
I. Standard of Review
“W e review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing
all the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Barney v.
Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1306 (10th Cir. 1998). Summary judgment is
appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
-2- genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
The moving party does not have to negate the nonmovant’s claims in order to obtain summary judgment. The movant only bears the initial burden of showing–that is pointing out to the district court–that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case. If the movant carries this initial burden, the non-movant may not rest upon its pleadings, but must set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial as to those dispositive matters for which it carries the burden of proof.
Barney, 143 F.3d at 1307 (quotations, citations and alterations omitted).
II. Physical Injury Requirem ent
The district court’s first basis for granting summary judgment to defendants
is that M r. M urray failed to make any claim of injury other than assertions of
mental and emotional distress. Therefore, the court concluded, his § 1983 claims
were barred by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), which
provides: “No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a
jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered
while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.” M r. M urray does
not dispute that he seeks to recover damages for emotional or mental injury as a
result of the alleged constitutional violations. But he argues that § 1997e(e) is
ambiguous and should not be interpreted to require a physical injury if the claim
alleges a constitutional violation which rarely results in physical injury, such as
his claims under the First, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. As M r. M urray
-3- acknowledges, however, this court has already held that “[t]he plain language of
the statute does not permit alteration of its clear damages restrictions on the basis
of the underlying rights being asserted.” Searles v. Van Bebber, 251 F.3d 869,
876 (10th Cir. 2001). In Searles we rejected the contention that § 1997e(e)
should not be construed to require the showing of a physical injury in a claim for
violation of the First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. W e concluded
that “[t]he statute limits the remedies available, regardless of the rights asserted,
if the only injuries are mental or emotional.” Id.
M r. M urray argues in the alternative that he did allege physical injuries.
W hen asked at his deposition to specify every physical injury he had sustained
while at the Jail, he testified as follow s:
Defendants’ Counsel: Any sort of physical impairment, muscle atrophy, bone deterioration, anything like that?
M r. M urray: Not that I know of. You know, I’m not a medical expert or anything.
Defendants’ Counsel: W ell, but did you notice any conditions–change of conditions in your physical condition during Edwards County?
M r. M urray: W ell, I lost w eight.
Defendants’ Counsel: Aside from losing weight?
M r. M urray: That’s–several times I guess I had problems sleeping sometimes. Headaches every now and then. Those might just be typical ailments.
-4- R., Vol. II, Doc. 191, Exhibit 2 at 67-8. The district court concluded that his only
claim of physical injury was his alleged weight loss as a result of his inability to
exercise outside of his cell. The court held, however, that the uncontroverted
evidence showed that he weighed the same amount when he entered and left the
Jail. 1
M r. M urray contends on appeal that he suffered other physical injuries
including “headaches, muscle soreness and pains.” Aplt. Br. at 18. Nowhere in
the exchange quoted above, nor anywhere else in his deposition, did he mention
muscle soreness resulting from the conditions of his confinement in the Jail. Yet
he subsequently filed a contradictory affidavit supporting his summary judgment
motion, in which he complained of periodic sore and aching muscles. He did not
explain in his affidavit why he failed to testify about sore muscles at his
deposition. Nor did he attempt to clarify his prior testimony or claim that his
affidavit was based on newly-discovered evidence. Therefore, we hold that
M r. M urray’s affidavit fails to create a material disputed fact regarding whether
he suffered muscle soreness as a result of the conditions of his detainment in the
Jail. See Franks v. N im m o, 796 F.2d 1230, 1237 (10th Cir. 1986) (“[T]he utility
of summary judgment as a procedure for screening out sham fact issues would be
1 M r. M urray does not argue on appeal that the district court erred in reaching this conclusion regarding lack of evidence of his alleged weight loss.
