UDALL, Justice.
The instant matter is before this Court on appeal from the Superior Court judgment entered in favor of the appellee City of Phoenix Board of Adjustment, hereinafter referred to as Board. The appellants are a large group of residents and property owners in the Rancho Solano area of north Phoenix whose properties lie in the immediate general vicinity of the subject property, Arizona Ranch House Inn.
This matter reached the Superior Court on a petition for writ of certiorari wherein the appellants were petitioners. That petition challenged the involved order of the respondent Board as having been rendered in excess of its jurisdiction. The final order of that court held that the Board had acted within its jurisdiction and had not abused its discretion. Thus the lower court affirmed the decisions of the Board and dismissed the appellants’ petition.
The pertinent facts are as follows: the Arizona Ranch House Inn was a large old residence on North Central Avenue in Phoenix. The owners then began using the premises during the winter months as [578]*578a guest home.' The 'facility at that time had. less than twenty units. 'Also, meals were-served to guests in a dining • room with a capacity of approximately forty. The. facilities were then expanded to include nearly twice the original number of apartment units and a dining room capacity for one hundred and fifty. At this time beer and wine were also served on the premises.
In April of 1959 this area was annexed to the City of Phoenix. Following the annexation the city zoned the entire area R-l (single-family residential). The Arizona Ranch House Inn from the time of, the annexation and zoning has occupied a status of nonconforming use in the R-l area. Since that time there have been numerous hearings before city boards concerning the property with respect to expansion' of these nonconforming uses and the propriety of certain allegedly “accessory” uses.- In addition there was also a hearing, for a liquor license to serve spirituous liquors on the premises, held by the State Superintendent of Liquor Licenses and Control. While it appears that each such application before a city board was contested no lawsuit was filed during this time to review the actions of these city boards or of the State Superintendent of Liquor Control.
Thus gradually the character of the Arizona Ranch House Inn evolved from that of a residence to a guest house and finally to a restaurant-nightclub-apartment facility where live entertainment, patio parties, increased noise, lights and billboard advertising were much in evidence.
On February 15, 1962 the Phoenix City Building Inspector by letter notified the Arizona Ranch House Inn that, “ * * * the use of a public bar and providing live, entertainment on the Ranch House prop-, erty is in violation of the zoning ordinances.” The Phoenix Mayor on February 21, 1962 by letter also stated that the subject property was in violation of the zoning ordinances with respect to a public bar and live entertainment. With the validity of such uses thus 'at issue the circumstances were drastically changed by a fire which occurred on the premises of the subject property in August of 1962, destroying a major portion of the facilities.
This .matter arises from the efforts of the ownership of the Arizona Ranch House Inn to reconstruct the premises after the fire. Pursuant to this intent an application was made to the Building Inspections Department of the City of Phoenix for the building permits necessary for the-planned reconstruction. The application was denied by the Building Inspector because under the Phoenix zoning ordinances the reconstruction of the nonconforming-use required a use permit from one of the Phoenix Adjustment Boards. An-appeal of the denial was made to the Board.At the hearings conducted pursuant to the application the appellants appeared in opposition.
■ The Board conducted several hearings on this particular application and entered its decision and order granting the' use permit for reconstruction of the nonconforming use in accordance with the plan and design submitted by the applicant subject to seven stipulations contained in the' order. It appears that the order was a compromise determination allowing the, applicant to rebuild and yet restricting the. future use in order to placate the opposing neighbors.
The appellants contend that the Board exceeded its jurisdiction in a number of ways and that the Superior Court judgment was erroneous in affirming the Board determination. The contention in general is that the Board by its action sanctioned activity which, in effect, constitutes a complete rezoning of the subject property. That the only legal way in which the subject property could be put to the contested-, uses would be through a rezoning of the subject premises to a commercial category, such requiring a legislative act on the part of the Phoenix City Council. Therefore that if the Board’s action is allowed to stand the zoning ordinances designed to protect residents and property owners in [579]*579the enjoyment of their rights becomes utterly meaningless and of no force and effect.
