Murphy v. Brookshire Grocery Co.
This text of 832 So. 2d 1157 (Murphy v. Brookshire Grocery Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Pam MURPHY
v.
BROOKSHIRE GROCERY COMPANY.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
*1159 Glynn Shelly Maturin, II, Esq., Galloway & Jeffcoat, Lafayette, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellee, Pam Murphy.
Charles J. Foret, Briney & Foret, Lafayette, LA, for Defendant/Appellant, Brookshire Grocery Company.
Court composed of HENRY L. YELVERTON, OSWALD A. DECUIR, and ELIZABETH A. PICKETT, Judges.
YELVERTON, Judge.
Brookshire Grocery Company appeals a workers' compensation judgment claiming that the trial court erred in finding that Pam Murphy did not violate Louisiana Revised Statute 23:1208 and in finding that she suffered a work-related accident. We find no error, and affirm.
FACTS
Murphy went to work for Brookshire at the Super 1 grocery store in Lafayette in August 1998 as a cashier. On April 10, 2001, she was helping out in the bakery department because someone was on sick leave. She was the closing person and was in the process of cleaning the area. She picked up a cookie cutting machine and placed it in the dishwasher. As she did, she felt something pull and burn in her neck.
She told David Boudreaux, the grocery manager, about the incident. Murphy then went on break. Murphy explained that she thought she had pulled a muscle and that the pain would get better, but it only got worse as the days went by. She finally saw Dr. Richard Feucht on April 23, 2001, after she aggravated the problem by pulling on a bag of dog food while checking out a customer. Her last day to work was May 23, 2001, when an MRI revealed that she had a herniated disc, so she was placed on light-duty status. The store did not have a position for her that was light-duty at the time.
Initially, Murphy received workers' compensation benefits, but Brookshire terminated these benefits in July 2001, after approximately eight weeks. Murphy then filed the present claim. The trial court found that Murphy proved that she suffered a work-related accident, and that as a result, she was entitled to temporary, total disability benefits and reasonable and necessary medical expenses.
SECTION 1208 VIOLATION
Brookshire first argues that the trial court erred in finding that Murphy did not violate Louisiana Revised Statute 23:1208 which provides in pertinent part:
A. It shall be unlawful for any person for the purpose of obtaining or defeating any benefit or payment under the provisions of this Chapter, either for himself or for any other person, to willfully make a false statement or representation.
*1160 ....
E. Any employee violating this Section shall, upon determination by workers' compensation judge, forfeit any right to compensation benefits under this Chapter.
"The only requirements for forfeiture of benefits under Section 1208 are that (1) there is a false statement or representation, (2) it is willfully made, and (3) it is made for the purpose of obtaining or defeating any benefit or payment." Resweber v. Haroil Const. Co., 94-2708, p. 7 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 7, 12. "The issue of whether an employee forfeited his workers' compensation benefits by willfully making false statements in order to obtain benefits is one of fact, which is not to be reversed on appeal absent manifest error." Bibbins v. Sonny's Pizza, Inc., 01-1524, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/21/02), 822 So.2d 79, 82.
Brookshire alleges that Murphy lied on two separate occasions when she gave a deposition about the events surrounding a 1997 vehicular accident. It claims that she lied when she denied being hurt in the vehicular accident and when she stated that she never hurt her neck before. Although the workers' compensation judge did not specifically rule on the when a judgment is silent as to an issue, forfeiture issue, it is well established that a when a judgment is silent as to an issue, the issue is considered rejected. Baker Hughes, Inc. v. Ardoin, 99-1217, 99-1218 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/2/00), 758 So.2d 830, writ granted in part on other grounds and denied in part, 00-681 (La.4/20/00), 759 So.2d 771. This is especially true since the judgment was in Murphy's favor. Therefore, we will review the evidence to determine whether the workers' compensation judge was clearly wrong in finding that Murphy did not forfeit her right to benefits.
Murphy never denied that she was involved in a vehicular accident in 1997. However, she did state that she never injured her neck before. Medical records indicate that Murphy went to the hospital after the wreck complaining of neck and back pain. Furthermore, a suit filed on behalf of Murphy for the accident demanded damages for injuries.
When asked at trial to explain her denial, Murphy testified that she did not think that a whiplash was an injury. The record reveals that Murphy was very forthcoming about the fact that she was in an accident and never tried to conceal this fact. While it appears that Murphy may have had a neck problem following the wreck, there is no evidence in the record to indicate that these problems continued past a few months after the accident. It is understandable that Murphy perceived that a whiplash would not qualify as the type of injury that the attorney was asking her about. As can be seen from her testimony in this case, she also thought that the neck problems from the present incident would resolve and were not serious. We do not find that the workers' compensation judge was clearly wrong in finding that Murphy's answers were not willful, but probably more in the line of a misunderstanding as to whether whiplash would qualify as an injury. Furthermore, the workers' compensation judge found Murphy to be a credible witness which we will explain further in the next section.
ACCIDENT
Brookshire alleges that even if we do not find that Murphy forfeited her right to receive benefits, that the workers' compensation judge erred when she found *1161 that Murphy sustained a work-related accident despite the substantial evidence which cast serious doubt upon her version of events.
Proof of an accident must be by preponderance of the evidence, and a claimant's testimony alone may be sufficient to discharge this burden, provided two elements are satisfied. First, no other evidence must discredit or cast serious doubt upon the claimant's version of the incident, and second, his testimony must be corroborated by circumstances following the alleged incident. Bruno v. Harbert Intern.., Inc., 593 So.2d 357 (La. 1992); Honeycutt v. Elbert Walker Construction, 01-1291 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/6/02); 815 So.2d 1011. Corroboration of the claimant's testimony may be provided by the testimony of co-workers, spouses, friends, or by medical evidence. Bruno, 593 So.2d 357. Barring circumstances that cast suspicion on the reliability of the claimant's uncontradicted testimony, the trial court should accept the testimony as true when determining whether he has discharged his burden. Id; Honeycutt, 815 So.2d 1011. These determinations are factual in nature and will not be disturbed unless clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous. Id.
Tate v. Cabot Corp., 01-1652, pp. 9-10 (La.App. 3 Cir. 7/3/02), 824 So.2d 456, 463.
Brookshire claims that the medical evidence casts serious doubt upon Murphy's version of what occurred, buttressed by the fact that her credibility is at issue. Brookshire speculates that the reason for this finding is that the workers' compensation judge did not review the medical evidence.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
832 So. 2d 1157, 2002 La.App. 3 Cir. 0808, 2002 La. App. LEXIS 3753, 2002 WL 31759891, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/murphy-v-brookshire-grocery-co-lactapp-2002.