-5- greatly undermined if a party could create an issue of fact merely by submitting
an affidavit contradicting his ow n prior testimony.”). 2
M r. M urray did testify in his deposition that he experienced periodic
headaches w hile in the Jail, and in his affidavit in support of his summary
judgment motion he attributed his headaches to a lack of sleep due to the
continuous illumination of the cells. He also testified regarding periodic pain
resulting from defendants’ failure to provide him dental care for two broken
teeth. 3 For the purpose of this appeal, we w ill assume that M r. M urray’s
2 The district court generally criticized much of M r. M urray’s evidence attempting to controvert defendants’ facts, but did not make any specific evidentiary rulings excluding particular evidence. Nonetheless, it is clear that the district court disregarded his claim of muscle soreness. M oreover, we may affirm on any ground if the record is sufficient to permit conclusions of law, even grounds not relied upon by the district court. See Bell v. Bd. of County Com m’rs of Jefferson County, 451 F.3d 1097, 1102 n.5 (10th Cir. 2006). 3 M r. M urray testified as follows regarding his tooth pain:
Defendants’ counsel: And what were the symptoms you were having with the cracked teeth?
M r. M urray: W ell, when I would eat food I would get pain periodically from chewing down, and I mean, it wasn’t constant. It was just periodic. But the other one, the tooth cracked all the way to the gum, and, in fact, I ended up pulling a piece of it off because . . . it was bothering me, and they weren’t bringing me to the dentist, so I went ahead and pulled what piece I could.
R., Vol. II., Doc. 191, Exhibit 2 at 50.
-6- headaches and tooth pain are “physical injuries” sufficient to permit him to
recover damages for mental or emotional injury under § 1997e(e) on his claims
related to cell illumination and denial of dental care.
M r. M urray does not argue that the district court erred by failing to
consider any other physical injuries resulting from any of his other claims.
Therefore, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on all claims
not related to cell illumination or dental care, based on his failure to show any
physical injury as required by § 1997e(e). 4
III. Rem aining Claim s 5
The conditions of confinement may not amount to punishment of a pretrial
detainee. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). But “jail conditions may be
restrictive and even harsh without violating constitutional rights.” Ledbetter v.
City of Topeka, 318 F.3d 1183, 1188 (10th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted).
Although, as a pretrial detainee, M r. M urray was protected by the D ue Process
4 In Searles we held that, even in the absence of a showing of physical injury, § 1997e(e) does not bar recovery of nominal or punitive damages for a constitutional violation. 251 F.2d at 879, 881. But M r. M urray does not contend on appeal that the district court erred in granting summary judgment where he sought that relief. He therefore has waived that argument on appeal. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. M hoon, 31 F.3d 979, 984 n.7 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that issue not raised in opening appellate brief was w aived). 5 In its analysis of the merits of M r. M urray’s various claims, the district court did not directly address his claims regarding cell illumination and denial of dental care. But again, we may affirm on any ground if the record is sufficient to permit conclusions of law , even grounds not relied upon by the district court.
-7- Clause of the Fourteenth A mendment, in determining whether his rights were
violated we apply the same analysis as applied in § 1983 claims alleging Eighth
Amendment violations. See id. “The test for a ‘deliberate indifference’ claim
under the Eighth Amendment has both an objective and a subjective component.”
Kikumura v. Osagie, 461 F.3d 1269, 1291 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted).
In order to satisfy the objective component, M r. M urray was required to show that
he suffered harm “sufficiently serious to implicate the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause.” Id. (quotation omitted). To satisfy the subjective
component, he needed to establish that defendants “kn[ew] of and disregard[ed]
an excessive risk to [his] health or safety.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Under the objective “sufficiently serious” component, “a prison official’s
act or omission must result in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (quotation omitted).
M r. M urray must show that he was detained “under conditions posing a
substantial risk of serious harm” to his health or safety. Id. The purpose of the
“sufficiently serious” requirement “is to limit claims to significant, as opposed to
trivial, suffering. Consequently, we look to the alleged injury claimed by the
prisoner, and ask whether that harm is sufficiently serious.” Kikum ura, 461 F.3d
at 1292 (quotations and citation omitted). Under this objective prong, the court
examines the harm identified by the prisoner to determine if it was sufficiently
-8- serious, without regard to causation or the subjective prong. M ata v. Saiz,
427 F.3d 745, 753 (10th Cir. 2005).
The subjective prong of the deliberate indifference test requires the plaintiff to present evidence of the prison official’s culpable state of mind. The subjective component is satisfied if the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.
Id. at 751 (quotation, citation, and alteration omitted).
A. Cell Illum ination
M r. M urray challenges the Jail’s practice of leaving certain lights on
24 hours a day as an unconstitutional deprivation of his basic right to sleep. In
order to prevail on this claim, he must present evidence that he suffered a harm
“‘sufficiently serious’ to implicate the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.”