Specifically the appellants contend that the Board had no jurisdiction to grant a use permit without making a finding that the use covered by the permit would not be detrimental to the persons residing or working in the vicinity, to adjacent property, to the neighborhood or to the public welfare in general. Appellants contend there was no evidence to sustain such a finding. In searching the record we have found that several local property owners stated they felt that the complained of use would not depreciate their property or be detrimental to it. Specifically, one stated that she felt the rebuilding should not be opposed, that as far as the character of the neighborhood as an environment for her children she felt that it would not hurt or benefit them to have the building there. Another person who spoke stated that he and his brother who lived across the street from the Ranch House Inn had never been disturbed by anything on the subject premises and that they certainly were in favor of the reconstruction. Finally, another local resident said the only fault he saw with the area was that the building had burned down and not been reconstructed, feeling that the area should be built up. Further, one of the two neighbors who spoke in opposition stated that this g'roup had not objected to the original operation but only now had objections to certain types of uses with particular regard to outside entertainment and use and the type of entertainment. In addition, the Board had before it the plans for the proposed reconstruction.
A Board cannot create jurisdiction by finding a fact upon which its jurisdiction depends without evidence in support thereof. Gibbons v. Finley, 77 Ariz. 391, 272 P.2d 610. Thus the sufficiency of evidence is properly reviewable on certiorari in determining whether jurisdictional facts were proved. Hunt v. Norton, 68 Ariz. 1, 198 P.2d 124, 5 A.L.R.2d 668. So while this Court may not weigh the-evidence introduced below on which a decision is based in order to determine the correctness of the decision reached it will consider such evidence in so far as it may, tend to show jurisdiction or lack thereof to render the decision questioned by the certiorari decision. Civil Service Commission of City of Tucson v. Foley, 75 Ariz. 364, 257 P.2d 384.
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UDALL, Justice.
The instant matter is before this Court on appeal from the Superior Court judgment entered in favor of the appellee City of Phoenix Board of Adjustment, hereinafter referred to as Board. The appellants are a large group of residents and property owners in the Rancho Solano area of north Phoenix whose properties lie in the immediate general vicinity of the subject property, Arizona Ranch House Inn.
This matter reached the Superior Court on a petition for writ of certiorari wherein the appellants were petitioners. That petition challenged the involved order of the respondent Board as having been rendered in excess of its jurisdiction. The final order of that court held that the Board had acted within its jurisdiction and had not abused its discretion. Thus the lower court affirmed the decisions of the Board and dismissed the appellants’ petition.
The pertinent facts are as follows: the Arizona Ranch House Inn was a large old residence on North Central Avenue in Phoenix. The owners then began using the premises during the winter months as [578]*578a guest home.' The 'facility at that time had. less than twenty units. 'Also, meals were-served to guests in a dining • room with a capacity of approximately forty. The. facilities were then expanded to include nearly twice the original number of apartment units and a dining room capacity for one hundred and fifty. At this time beer and wine were also served on the premises.
In April of 1959 this area was annexed to the City of Phoenix. Following the annexation the city zoned the entire area R-l (single-family residential). The Arizona Ranch House Inn from the time of, the annexation and zoning has occupied a status of nonconforming use in the R-l area. Since that time there have been numerous hearings before city boards concerning the property with respect to expansion' of these nonconforming uses and the propriety of certain allegedly “accessory” uses.- In addition there was also a hearing, for a liquor license to serve spirituous liquors on the premises, held by the State Superintendent of Liquor Licenses and Control. While it appears that each such application before a city board was contested no lawsuit was filed during this time to review the actions of these city boards or of the State Superintendent of Liquor Control.
Thus gradually the character of the Arizona Ranch House Inn evolved from that of a residence to a guest house and finally to a restaurant-nightclub-apartment facility where live entertainment, patio parties, increased noise, lights and billboard advertising were much in evidence.
On February 15, 1962 the Phoenix City Building Inspector by letter notified the Arizona Ranch House Inn that, “ * * * the use of a public bar and providing live, entertainment on the Ranch House prop-, erty is in violation of the zoning ordinances.” The Phoenix Mayor on February 21, 1962 by letter also stated that the subject property was in violation of the zoning ordinances with respect to a public bar and live entertainment. With the validity of such uses thus 'at issue the circumstances were drastically changed by a fire which occurred on the premises of the subject property in August of 1962, destroying a major portion of the facilities.
