Muhammed Ruhel Miah v. Pamela Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: March 9, 2026
• Docket: 17-72150
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED MAR 9 2026 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MUHAMMED RUHEL MIAH, No. 17-72150 18-70264 Petitioner, Agency No. A206-676-202 v.

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General, MEMORANDUM*

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted March 2, 2026** Seattle, Washington

Before: PAEZ, BEA, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.

Petitioner Muhammed Ruhel Miah (“Ruhel Miah”), a native and citizen of

Bangladesh, petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)

decision dismissing his appeal of an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision, which

denied his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under

the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Ruhel Miah also seeks review of a

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision decision of the BIA denying his motion to reconsider and motion to reopen based

on his later taking a polygraph examination to refute the IJ’s adverse credibility

determination. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Where “the BIA cites

Matter of Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872, 874 (BIA 1994), and also provides its

own review of the evidence and law, we review both the IJ’s and the BIA’s

decisions.” Ruiz-Colmenares v. Garland, 25 F.4th 742, 748 (9th Cir. 2022)

(citation modified). “We review factual findings, including adverse credibility

decisions, under the deferential substantial evidence standard.” Zhi v. Holder, 751

F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 2014). We review BIA decisions on a motion to

reconsider a final order of removal for abuse of discretion. Lona v. Barr, 958 F.3d

1225, 1229 (9th Cir. 2020). We review BIA decisions on a motion to reopen for

abuse of discretion. Rodriguez-Lariz v. INS, 282 F.3d 1218, 1222 (9th Cir. 2002).

We deny the petition.

1. Ruhel Miah forfeited review of the Agency’s alternative merits-based

denial of relief, based on the BIA’s adoption of the IJ decision, that Ruhel Miah

did not qualify for asylum or withholding of removal because he lacked a well-

founded fear of future persecution. Ruhel Miah also forfeited review of the

Agency’s denial of his application for CAT protection. Ruhel Miah’s opening

brief claims only that “he presented sufficient evidence of eligibility” for asylum,

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

2 withholding of removal, and CAT protection. Hernandez v. Garland, 47 F.4th

908, 916 (9th Cir. 2022) (as amended) (citation modified) (court need not address

issue mentioned in a single sentence of the opening brief without any coherent

development of the argument); Velasquez-Gaspar v. Barr, 976 F.3d 1062, 1065

(9th Cir. 2020) (same).

2. For similar reasons, Ruhel Miah likely forfeited review of the Agency’s

denial of asylum and withholding relief on adverse credibility grounds because his

opening brief argues only that “the discrepancies were minor and did not go to the

heart of Mr. Ruhel’s claims.” Even if we considered this argument, substantial

evidence supports the adverse credibility determination based on the substantive

discrepancies between Ruhel Miah’s testimony and declaration and material

omissions of significant details in his written declaration. The record does not

compel a contrary conclusion, which is dispositive of Ruhel Miah’s claims.

3. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Ruhel Miah’s motion to

reconsider because his motion simply repeated his prior argument that the Agency

erred in its credibility determination because the discrepancies in his testimony

were minor without identifying how the BIA committed error. 8 C.F.R.

§ 1003.2(b)(1); see Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 558 (9th Cir. 2004) (“A

petitioner’s motion to reconsider must identify a legal or factual error in the BIA’s

prior decision.”). Nor did the BIA abuse its discretion in denying his motion to

3 reopen for consideration of polygraph evidence because “polygraph evidence

cannot serve as the basis for reopening under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c).” Goel v.

Gonzales, 490 F.3d 735, 739 (9th Cir. 2007).

4. Ruhel Miah’s argument that the immigration court lacked jurisdiction,

pursuant to Pereira v. Sessions, 585 U.S. 198 (2018), because the notice to appear

lacked the time and location of the hearing is foreclosed by our decision in United

States v. Bastide-Hernandez, 39 F.4th 1187, 1188 (9th Cir. 2022) (en banc)

(holding “that the failure of an NTA to include time and date information does not

deprive the immigration court of subject matter jurisdiction”). As happened in this

case, the “filing of an undated NTA that is subsequently supplemented with a

notice of hearing fully complies with the requirements of [8 C.F.R. § 1003.14]”

and does not deprive the immigration court of jurisdiction. Id. at 1193.

PETITION DENIED.