Murphy v. Children's Hospital Colorado

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: January 8, 2026
• Docket: 25-1304
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 25-1304 Document: 26 Date Filed: 01/08/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT January 8, 2026 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court ALYSIA MURPHY,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. No. 25-1304 (D.C. No. 1:25-CV-02248-SKC-STV) CHILDREN’S HOSPITAL COLORADO, (D. Colo.) LORA BYRNE; AMY ROSS; NILES ACKERSON,

Defendants - Appellees. _________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________

Before CARSON, BALDOCK, and KELLY, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

Appellees (collectively, “the Hospital”) move to dismiss this appeal as moot.

Appellant Alysia Murphy opposes. We will grant the motion.

The parties are familiar with the unfortunate circumstances leading to this

proceeding. We recount only the minimum background necessary to provide context

for our decision.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined *

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 25-1304 Document: 26 Date Filed: 01/08/2026 Page: 2

Murphy’s minor son became a patient at the Hospital after suffering a severe

brain injury. Disputes arose between Murphy and the Hospital, leading to restrictions

on Murphy’s ability to visit her son. Murphy sued the Hospital in federal court. She

moved for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a preliminary injunction against

the visitation restrictions. She also moved to compel the Hospital to transfer her son

to another facility. The district court denied a TRO and denied the transfer motion.

On August 7, 2025, Murphy brought this appeal, arguing that the district court

erroneously denied her motions. She further argued that this court has jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), which allows us to review a district court’s

interlocutory orders “granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving

injunctions.” But the question of this court’s statutory jurisdiction was soon

overtaken by events calling into question this court’s constitutional jurisdiction, or in

other words, whether there still exists a “Case[]” or “Controvers[y]” to adjudicate.

See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Specifically, on August 21, the Hospital performed

brain-death testing and concluded Murphy’s son was indeed brain-dead. The

Hospital accordingly informed Murphy it would soon withdraw life support from her

son. Murphy unsuccessfully sought relief from that plan in state court. The Hospital

withdrew life support, with Murphy at her son’s side, on September 20. His heart

stopped beating soon after and his body was released to the coroner.

The Hospital argues this appeal is now moot because this court can no longer

grant the relief Murphy seeks, i.e., an order requiring the Hospital to allow her to

visit her son and to transfer her son to a different facility. See United States v. 2 Appellate Case: 25-1304 Document: 26 Date Filed: 01/08/2026 Page: 3

Carter, 995 F.3d 1222, 1232 (10th Cir. 2021) (“Under Article III, a continuing case-

or-controversy exists only if the parties retain a personal stake in the outcome

throughout the litigation, including appellate review. The matter otherwise becomes

moot when it is impossible to grant any effectual relief.” (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted)). Murphy counters that the appeal is not moot for

numerous reasons. Many of these reasons overlap, and we conclude they all fall into

three categories, which we address in turn.

First, Murphy argues she still has claims against the Hospital for nominal

damages, compensatory damages, attorneys’ fees, costs, and declaratory judgment,

based on the Hospital’s alleged interference with her parental rights before her son’s

death. But these claims do not prevent this appeal from becoming moot because

issues of monetary compensation and declaratory judgment are not before us. Those

issues remain to be decided by the district court, assuming Murphy has properly

raised them there.

Second, Murphy argues it would be bad policy to treat this appeal as moot

because the Hospital brought about the mootness through its own actions, thus

destroying this court’s jurisdiction. We do not wish to minimize the gravity of the

events that took place, but the Hospital’s decision to withdraw life support did not

violate any order from this court or the district court. Cf. United States v. United

Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 294 (1947) (noting that contempt proceedings

may go forward for violating a court order “though the basic action has become

3 Appellate Case: 25-1304 Document: 26 Date Filed: 01/08/2026 Page: 4

moot”). Thus, as far as this court is concerned, the Hospital was allowed to act as it

did, even if those actions mooted this controversy.

Third, Murphy argues this dispute should not be deemed moot because it is

capable of repetition but will evade review. See Fleming v. Gutierrez, 785 F.3d 442,

445 (10th Cir. 2015) (discussing “the exception to mootness for conduct capable of

repetition yet evading review”). But this exception requires “a reasonable

expectation that the same complaining party will be subjected to the same action

again.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Nothing in the record suggests a

reasonable expectation that Murphy will endure the same circumstances again. The

exception therefore does not apply.

Finally, Murphy says, “If [this court] concludes mootness exists, it must vacate

the lower court’s judgment to prevent [the Hospital] from benefitting from its

strategic conduct.” Aplt. Opp’n to Aplee. Mot. to Dismiss Appeal as Moot at 11

(emphasis removed). In support, she cites United States v. Munsingwear, Inc.,

340 U.S. 36 (1950). Munsingwear says that if a case becomes moot on appeal, the

appellate court should “vacate the judgment below and remand with a direction to

dismiss.” Id. at 39. Such a procedure, the Court said, “clears the path for future

relitigation of the issues between the parties and eliminates a judgment, review of

which was prevented through happenstance.” Id. at 40.

This appeal does not present a Munsingwear situation. As used in

Munsingwear, “judgment” means a judgment with collateral estoppel effect. See id.

at 38 (discussing the collateral estoppel standard); see also Okla. Radio Assocs. v. 4 Appellate Case: 25-1304 Document: 26 Date Filed: 01/08/2026 Page: 5

FDIC, 3 F.3d 1436, 1437 (10th Cir. 1993) (noting “the rationale of vacatur as

explained in Munsingwear, i.e., to protect against future preclusive collateral

estoppel effects on the parties to litigation” (emphasis removed)). Only a final

judgment has collateral estoppel effect. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443

(1970) (“‘Collateral estoppel’ . . . means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact

has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be

litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.”). No such judgment is at

issue in this appeal. The district court merely denied a TRO and denied the transfer

motion. Moreover, its denials were based on Murphy’s failure to support her

arguments, not based on an evaluation of the underlying merits. We therefore deny

the vacatur request.

For all these reasons, we grant the Hospital’s motion and dismiss this appeal.

Entered for the Court

Bobby R. Baldock Circuit Judge