UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
JAMES M. MURPHY,
Plaintiff, Case No. 1:17-cv-1911 (ACR) v.
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
A Discharge Board convened by Defendant Department of the Air Force found that an
Air Force physician sexually assaulted a female officer and then tried to thwart the ensuing
investigation. Dkt. 89-7 at 1. A separate Peer Review Panel substantiated the woman’s
allegations and found that the physician breached patient trust and presented a danger to patient
safety. Dkt. 89-9 at 1. The Discharge Board recommended that the Air Force discharge the
physician “under other than honorable conditions,” Dkt. 89-7 at 1, and the Peer Review Panel
recommended that the Air Force revoke the physician’s “clinical privileges,” Dkt. 89-9 at 1. The
Oregan State Medical Board revoked the physician’s medical license. Dkt. 89-6 at 4.
With this limited information, the reader might well suppose that the woman is the
plaintiff. Perhaps she has sued the Air Force, the physician’s employer, on some type of tort
claim. After all, at least two independent panels confirmed the sexual assault and found that the
physician presents a danger to patient safety. However, it is the physician, Plaintiff James M.
Murphy, who claims victimhood. He has sued the Air Force for violating his rights under the
Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a.
1 How? Before the Air Force could discharge him, Plaintiff left and obtained employment
as an anesthesiologist at an Army medical center. Deducing that the Army might want to know
their new doctor presented a danger to patient safety, an Air Force attorney informed the medical
center of the Discharge Board’s findings. Plaintiff claims that this disclosure violated the
Privacy Act because the Army did not “need to know” anything about the Air Force
investigations. Compl. ¶ 39. And he claims that the disclosure —and not, say, his derelict
conduct and the revocation of his medical license—led the Army to fire him.
The Air Force, to no one’s surprise, responds that the Army needed to know that two
panels had found that its new doctor had sexually assaulted a patient and presented a danger to
patient safety. It argues, moreover, that a Privacy Act violation requires an intent to violate the
Act and that the Air Force attorney had no intention other than to inform the Army of a patient
safety issue. Finally, the Air Force contends that the disclosure did not cause the Army to fire
him. Instead, Plaintiff’s conduct and ensuing consequences led to his dismissal.
The Court has no trouble agreeing that the Air Force did not violate the Privacy Act. The
Court therefore GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. 89, and DENIES
Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. 106.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
While Plaintiff denies that he performed a genital examination and contests the truth of
the various investigations and board findings, see generally Dkt. 105-2, there is no dispute as to
the facts relevant to the summary judgment motion, see id.
A. Plaintiff’s Service and Employment Background
Plaintiff James M. Murphy graduated from medical school in 1996 and completed a
three-year residency in anesthesiology from 1999 to 2002. Compl. ¶ 13, 15. He served in the
2 Air Force Reserve from 2005 until 2007. Dkt. 106-3 at 1. In 2007, the Air Force Reserve
assigned Plaintiff to the Oregon Air Force National Guard (ORANG) where he worked until
2016. Id.; Compl. ¶ 16. As part of his regular duties, Plaintiff conducted health examinations on
Air Force personnel. Compl. ¶ 17.
In June 2014, after the Air Force had opened numerous investigations into his conduct,
Plaintiff left Oregon, moved cross country, and obtained employment as a civilian
anesthesiologist at Fort Bragg Womack Army Medical Center (Womack Medical) in North
Carolina. Dkt. 89-1 at 7. First working as a contractor, Plaintiff accepted a full-time permanent
position as an anesthesiologist at Womack Medical on September 8, 2015. Dkt. 106-3 at 2. In
this role, Plaintiff was responsible for “[p]rovid[ing] contemporary regional and general
anesthesia care including pediatric, geriatric patients; obstetric anesthesia, and anesthesia for all
surgical specialties at” Womack Medical. Dkt. 89-20 at 3. Among other things, Plaintiff needed
to be licensed to practice medicine and be “fully credentialed” to provide the services described
above. Id. at 5.
On March 17, 2016, Womack Medical informed Plaintiff that it had removed him from
all patient duties, and that it would discharge him from the hospital effective April 1, 2016.
Compl. ¶ 29. On March 30, 2016, before his discharge, Plaintiff resigned from Womack
Medical. Dkt. 89-1 at 13. On August 22, 2016, “the Air Force took official action and
discharged” Plaintiff from ORANG and the Air Force Reserves. Id.