Kikum ura, 461 F.3d at 1291 (quotation omitted). He must also produce evidence
that defendants caused the harm “with the requisite culpable state of mind.”
M ata, 427 F.3d at 753. He must show that they “kn[ew] of and disregard[ed] an
excessive risk to [his] health or safety.” Id. at 751.
He claims that lights outside of the cells, consisting of four 75-watt bulbs,
remained on continuously. Although the lights were two to three feet away from
the cells, they illuminated inside the cells, and the lights w ere bright enough to
sometimes disturb his sleep, resulting in headaches w hich he experienced “every
now and then.” R., Vol. II, Doc. 191, Ex. 2 at 68. According to M r. M urray, the
-9- lighting also “caused other psychological effects, such as depression.” Id., Ex. 1
at 7. He claims that he and other inmates asked that the lights be turned off, but
that their requests were refused. Instead, he and other inmates attempted to block
the lights with towels.
W e have held that continuous lighting within a cell during a short-term
period of solitary confinement, along with other restrictions, did not amount to a
constitutional violation. See G regory v. Wyse, 512 F.2d 378, 382 (10th Cir.
1975). M r. M urray contends that other courts have held that subjecting an inmate
to continuous lighting in a cell for a longer period of time may amount to an
Eighth Amendment violation. See, e.g., Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1090-91
(9th Cir. 1996) (holding inmate produced sufficient evidence on lighting claim to
avoid summary judgment), amended by 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998). But the
plaintiff in Keenan alleged that as a result of the continuous lighting he “had no
way of telling night or day” and suffered “grave sleeping problems.” Id. at 1091
(quotations omitted).
In contrast, M r. M urray failed to produce evidence of a sufficiently serious
injury caused by the continuous lighting in his cell. Although he asserts that his
inability to sleep amounted to a “deprivation of constitutional dimension,”
Kikum ura, 461 F.3d at 1292, his own testimony indicated that the lights only
sometimes disturbed his sleep and that he suffered headaches as a result of his
loss of sleep only every now and then. In referring to his sleep and headache
-10- problems, he even indicated that “[t]hose might just be typical ailments.” R.,
Doc. 191, Exhibit 2 at 68. 6 Therefore, he failed to establish that either his
sleeping problems or his headaches constituted sufficiently serious harm to
sustain a claim under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.
M r. M urray did produce evidence that he suffered from significant
depression while he was in the Jail. He stated the following in his affidavit:
The conditions of the Jail made me feel as though I were being punished, humiliated and degraded by the Jail employees. I was depressed most of the time in the Jail. Such lasted my entire detainment. I felt depressed most of the day, every day. I felt worthless. In fact I entertained thoughts of suicide or death periodically in the Jail. I felt fatigued or had a loss of energy all of the time. The Jail was dull and gloomy and I had no pleasure in [a]ny activity in the Jail. I pretty much had a loss of interest in everything, especially life in general.
R., Vol. II, Doc. 191, Ex. 1 at 3. But while he may have presented evidence of a
sufficiently serious harm with respect to his depression, he failed to show that it
was caused by the continuous illumination of his cell. See M ata, 427 F.3d at 753
(noting causation requirement). He produced no evidence that the lighting, which
only sometimes disturbed his sleep or gave him headaches, caused him to suffer
6 W e note that M r. M urray stated in an affidavit that he “had alot of sleepless nights and trouble sleeping, due to the lights remaining on for 24 hours per day, every day for my entire 11 month detainment.” R., Vol. II, D oc. 191, Ex. 1 at 3. He also stated that “[t]his continuous illumination made it very difficult to sleep at night. It disturbed my sleep and caused restlessness, tossing and turning most of the night.” Id. at 7. But these statements contradict his previous testimony that the lights only sometimes disturbed his sleep. Therefore, his affidavit again fails to create a material disputed fact. See Franks, 796 F.2d at 1237.
