Mukherjee v. May-Ying Chu

217 F. App'x 971
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
DecidedFebruary 15, 2007
Docket2006-1450; Interference 105, 281
StatusUnpublished

This text of 217 F. App'x 971 (Mukherjee v. May-Ying Chu) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mukherjee v. May-Ying Chu, 217 F. App'x 971 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

Opinion

MICHEL, Chief Judge.

Shyama Mukherjee and Terje A. Skotheim (collectively “Mukherjee”) appeal the decision of the United States Patent and Trademark Office Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (“Board”) holding Mukherjee’s claims in Interference No. 105,281 unpatentable for failure to comply with the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

May-Ying Chu, Lutgard C. De Jonghe, Steven J. Visco, and Bruce D. Katz (collectively “Chu”) are the inventors named in U.S. Patent No. 6,030,720 (“the '720 patent”) directed to liquid electrolyte lithium-sulfur batteries. U.S. Patent No. 6,030,-720 (filed Oct. 10, 1997) (issued Feb. 29, 2000). On February 27, 2001, Mukherjee filed U.S. Patent Application No. 09/795,-915 directed to rechargeable lithium-sulfur batteries and entitled “Novel Composite Cathodes, Electrochemical Cells Comprising Novel Composite Cathodes, and Processes for Fabricating Same.” U.S. Patent Application No. 09/795,915 (filed February 27, 2001) (published May 9, 2002) (“Mukherjee application”).

*973 In lithium-sulfur batteries, the anode (i.e., negative electrode) usually contains lithium metal; the cathode (i.e., positive electrode) usually contains sulfur; and the electrolyte allows charged ions to migrate between the anode and cathode. The Mukherjee application discloses that in addition to sulfur, the cathodes contain an Electroactive Transition Metal Chalcogenide 1 (“ETMC”) composition. As defined in the Mukherjee application, ETMC is “an electroactive material having a reversible lithium insertion ability, wherein the transition metal is at least one selected from the group consisting of Ti, Y, Cr, Mn, Fe, Nb, Mo, Ta, W, Co, Ni, Cu, Y, Zr, Ru, Rh, Pd, Hf, Re, Os, and Ir, and the chalcogenide is at least one selected from the group consisting of O, S, and Se.” Mukherjee application at 19.

Along with his February 27, 2001 application, Mukherjee filed a preliminary amendment which, inter alia, added claims 94-100 for the purpose of provoking an interference with the '720 patent. On April 13, 2005, Administrative Patent Judge (“APJ”) James T. Moore (of the Board) declared Interference No. 105,281 between the Mukherjee application and the '720 patent, designating Mukherjee as the senior party and Chu as the junior party. Chu v. Mukherjee, No. 105,281 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 13, 2005) (“Patent Interference Decision”). The sole count of the interference was either claim 94 of the Mukherjee application or claim 41 of the '720 patent. Patent Interference Decision at 4. Claim 94 of the Mukherjee application reads:

94. A battery cell comprising:

(a) an anode comprising a metal or an ion of a metal;
(b) a cathode comprising a mixture of:
(i) an electroehemically active material comprising sulfur in the form of at least one of elemental sulfur, a sulfide of the metal, and a polysulfide of the metal; and
(ii) an electronically conductive material; and
(c) a liquid electrolyte comprising a solvent for at least some discharge products of said cathode,
wherein the battery cell is characterized by a separation distance between a back boundary where the liquid electrolyte is farthest removed from said anode and a front boundary where the liquid electrolyte is nearest said anode, wherein the separation distance is about 125 micrometers.

Patent Interference Decision at 4 n. 2. Noticeably absent from claim 94 is any requirement that the cathode contain an ETMC. APJ Moore designated claims 94— 96, 98, 100, and 101 2 of the Mukherjee application (“Mukherjee’s involved claims”) and claims 28-49 of the '720 patent as claims corresponding to the interference count. Patent Interference Decision at 4. None of Mukherjee’s involved claims recites that the cathode contains an ETMC composition.

Mukherjee and Chu filed a number of preliminary motions as part of the interference proceeding. Chu moved for a judgment that Mukherjee’s involved claims were unpatentable for failure to comply with the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 3 (“Chu’s Motion *974 4”), arguing that because the involved claims do not recite ETMC as part of the cathode component of a battery cell, the claims are broader than the specification on which they are based. On April 7, 2006, the Board granted Chu’s Motion 4, holding that one of skill in the art would have understood from a reading of the disclosure as a whole that Mukherjee’s invention was limited to battery cells with cathodes that contain an ETMC composition. Chu v. Mukherjee, No. 105,281 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 7, 2006) (“Board Decision”). Accordingly, the Board entered final judgment against Mukherjee and dismissed the remaining preliminary motions as moot. Mukherjee filed a timely appeal based on 35 U.S.C. § 141. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A).

II. DISCUSSION

Our review of the Board’s decision is limited by statute. Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706, we must affirm the Board’s “action, findings, and conclusion” unless they are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law ... [or] are unsupported by substantial evidence.” See also Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 152, 119 S.Ct. 1816, 144 L.Ed.2d 143, (1999) (holding that 5 U.S.C. § 706 governs our review of findings of fact made by the Patent and Trademark Office). Written description is a question of fact, judged from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art as of the relevant filing date, which we review in this appeal for substantial evidence. 5 U.S.C. § 706; Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-64 (Fed.Cir.1991). Substantial evidence is evidence “a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” In re Zurko, 258 F.3d 1379, 1384 (Fed.Cir.2001) (internal citations omitted).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Dickinson v. Zurko
527 U.S. 150 (Supreme Court, 1999)
Dr. Raymond G. Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc.
156 F.3d 1154 (Federal Circuit, 1998)
In re Zurko
258 F.3d 1379 (Federal Circuit, 2001)
Velander v. Garner
348 F.3d 1359 (Federal Circuit, 2003)
Dickinson v. Zurko
527 U.S. 150 (Supreme Court, 1999)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
217 F. App'x 971, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mukherjee-v-may-ying-chu-cafc-2007.