B. The Unauthorized Pap Smear and Its Discovery
On November 19, 2011, while working at ORANG, Plaintiff conducted a health
examination, which included a gynecological exam, on Staff Sergeant Hannah Mosebach. Dkt.
89-1 at 5-6. In December 2013, SSgt. Mosebach learned that gynecological exams were “not a
3 part of the periodic health assessment” for which SSgt. Mosebach saw Plaintiff. Dkt. Id. at 6.
After learning this, SSgt. Mosebach discovered that Plaintiff had not documented this exam in
her medical record of the visit. Id. at 7. The medical technician who helped her pull the relevant
file reported the unauthorized exam and Plaintiff’s failure to document it to the ORANG Medical
Group Commander. Id.
On December 8, 2013, the Medical Group Commander informed Plaintiff that ORANG
planned to initiate a Command Directed Investigation into an allegation of an unauthorized
gynecological exam, i.e., a sexual assault. Id. ORANG referred the case to the Office of
Complex Investigations (OCI) on January 5, 2014. Compl. ¶ 19. ORANG also opened a Quality
Assurance Investigation. Id. ¶ 22; Dkt. 89-1 at 9.
C. OCI Substantiates the Allegations and Quality Assurance Raises Concerns for Patient Safety
In August 2014, OCI concluded that SSgt. Mosebach’s report of sexual assault was
“substantiated based on a preponderance of the evidence.” Dkt. 89-8 at 1. OCI based this
conclusion on SSgt. Mosebach’s “credibility as demonstrated in the consistency of her recitation
of the sexual assault to others,” “her demeanor during her interview,” Plaintiff’s “demeanor
during his interview,” various electronic communications and statements of witnesses, and “the
absence of any apparent reason for [SSgt. Mosebach] to make a false allegation.” Id. Based on
these findings, Quality Assurance investigators weighed in with its concern that the “issue could
have had (or could potentially have) adverse effects on patient safety and healthcare delivery.”
Dkt. 106-2 at 245.
D. ORANG Discharge Board Substantiates Allegations and Recommends Discharge
On October 23, 2014, the ORANG Commander issued a Letter of Discharge
recommending that ORANG discharge Plaintiff for his “pattern of misconduct, professional
4 dereliction, and substandard performance of duty.” Dkt. 89-7 at 3. After a three-day evidentiary
hearing in May 2015, an ORANG administrative separation board (ORANG Discharge Board)
found that Plaintiff had been “derelict in the performance of his duties in…negligently fail[ing]
to refrain from conducting a genital exam” on SSgt. Mosebach, “failed to document his
performance of a genital exam…on a patient under his care,” “inten[ded] to deceive” by making
false statements about the event, and made “a false unsworn declaration” in which he “claimed
that a [different] military investigation had unsubstantiated a sexual assault report, when, in fact,
said investigation had substantiated the report.” Id. at 1. The Board recommended that the Air
Force discharge Plaintiff “under other than honorable conditions.” Id. (cleaned up).
E. Peer Review Panel Recommends Revocation of Plaintiff’s Medical License
Based on the ORANG Discharge Board’s recommendation, the Air Force convened a
Peer Review Panel on November 8, 2015, to review Plaintiff’s clinical performance. Dkt. 89-9
at 1. “The Panel agreed that this case did not suggest a simple breach of Standard of Care.” Id.
It found Plaintiff’s actions to be “outside the scope of privileges for a physician working in a
Guard Medical Unit (GMU), regardless of whether the act was in the best interest of the patient
or was performed properly without complication.” Id. The Panel concluded that Plaintiff’s
actions “demonstrated a breach of [patient] trust” and considered what action to take to best
“ensure future patient safety.” Id. Ultimately, the Panel determined that “action must be taken
against Plaintiff’s clinical privileges and due to the unethical nature of the allegation and concern
for patient safety, the Panel was unable to recommend a reasonable level of restriction which
would allow Plaintiff to continue practicing medicine within a GMU” of the Air Force. Id.
5 (cleaned up). Thus, “there was no recommendation to provide other than revocation of
[Plaintiff’s] clinical privileges.” Id. 1
But at this point, Plaintiff had moved to North Carolina to start his job at Womack
Medical. Dkt. 89-1 at 7. Because he was no longer living or practicing in Oregon, an ORANG
Medical Group Commander decided not to take any further action against Plaintiff. Id. at 10.