-11- the severe depression that he alleged. In fact, he cited numerous other conditions
and restrictions as causing or exacerbating his depression, such as the denial of
psychological treatment, see R., Vol. II, Doc. 191, Ex. 1 at 3.; the denial of all
outside or out-of-cell exercise or recreation, denial of visitation privileges, and
improper screening and blocking of his mail, see id., Ex. 11; and the unsanitary
cell conditions, see id., Ex. 1 at 6. Numerous inhumane conditions of
confinement may be actionable if in combination they “produce[] the deprivation
of a single, identifiable human need.” M itchell v. M aynard, 80 F.3d 1433, 1442
(10th Cir. 1996). But in this case we have already concluded that M r. M urray
cannot recover for his mental or emotional injuries related to any of these other
claims because he failed to produce evidence of a physical injury. Thus, his
failure to show that he suffered severe depression specifically as a result of the
illumination of his cell precludes his recovery on this claim.
W e conclude that M r. M urray has failed to produce evidence creating a
genuine issue of material fact, and therefore the district court did not err in
granting summary judgment on his claim related to cell illumination.
B. Denial of Dental Treatm ent
M r. M urray also contends that his requests for dental care were denied by
defendants, causing him to suffer sufficiently serious harm. Again, he must
produce evidence that he suffered from an objectively serious harm caused by
defendants’ deliberate indifference to his serious need for dental care. See M ata,
-12- 427 F.3d at 752-54. Although M r. M urray presents a superficially persuasive
theory, a review of the evidence he presented does not support his claim.
He testified that within the first few months of his detainment in the Jail,
which began in July 2003, he cracked two teeth while eating. He stated that his
tooth pain was not constant, but that he periodically experienced severe, shooting
pain when he ate. He says that he ended up pulling out some of one of the broken
teeth himself, in order to alleviate the pain. He testified that he asked several
times, including in writing, to see a dentist, but that his requests were refused.
Defendants deny that M r. M urray ever asked for dental care for any reason while
he was in the Jail, but we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to
him. But even when reviewed in that light, we find no evidence regarding the
nature of his requests for dental treatment while in the Jail or to whom they were
made.
Subsequent to his detainment in the Jail, M r. M urray was incarcerated in
the Kansas D epartment of Corrections (“K-DOC”) prison system beginning in
M ay 2004. He testified that he informed K-DOC of his broken teeth during the
intake process and there is evidence indicating he had a dental exam on M ay 12,
2004. Defendants point out, however, that he did not receive treatment from
K-DOC until several months later, when one tooth was extracted. 7 The evidence
7 M r. M urray explained that the intake process for K -DOC was intended only to evaluate any medical needs and that treatment came several months later when (continued...)
-13- reflects that M r. M urray submitted a written medical request to K-DOC on
September 30, 2004, in which he indicated that his tooth w as either broken or a
filling had come out and he was experiencing a sharp pain when he chewed. That
tooth was extracted the next day. M r. M urray produced no evidence of any
treatment received for his second broken tooth after leaving the Jail.
M r. M urray claims that he suffered a sufficiently serious harm resulting
from defendants’ denial of dental care. “The substantial harm requirement may
be satisfied by lifelong handicap, permanent loss, or considerable pain.” M ata,
427 F.3d at 751 (quotation omitted). He argues that defendants’ denial of dental
care caused him to be in extreme pain for the duration of his confinement in the
Jail and also resulted in the loss of two teeth. But he testified that his tooth pain
“wasn’t constant. It was just periodic.” R., Vol. II, Doc. 191, Ex. 2 at 50; see
also id., Ex. 1 at 10 (stating pain was periodic rather than constant). And after
leaving the Jail he did not seek dental care for several more months, nor does the
record reflect any interim complaints to K-DOC of tooth pain. Although “pain
experienced while waiting for treatment” may constitute substantial harm, “not
every twinge of pain suffered as a result of delay in medical care is actionable.”
Kikum ura, 461 F.3d at 1292 (quotation omitted).
7 (...continued) he was sent to a regular prison facility. But he did not present any evidence of complaints of tooth pain from the time that he left the Jail in M ay 2004, until the end of September.
-14- But M r. M urray did testify that, after being denied treatment, he suffered
pain at some point that was severe enough to cause him to remove part of one of
his teeth himself, which could be sufficient to show “considerable pain.” M ata,
427 F.3d at 751 (quotation omitted); see also Kikum ura, 461 F.3d at 1293
(holding that plaintiff’s “torturous” pain related to life-threatening illness, as well
as significant physical injuries, satisfied substantial harm requirement). And
evidence of the loss of a tooth could also satisfy the substantial harm requirement,
as a “permanent loss.” M ata, 427 F.3d at 751 (quotation omitted).
