Murray B. Marsh Co. v. Mohasco Industries, Inc.

326 F. Supp. 651, 1971 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,517, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14130
CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedMarch 18, 1971
DocketNo. 70-2620
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 326 F. Supp. 651 (Murray B. Marsh Co. v. Mohasco Industries, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Murray B. Marsh Co. v. Mohasco Industries, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 651, 1971 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,517, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14130 (C.D. Cal. 1971).

Opinion

ORDER DISMISSING COUNT SIX OF AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHOUT PREJUDICE

HAUK, District Judge.

This matter having come on before the Court for hearing on March 8, 1971, upon defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, to Stay and to Transfer Count Six of Amended Complaint,1 upon defendant’s Points and Authorities in support thereof, and Plaintiffs’ Authorities in Opposition thereto, and the Court having taken the said Motions under submission, subject to the filing of supplemental memoranda by defendant in support thereof and by plaintiffs in opposition thereto, and the Court having duly considered said Motions, Points and Authorities and supplemental memoranda and being fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing therefore,

It is hereby ordered and adjudged:

1. Count Six of the Amended Complaint be and the same hereby is dismissed without prejudice.

2. This Dismissal Without Prejudice is made and entered upon the grounds that the Court has discretionary power to grant or deny declaratory relief as sought in said Count Six of the Amended Complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 [653]*653and exercises its discretion to deny such relief by granting the Dismissal Without Prejudice.

3. Among the reasons and grounds the Court finds controlling in making the determination to dismiss Count Six of the Amended Complaint Without Prejudice are the following:

(a) Each and all of the issues raised by said Count Six of the Amended Complaint are present or can be raised in a prior pending action in the State of New York2 entitled Mohasco Industries, Inc., v. Giffen Industries, Inc., Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York, filed therein December 10, 1970, Index No. 21,000 — 1970, attachment having been levied thereunder on December 11, 1970 upon monies and property of defendant Giffen Industries, Inc., by service of the Order of Attachment upon the Franklin National Bank, the Bank of New York and K. Gimbel Accessories, Inc., with the result that the said action in New York was properly commenced and pending as of December 10, 1970, whereas the said Count Six of the Amended Complaint and the Amended Complaint were not filed herein until December 14, 1970.

We find that the New York suit is a prior pending action because, although the general New York process statute makes service of summons the effective incident triggering both commencement of action and acquisition of jurisdiction, N.Y.C.P.L.R. 304, nevertheless, if at the time summons is issued an order of attachment is granted, the action is deemed commenced for statute of limitations purposes as of the date of the granting of the attachment. N.Y.C.P.L.R. 203(b). Moreover, if the attachment and the summons are eventually served within the two year statutory period for such service, then the action is deemed commenced and jurisdiction is acquired as of the date of the granting of the attachment, apparently for all purposes. Arnold v. Mayal Realty Co., 299 N.Y. 57, 85 N.E.2d 616 (1949).

Here the New York action was filed, summons issued and the order of attachment was granted, all on December 10, 1970. The attachment was served on December 11, 1970 and the summons was served on December 29, 1970. It appears that all the conditions necessary to a finding of commencement of the New York action on December 10, 1970, have been met.

Turning to Count Six of the Amended Complaint, admittedly filed on December 14, 1970, plaintiffs urge that this filing should relate back to the filing date of the original complaint on November 20, 1970 under F.R.Civ.P., Rule 15 (c). The plausibility of plaintiff’s argument fades when upon analysis we see that Count Six of the Amended Complaint brings in an entirely new party (Giffen Industries, Inc.) and an entirely new claim for relief (Declaratory Judgment under 28 U.S.C. 2201) either of which would, arid certainly both combined do, operate to prevent the application of the “Relation Back” doctrine of Rule 15(c), even when such prevention harshly results in barring of actions under statutes of limitations. 3 Moore’s Federal Practice 15.15 [4.-1], pp. 1039-1048. Certainly here, where no such harsh result can occur, the presence of the two ingredients preventing “Relation Back” dictates that we find, as we do, that the New York action is prior and pending.

(b) The contract involved in said Count Six of the Amended Complaint and in the said prior pending action in the State of New York is a contract of Guaranty which, though made, entered and signed by Giffen Industries, Inc., (defendant in the New York action) in the State of Florida, is by its terms to be performed in the State of New York and governed by the laws of the State of [654]*654New York, with the result that the rights and liabilities thereunder should be litigated if at all possible in the courts of the State of New York. Litigation here in this Court in the Central District of California would constitute a multiplicity of litigation which should not be countenanced, particularly when the contracting parties to the said Guaranty are a New York corporation (plaintiff in the New York litigation) and a Florida corporation (defendant in the New York litigation) whose entities, officers and directors are more clearly and readily subject and available to the courts of the State of New York than to this Federal Court in the Central District of California.

(c) Because of the domiciles of the corporate entities in the New York litigation and the locations of their officers and directors in New York and Florida, it is clear that with respect to the contracted Guaranty and the rights and liabilities to be litigated and determined thereunder, the concerns and conveniences of the parties and witnesses dictate that such litigation and determination of rights and liabilities under the Guaranty should be made and carried out by the courts of the State of New York rather than a Federal Court sitting in the State of California, especially since the New York litigation was commenced at least four days prior to the filing of the Amended Complaint adding the new party plaintiff, Giffen Industries, Inc., and the new Count Six.

(d) Since ordinarily the courts should and do respect the plaintiff’s choice of forum, and since with respect to the contract of Guaranty the plaintiff Mohasco Industries, Inc., has chosen the forum of New York, and since its choice was made at least four days before the choice of this Federal Court in the Central District of California by the plaintiff Giffen Industries, Inc., in the case before us, and since the place of performance and the law governing the Guaranty are New York’s, and since there are no countervailing reasons for litigating and resolving the Guaranty contract issues here, it follows that the New York forum should prevail as it does by this Order now made to dismiss Count Six of the Complaint Without Prejudice.

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Bluebook (online)
326 F. Supp. 651, 1971 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,517, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14130, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/murray-b-marsh-co-v-mohasco-industries-inc-cacd-1971.