F. Oregon Revokes Plaintiff’s Medical License
On August 10, 2015, the Oregon Medical Board informed Plaintiff that it planned to
revoke his Oregon Medical Board license. Dkt. 89-6 at 1. After a multi-day hearing, an
administrative law judge issued a proposed order, finding that the Board proved by a
preponderance of evidence that Plaintiff knowingly submitted a false declaration to a court of
law. Id. at 3. The order also found that Plaintiff engaged in unprofessional conduct, including
by “willfully” and “publicly” divulging a patient’s confidential medical records. Id. It did not
find, however, that the Board proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Plaintiff conducted
an unauthorized gynecological exam.
On March 2, 2018, the Medical Board issued a final order adopting the proposed order
and ordering the revocation of Plaintiff’s Oregon medical license. Id. at 4. Plaintiff
unsuccessfully appealed the Board’s findings. Id. at 4. On June 28, 2018, the Medical Board
revoked Plaintiff’s Oregon medical license. Id. at 53.
1 The Court refers to the Office of Complex Investigation’s and the ORANG Discharge Board’s conclusions together as “the ORANG Findings and Recommendation to Discharge.” It refers to the Peer Review Panel’s conclusions as the “Peer Review Findings and Recommendation to Revoke Privileges.”
6 G. Plaintiff’s Opposition
In his opposition, Plaintiff makes two arguments but they conflict with each other. He
first argues that he “did not conduct a pap test on anyone on November 19, 2011,” the date of
SSgt. Mosebach’s exam. Dkt. 105-2 at 7. There is thus no note of the exam in SSgt.
Mosebach’s medical records because “Plaintiff’s practice was not to document exams he did not
conduct.” Id.
Next, Plaintiff feigns ignorance. He argues that even if he had conducted the exam, it
was because he “was negligently ignorant of a clinic rule concerning the scope of PHAs
[periodic health assessments] at ORANG since 2004.” Dkt. 106-3 at 2. According to Plaintiff,
the ORANG base routinely included gynecological exams as part of periodic health assessments
until 2004. Id. at 8. Sometime in or after 2004, the base “ceased including pap tests as part of
PHAs,” yet Plaintiff alleges that the base “did not have or create a written rule that prohibited
pap tests from being included in PHAs.” Id. Without a written policy, Plaintiff argues that he
did not know “that pap tests were no longer part of ORANG’s PHAs in 2011.” Dkt. 106-1 at 17.
Essentially, Plaintiff says: I did not do it. But if I did do it, it is because I did not know I
could not do it.
H. Major Wong Informs Army of the Findings Against Plaintiff
In December 2015, the Air Force assigned then-Captain Crystal Wong 2 to help ORANG
process a “clinical adverse action” against Plaintiff. Dkt. 89-10 at 1. In the Air Force, a clinical
adverse action is an “action invoked against a healthcare provider, where authority to practice
2 Crystal Wong has since received promotion to Major. The Court will refer to her by her current rank. The Court expresses its appreciation to SSgt. Mosebach, Maj. Wong, and other military declarants for their service to our country.
7 healthcare for the Air Force Medical Service is adversely affected.” Id. Action is taken if the
Air Force perceives a threat to patient safety, clinical incompetence, professional misconduct, or
impairment. Id.
Maj. Wong, an active-duty Air Force judge advocate, 3 was well-qualified for the
assignment. Id. During the time relevant here, Maj. Wong served in the Western Region as the
Senior Medical Law Consultant and as the lead attorney advising the Air Force on clinical
adverse actions. Id. She was also the subject matter expert in the field of medical law for Air
Force installations in California and Washington. Id.
To recap, by the time Maj. Wong took on the case, ORANG, the ORANG Discharge
Board, and an Air Force Peer Review Panel had each substantiated SSgt. Mosebach’s
allegations, found that Plaintiff interfered with investigators and harassed witnesses, and
recommended discharge and revocation of his clinical privileges. After extensive work, on
February 4, 2016, Maj. Wong provided the ORANG Commander and his team options on how to
proceed. Id. at 3. The Commander “elected not to take any action because . . . [Plaintiff] was no
longer seeing patients at [ORANG’s] facility.” Id.
