Murray v. City of New York

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMarch 8, 2023
Docket1:23-cv-00458
StatusUnknown

This text of Murray v. City of New York (Murray v. City of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Murray v. City of New York, (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ROBERT L. MURRAY, a/k/a Leviticus Bomfet Lucfer and SHAQUAN BUTLER, Plaintiffs, 23 Civ. 458 (KPF) -v.- ORDER OF SERVICE CITY OF NEW YORK, 15 JOHN DOE C.O., 2 JOHN DOE CAPT., 2 JOHN DOE DEPT., 1 JANE DOE DEPT., and 2 JOHN DOE CHS STAFF, Defendants. KATHERINE POLK FAILLA, District Judge: Plaintiff Robert L. Murray, who is currently detained at the George R. Vierno Center (“GRVC”) on Rikers Island, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants used excessive force against him. By order dated February 3, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff Murray’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees.1 As set forth below, the Court: (i) dismisses without prejudice any claims Plaintiff asserts on behalf of Shaquan Butler and others; (ii) requests the City of New York waive service of summons; (iii) directs the City of New York and NYC Health + Hospitals to assist Plaintiff in identifying the correction and the Correctional Health Services (“CHS”) staff members involved in the alleged deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights; (iv) applies Local Civil Rule 33.2 to this action; and (v) refers Plaintiff to the New York Legal Assistance Group’s Clinic. 1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).

The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72

(2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits — to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. DISCUSSION

A. Claims on Behalf of Others Plaintiff Robert Murray brings this action on behalf of himself and Shaquan Butler, who has not signed the complaint. He also writes at the top of the form complaint “Plaintiff 1# Class Action.” (Dkt. #2). To the extent that Plaintiff Murray seeks to bring this action on behalf of Shaquan Butler and others, his request is denied. The statute governing appearances in federal

court, 28 U.S.C. § 1654, allows two types of representation: “that by an attorney admitted to the practice of law by a governmental regulatory body, and that by a person representing himself.” Lattanzio v. COMTA, 481 F.3d 137, 139 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Eagle Assocs. v. Bank of Montreal, 926 F.2d 1305, 1308 (2d Cir. 1991)). “[B]ecause pro se means to appear for one’s self, a person may not appear on another person’s behalf in the other’s cause.” Iannaccone v. Law, 142 F.3d 553, 558 (2d Cir. 1998); see also United States v. Flaherty, 540 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[A]n individual who is not licensed as an attorney

‘may not appear on another person’s behalf in the other’s cause.’”) (citations omitted). Although the docket reflects that Shaquan Butler is being represented by himself, pro se, the Court understands from the complaint that only Robert Murray brings this action. Further, as a nonlawyer cannot bring suit on behalf of others, a pro se plaintiff cannot act as a class representative. Rodriguez v. Eastman Kodak Co., 88 F. App’x 470, 470 (2d Cir. 2004) (summary order); Phillips v. Tobin, 548 F.2d 408, 412-15 (2d Cir. 1976). The Court therefore construes this action as asserting claims solely on behalf of

Robert Murray, the only person who signed the complaint, and dismisses without prejudice all claims asserted on behalf of Shaquan Butler and others. All references to Plaintiff in this Order are to Robert Murray. B. City of New York The Clerk of Court is directed to notify the New York City Department of Correction and the New York City Law Department of this Order. The Court requests that the City of New York waive service of summons.

C. John/Jane Doe Defendants Under Valentin v. Dinkins, a pro se litigant is entitled to assistance from the district court in identifying a defendant. 121 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 1997). In the complaint, Plaintiff appears to supply sufficient information to permit the government to identify the John and Jane Doe Defendants who allegedly violated his rights on October 3, 2022, by using excessive force against him in the intake areas of the North Infirmary Command (“NIC”) and GRVC, and then denying him medical care for his injuries. It is therefore ordered that the New York City Law Department, which is

the attorney for and agent of the New York City Department of Correction (“DOC”), must ascertain the identity and badge number of each John Doe correction officer whom Plaintiff seeks to sue here and the address where each defendant may be served.2 It is also ordered that the NYC Health + Hospitals (“H+H”), which is the medical care provider for all DOC facilities, must ascertain the identity of each John Doe medical staff member whom Plaintiff

2 If a Doe defendant is a current or former DOC employee or official, the Law Department should note in the response to this Order that an electronic request for a waiver of service can be made under the e-service agreement for cases involving DOC defendants, rather than by personal service at a DOC facility.

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Eagle Associates v. Bank of Montreal
926 F.2d 1305 (Second Circuit, 1991)
United States Ex Rel. Mergent Services v. Flaherty
540 F.3d 89 (Second Circuit, 2008)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Iannaccone v. Law
142 F.3d 553 (Second Circuit, 1998)
Abbas v. Dixon
480 F.3d 636 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Lattanzio v. Comta
481 F.3d 137 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Rodriguez v. Eastman Kodak Co.
88 F. App'x 470 (Second Circuit, 2004)

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Bluebook (online)
Murray v. City of New York, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/murray-v-city-of-new-york-nysd-2023.