Again, M r. M urray also must show that defendants caused the substantial
harm he claims to have suffered. In M ata we noted,
[o]f course, a prisoner must be careful in selecting what harm to claim. The prisoner may be better off claiming some intermediate harm rather than the last untoward event to befall her. After all, the prisoner may not be able to prove that this last event was caused by any government actor or that the actor who caused the event acted with the requisite culpable state of mind.
Id. at 753. Here, M r. M urray failed to support his claim that defendants’ refusal
to provide him dental treatment caused the loss of the tooth extracted in K-D OC.
First, he presented evidence of only one “lost” tooth. And the dental treatment he
ultimately received was the extraction of that tooth in K-DOC. He produced no
evidence that earlier dental treatment, while he was in the Jail, would have
prevented that consequence and allowed him to avoid removal of his tooth. See
Sealock v. Colorado, 218 F.3d 1205, 1210 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting lack of
-15- medical evidence that damage to heart resulted from delay in receiving care).
There is simply no evidence supporting M r. M urray’s assertion that defendants’
denial of dental care resulted in him losing any teeth.
But he did produce evidence of causation with respect to the pain he
experienced w hich led him to pull out part of his tooth while at the Jail. He
indicated that he did so in order to alleviate the pain, after he was denied dental
treatment. See id. at 1210 n.5 (holding there was sufficient evidence for jury to
conclude that delay in medical care unnecessarily prolonged prisoner’s pain and
suffering).
Nonetheless, M r. M urray failed to produce evidence of any defendant’s
culpable state of mind in support of his claim regarding the denial of dental care.
“[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be
drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the
inference.” M ata, 427 F.3d at 751 (quotation and alteration omitted). W e
addressed in M ata the proof necessary to satisfy this requirement. The plaintiff,
M s. M ata, offered evidence through deposition testimony and her affidavit that
she reported severe chest pain to a prison nurse. Id. at 750, 758-59. W e held that
evidence was sufficient to avoid summary judgment, noting:
W hat is significant is that the evidence presented to the district court supports the conclusion that [the nurse] was in fact aw are M s. M ata was suffering from severe chest pains and required medical attention. M s. M ata personally reported as much to [the nurse].
-16- Id. at 756.
M r. M urray, in contrast, testified that he made a written request to see a
dentist, which was denied. In his affidavit, he similarly said that he asked to see
a dentist several times, but his requests were denied. He also said that he “lodged
numerous complaints regarding medical, dental and psychological care, but all
were denied.” R., Vol. III, Doc. 216 at 3. But M r. M urray produced no evidence,
through his affidavit or otherwise, showing that he made known to any of the
defendants the nature of his need for dental treatment or the extent of his pain.
Thus, he failed to establish an inference that any of the individual defendants
knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to his health. See M ata, 427 F.3d at
756. Nor has he shown that Edwards County acted with deliberate indifference
by producing evidence of a risk “so obvious that the official should have know n
of it.” Barney, 143 F.3d at 1307 n. 5. Therefore, M r. M urray failed to support
his claim with evidence from which a jury could infer the defendants’ deliberate
indifference. See M ata, 427 F.3d at 751.
W e again conclude that M r. M urray has failed to produce evidence creating
a genuine issue of material fact, and therefore the district court did not err in
granting summary judgment on his claim related to denial of dental treatment.
-17- IV. Denial of M otions to Strike Affidavits, For Protective Order and Sanctions
W e have considered M r. M urray’s arguments of error regarding the district
court’s denial of his various motions to strike certain affidavits, his motion for
protective order, and his motions for sanctions and find them to be without merit.
V. Conclusion
Because M r. M urray has failed to produce evidence establishing a dispute
of material fact on his claims related to cell illumination and denial of dental
treatment, we affirm the district court’s grant of sum mary judgment on those
claims. W e affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on all of
M r. M urray’s other claims based on his failure to show any physical injury as
required by § 1997e(e). The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Timothy M . Tymkovich Circuit Judge
-18-