Maj. Wong then asked the Commander if Plaintiff’s new employer knew of the
investigations into Plaintiff’s misconduct. Id. She asked this question because “such
information would normally be shared by the Commander with other facilities under [Air Force
Instruction (AFI)] 44-119.” Id. Specifically, the AFI provides that a medical treatment facility
3 The Judge Advocate General’s Corps predates the United States. Soon after becoming commander-in-chief of the Continental Army in 1775, General George Washington appointed the first Judge Advocate General and created an organization of lawyers dedicated to seeking justice within the military. Barbara Gersna, Soldiers First, Lawyers Always, Def. Visual Info. Distrib. Serv. (July 26, 2021), https://www.dvidshub.net/news/401697/soldiers-first-lawyers- always [https://perma.cc/L759-BD8X]. 8 commander “will notify other MTFs or civil medical treatment facilities where the provider is
practicing . . . when an abeyance or adverse action is initiated.” Id. at n.3 (quoting AFI 9.15.2.1).
Moreover, as an experienced lawyer in military medical law, she believed that the Department of
Defense could face liability if Plaintiff “committed similar misconduct at another military
medical treatment facility, when the Department of Defense knew of his prior misconduct.” Id.
at 3. The Commander did not know the answer and the two agreed that Maj. Wong would
contact Womack Medical.
On February 5, 2016, Maj. Wong held a call with the following Womack Medical
employees: Alvin Wadsworth, the Deputy Center Counsel; David Chatham, a medical law
attorney; and Jeffrey Drumm, the Chief of Credentials and Privileging. Id. These employees did
not know of Plaintiff’s disciplinary case. Id. Because she was concerned both for patient safety
and for the Department of Defense’s potential liability, Maj. Wong told Wadsworth, Chatham,
and Drumm about the ORANG Discharge Board’s Findings and Recommendation. Id. at 4.
When asked for details of Plaintiff’s misconduct, Maj. Wong relayed the ORANG Discharge
Board proceeding’s main findings. Id.
When Maj. Wong made the disclosures, she understood that medical facilities commonly
shared this type of information. Id. She shared it “to inform another branch of the Department
of Defense that one of their providers had been accused of performing an unauthorized pap
smear, which is a patient safety issue.” Id. Maj. Wong had no intent to violate the Privacy Act
in relaying this information. Id.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A court should grant summary judgment if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the [moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A
9 fact is material if it can affect the outcome of the litigation. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine issue exists if there is evidence “such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 895
(D.C. Cir. 2006) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
The moving party bears the burden of “demonstrat[ing] the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Though the Court should
draw “all justifiable inferences” in favor of the non-moving party, “the non-moving party must
offer more than mere unsupported allegations or denials.” Dormu v. District of Columbia, 795 F.
Supp. 2d 7, 17 (D.D.C. 2011). The Court must grant summary judgment when the non-moving
party presents no “evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant].”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Where “opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is
blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should
not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).
Here Plaintiff and Defendant have cross-moved for summary judgment under Rule 56 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Dkts. 89 and 106. In this situation, “each motion is
viewed separately, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, with the court
determining, for each side, whether a judgment may be entered in accordance with the Rule 56
standard.” Howard Town Ctr. Dev., LLC v. Howard Univ., 267 F. Supp. 3d 229, 236 (D.D.C.
2017) (cleaned up).
10 III. ARGUMENT
A. Statutory Background
The Privacy Act aims to “protect the privacy of individuals identified in information
systems maintained by Federal agencies.” Pub. L. No. 93–579, § 2(a)(5), 88 Stat. 1896, 1896
(1974). To achieve this goal, “[t]he Act gives agencies detailed instructions for managing their
records and provides for various sorts of civil relief to individuals aggrieved by failures on the
Government’s part to comply with the requirements.” Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 618 (2004).
Congress has essentially given individuals the power “to participate in ensuring that [their
federal agency] records are accurate and properly used.” Bartel v. FAA, 725 F.2d 1403, 1407
(D.C. Cir. 1984).
“The [Privacy] Act attempts to strike a balance between an individual’s interest in
correcting inaccurate information and the burdens placed on agencies in locating such
information.” McCready v. Nicholson, 465 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2006). And “[t]o do so, it
imposes a series of substantive and procedural obligations on federal agencies regarding records
they maintain while simultaneously limiting what records are subject to the Act.” Id.
Plaintiff originally sued under numerous provisions of the Act, but now pursues his suit
only under 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g). See Dkt. 112 at 2. To prevail under this subsection, Plaintiff
must prove that: “(1) the disclosed information is a record contained within a system of records;
(2) the agency improperly disclosed the information; (3) the disclosure was willful or intentional;
and (4) the disclosure adversely affected the plaintiff.” Reed v. Dep’t of Navy, 910 F. Supp. 2d
32, 40 (D.D.C. 2012) (cleaned up). “The burden of proof” on each of the four required elements
“lies with the plaintiff.” Doe v. Dep’t of Just., 660 F. Supp. 2d 31, 44 (D.D.C. 2009).