This .matter arises from the efforts of the ownership of the Arizona Ranch House Inn to reconstruct the premises after the fire. Pursuant to this intent an application was made to the Building Inspections Department of the City of Phoenix for the building permits necessary for the-planned reconstruction. The application was denied by the Building Inspector because under the Phoenix zoning ordinances the reconstruction of the nonconforming-use required a use permit from one of the Phoenix Adjustment Boards. An-appeal of the denial was made to the Board.At the hearings conducted pursuant to the application the appellants appeared in opposition.
■ The Board conducted several hearings on this particular application and entered its decision and order granting the' use permit for reconstruction of the nonconforming use in accordance with the plan and design submitted by the applicant subject to seven stipulations contained in the' order. It appears that the order was a compromise determination allowing the, applicant to rebuild and yet restricting the. future use in order to placate the opposing neighbors.
The appellants contend that the Board exceeded its jurisdiction in a number of ways and that the Superior Court judgment was erroneous in affirming the Board determination. The contention in general is that the Board by its action sanctioned activity which, in effect, constitutes a complete rezoning of the subject property. That the only legal way in which the subject property could be put to the contested-, uses would be through a rezoning of the subject premises to a commercial category, such requiring a legislative act on the part of the Phoenix City Council. Therefore that if the Board’s action is allowed to stand the zoning ordinances designed to protect residents and property owners in [579]*579the enjoyment of their rights becomes utterly meaningless and of no force and effect.
Specifically the appellants contend that the Board had no jurisdiction to grant a use permit without making a finding that the use covered by the permit would not be detrimental to the persons residing or working in the vicinity, to adjacent property, to the neighborhood or to the public welfare in general. Appellants contend there was no evidence to sustain such a finding. In searching the record we have found that several local property owners stated they felt that the complained of use would not depreciate their property or be detrimental to it. Specifically, one stated that she felt the rebuilding should not be opposed, that as far as the character of the neighborhood as an environment for her children she felt that it would not hurt or benefit them to have the building there. Another person who spoke stated that he and his brother who lived across the street from the Ranch House Inn had never been disturbed by anything on the subject premises and that they certainly were in favor of the reconstruction. Finally, another local resident said the only fault he saw with the area was that the building had burned down and not been reconstructed, feeling that the area should be built up. Further, one of the two neighbors who spoke in opposition stated that this g'roup had not objected to the original operation but only now had objections to certain types of uses with particular regard to outside entertainment and use and the type of entertainment. In addition, the Board had before it the plans for the proposed reconstruction.
A Board cannot create jurisdiction by finding a fact upon which its jurisdiction depends without evidence in support thereof. Gibbons v. Finley, 77 Ariz. 391, 272 P.2d 610. Thus the sufficiency of evidence is properly reviewable on certiorari in determining whether jurisdictional facts were proved. Hunt v. Norton, 68 Ariz. 1, 198 P.2d 124, 5 A.L.R.2d 668. So while this Court may not weigh the-evidence introduced below on which a decision is based in order to determine the correctness of the decision reached it will consider such evidence in so far as it may, tend to show jurisdiction or lack thereof to render the decision questioned by the certiorari decision. Civil Service Commission of City of Tucson v. Foley, 75 Ariz. 364, 257 P.2d 384.
In the instant matter we find there was sufficient evidence to support the necessary jurisdictional finding that the use covered by the permit would not be detrimental to the persons residing or working in the .vicinity, to adjacent property, to the neighborhood or to the public welfare in general. Such is our determination in light of the circumstance of the presentation of divergent views by groups of neighbors, the qualified objections by the opposition neighbors who apparently took exception only to certain variations within a use category and the presence before the Board of the plans of the proposed reconstruction.
Next the appellants contend- that the lower court erred in- its judgment finding that the Board acted within its jurisdiction for the reason that the Board had no jurisdiction to grant a permit without making a finding that the use covered by the permit, the manner of conducting the same and any building involved will be in full conformity to any conditions, requirements or standards prescribed therefor by the Phoenix City Zoning Ordinance, § 109(b) 3.
