Mullis v. Dobbs

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Missouri
DecidedDecember 21, 2022
Docket1:22-cv-00135
StatusUnknown

This text of Mullis v. Dobbs (Mullis v. Dobbs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mullis v. Dobbs, (E.D. Mo. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION

MASON GAGE MULLIS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. 1:22-cv-00135-SNLJ ) MARK DOBBS, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER This matter comes before the Court on the motion of plaintiff Mason Gage Mullis for leave to commence this civil action without prepayment of the required filing fee. (Docket No. 2). Having reviewed the motion and the financial information submitted in support, the Court has determined that plaintiff lacks sufficient funds to pay the entire filing fee, and will assess an initial partial filing fee of $1.00. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Additionally, for the reasons discussed below, the Court will order plaintiff to file an amended complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil action in forma pauperis is required to pay the full amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in his or her prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the prisoner’s account, or (2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner’s account for the prior six-month period. After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s account. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these monthly payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the prisoner’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is fully paid. Id. Plaintiff has not submitted an inmate account statement as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). Instead, he has sent the Court what appears to be a computer printout of his account

transactions. (Docket No. 4). While this includes a “personal balance,” it does not actually provide the amount of each transaction or the opening balance of the account, meaning that there is not enough information for the Court to properly assess an initial partial filing fee. Nevertheless, having reviewed the information contained in the motion, the Court will require plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $1.00. See Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 484 (8th Cir. 1997) (explaining that when a prisoner is unable to provide the court with a certified copy of his inmate account statement, the court should assess an amount “that is reasonable, based on whatever information the court has about the prisoner’s finances”). If plaintiff is unable to pay the initial partial filing fee, he must submit a copy of his inmate account statement in support of his claim. Legal Standard on Initial Review

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief, which is more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679. The court must “accept as true the facts alleged, but not legal conclusions or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir. 2016). See also Brown v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 372-73 (8th Cir. 2016) (stating that court must accept factual allegations in complaint as true, but is not required to “accept as true any legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).

When reviewing a pro se complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must give it the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A “liberal construction” means that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, the district court should construe the plaintiff’s complaint in a way that permits his or her claim to be considered within the proper legal framework. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015). However, even pro se complaints are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980). See also Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating that federal courts are not required to “assume facts that are not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger complaint”). In addition, affording a pro se complaint the benefit of a liberal construction does not

mean that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation must be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993). The Complaint Plaintiff is a self-represented litigant who is currently incarcerated at the Eastern Reception, Diagnostic and Correctional Center (ERDCC) in Bonne Terre, Missouri. He states that he is a convicted and sentenced state prisoner, though at the time relevant to the complaint, he was a pretrial detainee. (Docket No. 1 at 3-4). Plaintiff brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, naming Sheriff Mark Dobbs, Jail Administrator Mike Jones, Jail Administrator Dave Light, Judge Thomas Swindle, Prosecutor Casey Proctor, Attorney James Keen, Correctional Officer (CO) Samuel Unknown, and CO Francisco Vega as defendants. (Docket No. 1 at 1-2). Sheriff Dobbs and Jail Administrator Light are sued in their individual capacities only. (Docket No. 1 at 3-4). Plaintiff does not indicate the capacity in which the other defendants are sued. The complaint contains allegations that plaintiff was wrongfully held at the ERDCC while still a pretrial detainee.

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Related

Haines v. Kerner
404 U.S. 519 (Supreme Court, 1972)
McNeil v. United States
508 U.S. 106 (Supreme Court, 1993)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Reynolds v. Dormire
636 F.3d 976 (Eighth Circuit, 2011)
Martin v. Aubuchon
623 F.2d 1282 (Eighth Circuit, 1980)
Madewell v. Roberts
909 F.2d 1203 (Eighth Circuit, 1990)
Mayorga v. Missouri
442 F.3d 1128 (Eighth Circuit, 2006)
Kevin Ward v. Bradley Smith
721 F.3d 940 (Eighth Circuit, 2013)
Samvel Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
760 F.3d 843 (Eighth Circuit, 2014)
James Solomon v. Deputy U.S. Marshal Thomas
795 F.3d 777 (Eighth Circuit, 2015)
Pratt v. Corrections Corp. of America
124 F. App'x 465 (Eighth Circuit, 2005)
Raymond L. Brown v. Green Tree Servicing LLC
820 F.3d 371 (Eighth Circuit, 2016)
Barton Ex Rel. Estate of Barton v. Taber
820 F.3d 958 (Eighth Circuit, 2016)

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Bluebook (online)
Mullis v. Dobbs, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mullis-v-dobbs-moed-2022.