11 A disclosure is not improper if it falls within any of the exceptions in § 552a(b). 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(b)(1)-(12). Relevant here, agencies can disclose on a need to know basis, see id.
§ 552a(b)(1), and “for a routine use,” id. § 552a(b)(3).
B. Major Wong’s Disclosure Fell Within the “Need to Know” § 552a(b) Exception.
Plaintiff’s claim that the Privacy Act applies flatlines on two unassailable points: (1) the
Air Force and Army are subagencies of the Department of Defense; and (2) a medical center
needs to know if an employee doctor has been found to have assaulted a patient, and was
recommended for discharge. And, rather sensibly, the Privacy Act exempts intra-agency
disclosure to employees who need to know the information. See Bigelow v. Dep’t of Def., 217
F.3d 875, 877 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Though these two points should be self-evident, the Court
addresses each below.
First, Plaintiff claims that Maj. Wong made the disclosure between two agencies—the
Air Force and the Army. See Dkt. 106-1 at 28–31. But both are part of the Department of
Defense. See 10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(6). The Privacy Act contemplates that an executive
department, such as the Department of Defense, is an agency for purposes of its coverage. 5
U.S.C. § 552a(f)(1); cf. Bigelow, 217 F.3d at 877. Thus, Maj. Wong made her disclosure within
an agency and therefore, is exempt from the Act.
Second, Plaintiff argues that Womack Medical did not need to know of the Board’s
conclusions because neither his actions nor the Board’s findings indicated any concern for
patient safety. See Dkt. 106-1 at 36. That contention borders on the absurd. The ORANG
Office of Complex Investigations found that SSgt. Mosebach’s report of sexual assault was
“substantiated based on a preponderance of the evidence.” Dkt. 89-8 at 1. Based on that finding,
Quality Assurance at ORANG was concerned that the “issue could have had (or could potentially
12 have) adverse effects on patient safety and healthcare delivery.” Dkt. 106-2 at 245. The
ORANG Discharge Board found that Plaintiff had been “derelict in the performance of his duties
in…negligently fail[ing] to refrain from conducting a genital exam” on SSgt. Mosebach. Dkt.
89-7 at 1. And the Peer Review Panel “agreed that this case did not suggest a simple breach of
Standard of Care.” Id. In fact, “[d]ue to the unethical nature of the allegation and concern for
patient safety, the Panel was unable to recommend a reasonable level of restriction which would
allow . . . [Plaintiff] to continue practicing medicine within a [Guard Medical Unit] of the Air
Force.” Dkt. 89-9 at 1. Thus, “there was no recommendation to provide other than revocation of
[Plaintiff’s] clinical privileges.” Id. The Oregon Medical Board ultimately revoked Plaintiff’s
medical license.
Plaintiff’s response is to ignore all of these findings and make three specious arguments.
First, Plaintiff claims that he was not found to have committed “medical malpractice” and so the
Army did not need to know about the investigations. Dkt. 106-1 at 37. But conduct need not
rise to the level of medical malpractice to present a patient safety issue. And, in any event, the
Peer Review Panel found that, at a minimum, he had acted negligently. Dkt. 89-9 at 1. Second,
he argues that, because ORANG terminated its clinical adverse action against Defendant, clearly
no patient safety concern existed. Dkt. 110 at 7. But by Plaintiff’s own admission, ORANG
terminated the process “because the Air Force determined that this process shouldn’t have been
used with a[n] Air National Guard facility.” Tr. (Feb. 27, 2024) at 43. The termination did not
reflect the charges against him. Finally, Plaintiff argues that Womack Medical did not need to
know about the discharge proceedings because at the time of the disclosure, Plaintiff was a
civilian. Id. at 42. But patient safety issue does not cease to be a patient safety issue because
Plaintiff acts in his civilian, rather than his military, capacity.
13 C. Major Wong Did Not Intend to Violate the Privacy Act
The Privacy Act is not a strict liability, or even negligence, statute. Albright v. United
States, 732 F.2d 181, 189 (D.C. Cir.1984). The Act “imposes liability only when the agency acts
in violation of the Act in a willful or intentional manner, either by committing the act without
grounds for believing it to be lawful, or by flagrantly disregarding others’ rights under the Act.”
Id.