The cited portion of the Phoenix City Code reads in pertinent part as follows:
“3. To hear applications for and to grant those special exceptions designated as use permits where required by this ordinance upon a finding by the board hearing, the application that the use covered by the permit, the manner of conducting the same, and any building which is involved will not be detrimental to persons residing or working in the vicinity, to adjacent property, to the neighborhood or the public welfare in general, and that the same will be in full conformity to any [580]*580conditions, requirements or standards prescribed therefor by this ordinance or pursuant thereto.” § 109(b).
This Code section provides that the Board make a finding of fact. The Board in its final hearing of this cause ordered the granting of the requested permit based upon the
“ * * * testimony and documentary evidence presented to this Board that the use permit requested for the reconstruction of the nonconforming use and the proposed manner of conducting the Arizona Ranch House Inn after reconstruction, as proposed, will not be detrimental to persons residing or working in the vicinity, to adjacent property, to the neighborhood, or the public welfare in general, and that therefore the use permit for reconstruction of the nonconforming úse be granted, the use permit, however, subject to each and every one of the following stipulations * * * ”
The stipulations provided in effect that: the signs would be limited to specified standards; there could be no outside serving of food or drink; there should be no loud-speakers outside, nor music or dancing; dancing be permitted with bands and vocalists connected with such bands, but that no featured stars or entertainment be otherwise permitted; there be no excessive exterior lights as to be incompatible with the surrounding residential area; there could be no activities in and around the pool area except for those activities normally associated with swimming; and that alcoholic beverage be served only in the dining room, lounge and banquet rooms as designated on the proposed plans; that reconstruction be in substantial compliance with the plans submitted by the applicant, that no alcoholic beverages be served in any area other than those previously designated and that there be no public bar.
To contend that because the Board did not state verbatim in its finding “that the same will be in full conformity to any conditions, requirements or standards prescribed therefor by this ordinance or pursuant thereto” such order is invalid, seems an unwarranted position in light of the Board determination. The order of the Board did not just grant permission for the reconstruction. Its order specified that the reconstruction and the use of the reconstructed premises would be subject to the above-stated stipulations. These stipulations show that the Board completely an-alysed the opposition’s complaints, the legal implications and possible future conflicts over the use of the subject premises. Clearly any violation of the Board’s order is something that may or may not take place in the future. In this matter the Board made its determination of the validity of the contested use and in so doing specified the limits of the use in all of the areas of known conflict. Thus we are obliged to find the Board, in effect, made its necessary determination that the use, the manner of conducting same and any building involved would be in full conformity to the conditions, requirements or standards prescribed by the Phoenix Zoning Ordinance.
The appellants next contend that it is clear from § 106(a) 5 of the Phoenix Zoning Ordinance that any nonconforming use which is damaged or destroyed may be restored or reconstructed subject to a use permit but only for the same use which existed on the subject property prior to the damage. That here a use permit was granted which authorized the construction of a larger structure and the conversion of residential units and offices into night-club and banquet areas contrary to what appellants contend constitutes a positive limitation on the Board in granting a use permit.
It was the position of the applicant Ranch House Inn before the Board, that,
“The total proposed reconstructed building external measurements would be 10,878 square feet as opposed to the 12,954 which Mr. Salome have had by 100% expansion, and as opposed to the 11,684 that was originally on the premises.”
This position was controverted in part by the appellants. But it is apparent that prior [581]*581to the hearings in this matter the Ranch House Inn had at one time requested an expansion permit. Said permit was granted authorizing a 100% expansion of the use under § 106(a) 1 which states:
“A nonconforming use may be expanded subject to use permit within the confines of the lot or parcel of land upon which it is located at the time of enactment or amendment of this ordinance, provided, however, that the expansions shall not exceed an area equal to one hundred (100%) of the land area and/or building area being used for said nonconforming use at the time of enactment or amendment of this ordinance.”
Further, no appeal of this expansion was taken by the opponents when it was granted several years prior to these hearings.
