Murillo v. Texas a & M University System

921 F. Supp. 443, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4219, 1996 WL 161834
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Texas
DecidedJanuary 18, 1996
DocketL-93-111
StatusPublished

This text of 921 F. Supp. 443 (Murillo v. Texas a & M University System) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Murillo v. Texas a & M University System, 921 F. Supp. 443, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4219, 1996 WL 161834 (S.D. Tex. 1996).

Opinion

AGREED CLASS ACTION CONSENT DECREE

KAZEN, District Judge.

Pending before the Court is the parties’ Joint Motion for Class Certification, for Approval of Class Action Settlement and for entry of Agreed Class Action Consent Decree (Dckt. No. 35). Plaintiff Murillo filed this class action suit alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (“AWPA”), the Federal Insurance Contribution Act (“FICA”), the Civil Rights Act under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Texas Revised Civil Statutes under Article 695h. After many months of negotiations over the details of the settlement, the parties request the entry of the Agreed Class Action Consent Decree for the purpose of settling the claims at issue in this lawsuit.

BACKGROUND

On August 10, 1993, Berene Murillo, on behalf of herself and all other similarly situated persons, filed this lawsuit against the Texas A & M University System and Dr. Edward A. Hiler, Director of the Agricultural Experiment Station. Plaintiff Murillo is an agricultural worker from West Texas who worked for the Defendants at the Agrieultur *445 al Experiment Station in Halfway, Hale County, Texas.

Plaintiff alleges that she and several hundred other farmworkers were misclassified as independent contractors by Defendants. Plaintiff claims that Defendants’ misclassification of agricultural employees as independent contractors led to violations of the FLSA, the AWPA, the FICA, the Civil Rights Act under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Texas Revised Civil Statutes under Article 695h. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that Defendants failed to pay the federally mandated minimum wage, the social security excise tax, and a special social security tax benefit entitlement that is afforded exclusively to Texas state employees. Plaintiff Murillo filed this class action suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act for unpaid wages, liquidated damages, and injunctive and declaratory relief on behalf of all similarly situated agricultural workers.

Four months after this action was filed, Defendants and Plaintiff reached a settlement and requested the Court to stay the litigation (Dckt. No. 21). In the ensuing months, the parties negotiated the details of the settlement and sought the cooperation of the Internal Revenue Service to correct the farmworkers’ tax problems. On June 26, 1995, the parties informed the Court that they had settled all of the class members’ claims and moved for approval of a class settlement notice (Dckt. No. 34). The Court approved the class notice on June 30, 1995. The class notice was publicized for ninety (90) days, and the notice period ended on November 12, 1995. The parties’ joint motion for class certification, for approval of class-action settlement and for entry of agreed class action consent decree is now properly before the Court.

DISCUSSION

Settlements in class action suits are encouraged and favored. Court approval of settlements, however, is not a perfunctory function. District courts have a duty to determine whether the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204, 1208-09 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 828, 103 S.Ct. 63, 74 L.Ed.2d 65 (1982). Although approval of a settlement is discretionary with the court, it is advisable for district courts to make findings showing that it considered the diverse interests and the factors necessary for a determination that the proposed settlement is fair and adequate. See e.g., McNary v. Am. Sav. and Loan Ass’n, 76 F.R.D. 644 (N.D.Tex.1977).

In deciding whether a settlement is fair and reasonable, the court does not decide the merits of the case. Parker, 667 F.2d at 1209. Rather, the court determines the fairness and adequacy of the settlement by considering the following factors: “(1) whether the settlement was a product of fraud or collusion; (2) the complexity, expense, and likely duration of the litigation; (3) the stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed; (4) the factual and legal obstacles prevailing on the merits; (5) the possible range of recovery and the certainty of damages; and (6) the respective opinions of the participants, including class counsel, class representative, and the absent class members.” Id.

There is an initial presumption of fairness when a proposed class settlement was negotiated at arm’s length by counsel for the class. 2 Alba Conte, Newberg on Class Actions § 11.41 (3rd ed. June 1995). This presumption is established if the court finds the following: the settlement was arrived at by arm’s length bargaining, there was sufficient discovery informing the parties and the court of the issues, counsel for the parties are experienced in similar litigation, and the number of objectors is not large compared to the class size. “This initial presumption must then withstand the test of plaintiffs likelihood of success.” Id. The burden of proving the fairness and adequacy of a settlement essentially consists in providing the court with sufficient background information which would enable it to evaluate the merits of the plaintiffs claims. McNary, 76 F.R.D. at 648-49.

It appears that the presumption of fairness has been established in this case. The parties diligently began negotiating after the suit was filed. On November 24, *446 1993, an agreement was reached to settle Plaintiffs claims. Thereafter, the parties negotiated the details of the settlement and sought the cooperation of the Internal Revenue Service to correct the class members’ social security tax problems. After “lengthy meetings, a video conference, and numerous telephone conferences with opposing counsel,” the parties finalized the class settlement. Plf.’s First Class Report at 8 (Dckt. No. 38). Class members were given notice of the proposed settlement pursuant to the Court’s June 30, 1995 Order (Dckt. No. 36), and had ninety (90) days to file objections to the settlement or to “opt out” from the class. Plaintiffs counsel reports that many individuals visited or telephoned their offices to inform themselves about their rights under the settlement. At the end of the class notice period, no one objected to the settlement and only one person, Ms. Maria Solis Lopez, exercised her right to “opt out” of the class.

Plaintiffs counsel states that Ms. Murillo, the class representative, has authorized the proposed settlement. Moreover, counsel for Ms. Murillo and Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc. staff members report that they have personally consulted with a number of class members who visited or called the Texas Rural Legal Aid office. According to counsel, these class members are also satisfied with the settlement. Plf.’s First Class Report at 6 (Dckt. No. 29).

Under the settlement, the class members will receive a generous amount of damages for the labor law violations allegedly perpetrated by Defendants.

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Related

McNary v. American Savings & Loan Ass'n
76 F.R.D. 644 (N.D. Texas, 1977)
Parker v. Anderson
667 F.2d 1204 (Fifth Circuit, 1982)

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Bluebook (online)
921 F. Supp. 443, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4219, 1996 WL 161834, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/murillo-v-texas-a-m-university-system-txsd-1996.