Maj. Wong has submitted an unrebutted declaration stating her intent. Dkt. 89-10. She
says she made the disclosure “to inform another branch of the Department of Defense that one of
their providers had been accused of performing an unauthorized pap smear, which is a patient
safety issue.” Dkt. 89-10 at 4. She believed that this information “was commonly shared
between medical facilities in order to protect patients from potentially unsafe providers.” Id.
Maj. Wong also hoped that sharing the information would help the Department avoid liability if
Plaintiff engaged in further misconduct. Dkt. 89-10 at 3. This is hardly “so patently egregious
and unlawful that anyone undertaking the conduct should have known it unlawful.” Laningham
v. U.S. Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (cleaned up).
Plaintiff asserts only that Maj. Wong willfully and intentionally violated the Act in
making the disclosure because, as an attorney, she was “generally aware of the Privacy Act prior
to her disclosure of Plaintiff’s records” and because “Defendant present[ed] no evidence that
[Maj.] Wong conducted any analysis to ensure that her disclosure was legal under the Act.” Dkt.
110 at 10–11 (emphasis in original). This argument both seeks to shift the burden to Defendant
to disprove a violation of the Act, and, even if accepted, at most would show that Maj. Wong
negligently violated the Act. The Act does not countenance either approach. See Maydak v.
United States, 630 F.3d 166, 180 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
14 D. The Disclosure Did Not Cause Plaintiff’s Injuries.
Plaintiff’s actions, not Maj. Wong’s disclosure, led to his being fired. To no surprise,
Plaintiff does not provide evidence to support causation, which his claim requires. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(g)(4); Chao, 540 U.S. at 619. He does not show that Maj. Wong’s disclosure was the
proximate cause of his injury, see Dickson v. Off. of Pers. Mgmt., 828 F.2d 32, 37 (D.C. Cir.
1987), nor that it “was a substantial factor in the sequence of events leading to Plaintiff’s
injuries,” In re U.S. Off. of Pers. Mgmt. Data Breach Litig., 928 F.3d 42, 67 (D.C. Cir. 2019)
(cleaned up). Instead, the sequence of events establishes that Womack Medical fired Plaintiff
because Oregon had issued a notice that it planned to revoke his medical license.
Plaintiff’s supervisor, the Chief of the Department of Anesthesia at Womack Medical,
informed Plaintiff that Womack Medical was discharging him “because the Oregon State
Medical Board issued a Complaint and Notice of Proposed Disciplinary Action.” Dkt. 89-13
at 1. The Medical Board issued the complaint on February 26, 2016, and Plaintiff’s supervisor
informed him of his discharge on March 17, 2016. Dkt. 112 at 2. Indeed, these events occurred
after Maj. Wong’s February 5 phone call. Dkt. 89-13 at 1. But Plaintiff provides no evidence to
rebut the stated reason for his discharge. Notably, Womack Medical did not discharge Plaintiff
immediately upon learning of the disclosure but did do so soon after learning of the Medical
Board’s actions. The Medical Board ultimately did revoke Plaintiff’s license on June 28, 2018.
Dkt. 112 at 2.
In any event, Womack Medical would have learned of the ORANG Discharge Board’s
findings even absent the disclosure. The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 requires
federal agencies to report “final adverse actions” against health care providers to a National
Practitioner Data Bank. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7e(b)(1). The Chief of Air Force Medical
15 Agency Operational Quality, in a signed and unrebutted declaration, stated that the “adverse
action would have been a reportable event to the National Practitioner’s Data Bank.” Dkt. 112-1
at 2. Maj. Wong also highlighted that “[t]he discharge action itself is a mandatory report under
federal law to the National Practitioner’s Databank and something that Ft Bragg would have
learned about the next time [Plaintiff] was up for a renewal of his privileges.” Dkt. 89-17 at 2.
And Drumm, Chief of Credentials and Privileges at Womack Medical and one of the individuals
to whom Maj. Wong made the disclosure, agreed that the findings “probably would have hit . . .
the database.” Dkt. 112-2 at 4.
IV. CONCLUSION
There is a victim in all that occurred, but it was not the Plaintiff. His Privacy Act claim is
without any merit whatsoever and the Court hereby:
GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. 89;
DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. 106;
DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration, Dkt. 121;
DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint, Dkt. 1, and this case without prejudice; and
DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to close this case.
SO ORDERED.
This is a final appealable Order. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a).
Date: October 15, 2025 _________________________ ANA C. REYES United States District Judge