There is of course a presumption of validity in favor of the Board’s determination and one who attacks such decision is met with the presumption that it is correct and carries the burden of showing the decision to be against the weight of the evidence, unreasonable, erroneous, or illegal as a matter of law. Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning, Chap. 65, p. 27. We must conclude in reviewing this matter that the Board had sufficient evidence to sustain a determination that no expansion was at issue because of the original size of the facility. Thus we find against appellants even without reaching the question of the effect of the previous expansion permit in light of the reconstruction.
The next issue raised is whether the Board had the authority to allow the reconstruction of a nonconforming use which appellants contend was illegal. In order to determine whether the proposed reconstruction was allowable it must be decided if the reconstructed use would be within the realm of the valid, nonconforming uses that existed and any other accessory uses that might be incident thereto.
The Phoenix Zoning Ordinance G-449, Chap. II defines an accessory use as:
“Accessory use. A subordinate use of a building, other structure, or use of land;
a. which is clearly incidental to the use of the main building, other structure or use of land, and
b. which is customary in connection with the main building, other structure, or use of land, and
c. which is located on the same zoned lot with the main building, other structure, or use of land.”
We feel that some amount of latitude must be allowed a nonconforming use for reasonable expansion and the maintenance of accessory uses. In this matter what uses had been or were on the property, or could, be expected on the property were matters of fact for the Board to determine. We cannot say as a matter of law that the nightclub-restaurant-apartment facility involved here could not be determined by the Board to be a reasonable and lawful expansion of the original nonconforming use, or that the objectionable nightclub use could not be held a valid accessory use to the otherwise' unobjectionable nonconforming use.
The policy choice of whether to allow the reconstruction of the premises, is not before us. It is our concern only to determine whether the lower court was correct in sustaining the jurisdiction of the Board. Thus the court,
“ * * * will not substitute its judgment for that of the board, even where the question is faulty, debatable and one in which the court would have reached a different conclusion had it been the original arbitor of the issues raised by the application.” Rathkopf, supra, Chap. 51, p. 1.
The most this Court may do with this matter is to determine if the trial court had grounds to sustain the Board’s order. Thus it is not our place to weigh the evidence or to consider the probative force of conflicting testimony. To be justified in affirming the Board’s order, aside from the previously discussed jurisdictional issues, the lower court must have found some evidence [582]*582which will support the Board’s determination. Walker v. Dunham, 78 Ariz. 419, 281 P.2d 125; Hunt v. Norton, supra; Batty v. Arizona State Dental Board, 57 Ariz. 239, 112 P.2d 870. With the records of years of prior hearings, the opposing descriptions of past and proposed future uses on the subject premises, the plans for the proposed reconstruction, the testimony as to the effect on the .neighborhood and its own concern for zoning development of the city we feel the Board had sufficient evidence at its disposal to allow it to make a fair and reasonable determination of the merits of the application for reconstruction permission. Thus we find that the Board’s determination was correctly sustained by the lower court inasmuch as the evidence presented to the Board was capable of supporting a determination that the pre-fire use of the subject premises could legally be reinstituted subject to the provided-for stipulations.
. Appellants contend that the Board by providing for the reconstruction of the premises and containing therein a specific authorization for signs to be placed upon the premises in compliance with the standards specified for the C-l (commercial) district under the Zoning Ordinance exceeded its defined jurisdiction. We considered this contention with appellants’ next point wherein it is alleged that the Board exceeded its authority in recognizing and permitting the continuous use of a No. 6 liquor license activity on the premises.
The basis for appellants’ objection to the sign provision in the Board’s order is that there appear to have been no commercial signs on the subject property prior to the date of annexation and thus appellants contend this sign cannot be recognized under any facet of the nonconforming use. As to the No. 6 liquor license appellants point out that the subject property did not at the time of annexation enjoy such a license, that under R-l zoning the dispensing of hard liquor is not allowed aside from uses which may be nonconforming uses having had such status prior to annexation and thus the subject property was erroneously authorized to continue the dispensing' of hard liquors in violation of the zoning- provisions.
