Mullins v. Berryhill

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Virginia
DecidedMarch 24, 2020
Docket2:18-cv-00017
StatusUnknown

This text of Mullins v. Berryhill (Mullins v. Berryhill) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mullins v. Berryhill, (W.D. Va. 2020).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA BIG STONE GAP DIVISION

TRACEY N. MULLINS, ) Plaintiff ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 2:18cv00017 ) ANDREW SAUL,1 ) MEMORANDUM OPINION Commissioner of ) Social Security, ) Defendant ) BY: PAMELA MEADE SARGENT ) United States Magistrate Judge

I. Background and Standard of Review

Plaintiff, Tracey N. Mullins, (“Mullins”), filed this action challenging the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, (“Commissioner”), denying his claims for disability insurance benefits, (“DIB”), and supplemental security income, (“SSI”), under the Social Security Act, as amended, (“Act”), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 423 and 1381 et seq. (West 2011, West 2012 & Supp. 2019). Jurisdiction of this court is pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). This case is before the undersigned magistrate judge upon transfer by consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). Neither party has requested oral argument; therefore, this case is ripe for decision.

The court’s review in this case is limited to determining if the factual findings of the Commissioner are supported by substantial evidence and were reached through application of the correct legal standards. See Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d

1 Andrew Saul became the Commissioner of Social Security on June 17, 2019; therefore, he is automatically substituted for Nancy A. Berryhill as the defendant in this case. 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987). Substantial evidence has been defined as “evidence which a reasoning mind would accept as sufficient to support a particular conclusion. It consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance.” Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966). ‘“If there is evidence to justify a refusal to direct a verdict were the case before a jury, then there is “substantial evidence.’”” Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting Laws, 368 F.2d at 642).

The record shows that Mullins protectively filed applications for DIB and SSI on February 19, 2013, alleging disability as of February 11, 2012, based on shoulder problems; back problems; hypothyroidism; sleep apnea; arthritis; and anxiety.2 (Record, (“R.”), at 13, 359-60, 363-66, 383.) The claims were denied initially and upon reconsideration. (R. at 221-23, 228-30, 234, 237-39, 241-46, 248-50.) Mullins then requested a hearing before an administrative law judge, (“ALJ”). (R. at 251- 52.) A hearing was held on September 9, 2016, followed by a supplemental hearing on January 20, 2017, at both of which Mullins was represented by counsel. (R. at 51-92.)3

By decision dated April 19, 2017, the ALJ denied Mullins’s claims.4 (R. at

2 Mullins protectively filed a prior application for DIB on May 15, 2009, alleging disability as of March 27, 2009. (R. at 122.) This claim was denied initially and on reconsideration. (R. at 122.) An ALJ rendered an unfavorable decision on July 28, 2011, and the Appeals Council denied Mullins’s request for review. (R. at 122-32, 379.) Mullins did not appeal to this court. (R. at 379.)

3 After the initial hearing, the ALJ sent out medical interrogatories for an “independent look at the case.” (R. at 53.) After that, Mullins’s counsel requested a supplemental hearing.

4 The ALJ found a closed period of disability from February 11, 2012, through February 28, 2013. However, he found Mullins was not disabled for the period from March 1, 2013, through the date of his decision. Interestingly, although Mullins alleged disability beginning February 11, 2012, the ALJ also addressed the period from July 29, 2011, the day following the date of the prior ALJ’s decision, through February 10, 2012, the day before the ALJ found Mullins to be disabled. 13-43.) The ALJ found that Mullins met the nondisability insured status requirements of the Act for DIB purposes through December 31, 2014. (R. at 17.) The ALJ also found that Mullins had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date. (R. at 17.) The ALJ found that, beginning March 1, 2013, the medical evidence established that Mullins suffered from the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease; coronary artery disease; history of right shoulder replacement; hypertension; hypothyroidism; obesity; depression; anxiety; thoracic and lumbar spine fractures with subsequent surgery; and drug-induced psychotic disorder, in remission after February 2013. (R. at 17-18, 34.) The ALJ found that, beginning March 1, 2013, Mullins did not have an impairment or combination of impairments listed at or medically equal to one listed at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (R. at 34.) The ALJ found that, as of March 1, 2013, Mullins had the residual functional capacity to perform simple, unskilled sedentary work5 that required no more than occasional pushing/pulling with the upper extremities or overhead reaching with the right arm; no more than occasional kneeling, crawling, crouching, stooping, balancing or climbing; no more than occasional exposure to temperature extremes, humidity and vibrations; no exposure to hazards; and he needed access to a restroom on regularly scheduled breaks. (R. at 35.) The ALJ found that Mullins was unable to perform his past relevant work during this time period, but other jobs existed in significant numbers in the national economy that he could perform, including jobs as an assembler, an addressing clerk

On appeal to this court, Mullins challenges only the period from March 1, 2013, through April 19, 2017, the date of the ALJ’s partially favorable decision. That being the case, only the ALJ’s findings that are relevant to this period will be included in this opinion.

5 Sedentary work involves lifting items weighing up to 10 pounds at a time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers and small tools. Although a sedentary job is defined as one which involves sitting, a certain amount of standing or walking are required occasionally and other sedentary criteria are met. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a), 416.967(a) (2019). and a weight tester. (R. at 31-32, 42.) Thus, the ALJ found that, after February 28, 2013, Mullins was not under a disability as defined under the Act and was not eligible for DIB or SSI benefits. (R. at 42.) See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g) (2019).

After the ALJ issued his decision, Mullins pursued his administrative appeals, (R. at 354), but the Appeals Council denied his request for review. (R. at 1-5.) Mullins then filed this action seeking review of the ALJ’s unfavorable decision, which now stands as the Commissioner’s final decision. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481 (2019). The case is before this court on Mullins’s motion for summary judgment filed January 22, 2019, and the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment filed February 12, 2019.

II. Facts6

Mullins was born in 1968, (R.

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Mullins v. Berryhill, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mullins-v-berryhill-vawd-2020.