The discussion of accessory uses stated above is pertinent in determining the validity of both the sign and hard liquor dispensing issues. The business sign is an integral part of a business. It would seem an extreme position to allow a business as a nonconforming use in a residential section and yet to say as a matter of law that since no sign existed at the time of annexation such business would not be allowed a sign to identify its location or advertise its wares. We hold this is not the law and further we note that appellants have not shown us any authority to this effect. Thus while the Board in allowing such signs should be cognizant of the effects that such may have on the area we must conclude that providing for these signs is not an act beyond the authority of the Board.
The Arizona Ranch House Inn served beer and wine before the time of annexation. Several years ago the proprietors of this property sought and obtained a hard liquor license. No persons made objection to the granting of this license or sought to avoid its use through legal remedies. Instead the appellants have now sought to disallow the use of this hard liquor license by convincing the Board and the courts that such is not encompassed in the nonconforming use. We find that the Board had the power, under the facts of this case, to allow any use which can validly be found accessory to the original nonconforming use. We conclude that the hard liquor license as a change from a beer-wine license was not such a radical change as to be found outside the scope of being accessory and thus we find the Board’s authority properly exercised.
The appellants next raise the issue of the propriety of the hearings held in this matter in light of the fact that portions of the hearings were conducted in secret sessions closed to the public. Such action appellants contend should invalidate the ulti[583]*583mate order of the Board. We do not agree. The record of the hearings shows that the ■ obj écted-to secret sessions were a recess' and a deliberating session amongst the members of the Board with no other persons ■ present. The many hearings conducted in this matter were open to the public, there was ample opportunity for interested persons to present any and all evidence and argument and the final action of the Board ■ was adopted at an open hearing with all parties present. Thus appellants’ position that the Board’s action should be voided cannot be sustained.
Appellants’ final contention relates to the action of the Superior Court in dealing with appellants’ notice of appeal, super-sedeas bond and its own order staying further proceedings by the Board.
On March 11, 1964 the Superior Court made its minute entry with findings ordering that the Board determination be affirmed and the petition for certiorari be dismissed. Motion to vacate same was made and denied. At this time the Board was in session relative to the issuance of the final building permits. Appellants then filed their notice of appeal and supersedeas bond. The court then entered its order staying any future hearings pending disposition of the matter on appeal. The Board moved to vacate such order and to dismiss the notice of appeal. Appellants appeared and argued that the lower court had lost jurisdiction of the matter. The Board contended that the court had wrongfully entered a stay order when there had been no supersedeas bond properly filed and/or no proper entry of judgment. The lower court felt there had in fact been no entry of judgment nor proper filing and acceptance of bond and that the court had not as yet lost jurisdiction and therefore it proceeded. Thus the lower court issued an order dismissing the notice of appeal and revoking its order staying the proceedings. Appellants then refiled their notice of appeal and again posted bond that the matter be brought before this Court. The appellants did not seek to sustain their original notice of appeal and bond or the stay order which the lower court had at one point granted. Instead they immediately refiled their notice and again posted bond. Therefore this matter is before us on the latter notice of appeal. As a consequence the question offered as to the lower court’s treatment of the first notice of appeal, supersedeas bond and its stay order has become moot.
A question is moot if it seeks to determine an abstract problem which does not arise upon existing facts or rights. Such is the case with the issue at hand. Thus we find ourselves compelled to follow ■ the general rule that an appellate court need not decide moot questions or abstract propositions. Southwest Engineering Co. v. Ernst, 79 Ariz. 403, 291 P.2d 764; State ex rel. Sullivan v. Patterson, 64 Ariz. 40, 165 P.2d 309; State ex rel. Brawner v. Kerby, 32 Ariz. 118, 256 P. 113; Harrison v. Hunt, 28 Ariz. 75, 235 P. 158; Mesa Mail Pub. Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 26 Ariz. 521, 227 P. 572; Francis Construction Co. v. Pima County, 1 Ariz.App. 429, 403 P.2d 934. Therefore we decline to consider the. merits of this particular issue.
Judgment of the lower court affirmed.
BERNSTEIN, C. J., McFARLAND, V. C. J., and LOCKWOOD, J., concur.