Mrs. Patsy Ruth White v. Dallas Independent School District

Fifth Circuit

Mrs. Patsy Ruth White v. Dallas Independent School District

566 F.2d 906, 45 A.L.R. Fed. 338, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 12890, 15 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 8072, 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 739

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

DecidedJanuary 26, 1978

Docket76-1990

StatusPublished

Cited by6 cases

This text of 566 F.2d 906 (Mrs. Patsy Ruth White v. Dallas Independent School District) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Mrs. Patsy Ruth White v. Dallas Independent School District, 566 F.2d 906, 45 A.L.R. Fed. 338, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 12890, 15 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 8072, 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 739 (5th Cir. 1978).

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Opinions

COLEMAN, Circuit Judge.

In this suit Mrs. Patsy Ruth White alleged that the former maternity leave policy of the Dallas Independent School District had subjected her to unlawful sex discrimination.¹ The District Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Although Mrs. White argued below that jurisdiction existed on many grounds, her appeal is restricted to claims for relief under Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e, and Section 1983, 42 U.S.C.A. We affirm the dismissal.

The Title VII cause of action was dismissed because Mrs. White had failed to exhaust her Texas state remedies as required by the federal statute, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(c), (f). Before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) can sue or issue a right to sue letter to a charging party, it must comply with the requirements of deferral to state established mechanisms for eliminating discrimination. Such a deferral is initiated by the charging party filing a written statement with, or by the EEOC transmitting a copy of, the charge to the appropriate state officer or agency. Love v. Pullman, 404 Ú.S. 522, 92 S.Ct. 616, 30 L.Ed.2d 679 (1972). No deferral is involved if the state has no law prohibiting the discrimination in question. The section requiring deferral to the state and outlining the requirements for the states’ laws reads in part:

In the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring in a State, or political subdivision of a State, which has a State or local law prohibiting the unlawful employment practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a State or local authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, no charge may be filed under subsection (b) of this section by the person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State or local law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated . . . . (Emphasis added.)

[908]*90842 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(c). Thus, if a state has a law meeting the requirements of § 2000e-5(c), consideration of a discrimination charge by EEOC must be stayed for sixty days to allow the state authority time to act.

The Texas legislature enacted Article 6252-16,² Vernon’s Ann. Texas St., to provide relief from discrimination by officials or “employees of the state or its political subdivisions”. The statute prohibits the type of discrimination claimed by White and provides civil relief and criminal sanctions against those who do so discriminate. The language of the Texas statute was “chosen to take advantage of the deferral provision” of Title VII in certain instances. Nueces County Hosp. Dist. v. E. E. O. C., 5 Cir. 1975, 518 F.2d 895, 897.

In Nueces County, id., we addressed the issue of whether the EEOC must defer investigation of a charge to state officials for the requisite time when the charge claims that an employer, there a Hospital District, had retaliated against the charging party because of her efforts to be relieved from employment discrimination. We held that Article 6252-16 failed to meet Title VII’s requirements for deferral in that instance because the statute was “narrowly drawn to cover specific acts of discrimination, and it obviously does not prohibit an employer from retaliating for an employee’s attempts to be relieved from the consequences of the employer’s discrimination”. Id. at 897-898. Nueces County, was specifically limited to a retaliation charge. We did not address the broader question of whether a charge, alleging discrimination within the limits of the statute, must be filed with the state before the EEOC can investigate or the charging party can sue. Id. at 897, fn. 1.

Congress has seen fit to require claimants to go first to the state whenever a state has enacted legislation providing a remedy or authorizing criminal prosecution [909]*909for discrimination.³ We are of the opinion that the Texas statute meets this Title VII requirement for deferral. Before a charging party can be given authority to sue the state or one of its subdivisions, the proper local officials must be notified by either the EEOC or the aggrieved party. The first opportunity to act is to be afforded the state. Nueces County Hospital District v. E. E. O. C., 371 F.Supp. 1126 (S.D.Tex., 1974).

Mrs. White never pursued her remedies under Texas law and urges that notifying the proper officials would have been futile. Mrs. White’s argument overlooks the injunctive relief authorized under § 2 of the Texas act, which would seem to have been an ideal way to seek to prevent the enforcement of an unlawful maternity leave requirement, the impending effect of which can be easily predicted far enough in advance to make injunctive relief realistic. Even so, Title VII requires notifying the proper state official and allowing him sixty days to act in the criminal alternative permitted by the Act. The appellant also asserts that our decision should be controlled by General Insurance Company v. E. E. O. C., 9 Cir., 1974, 491 F.2d 133. In General Insurance, the Ninth Circuit held that a Washington state statute declaring wage discrimination illegal was not sufficient to require EEOC deferral to local prosecutors. Unlike the Washington statute, however, the Texas statute specifically addresses itself to Title VII notification and designates the local prosecutors as the recipients of the discrimination charges.

Therefore, the District Court did not err when it held that Mrs. White must first exhaust her state remedies in the criminal alternative permitted by the Act.

The appellant also asserts that the District Court had jurisdiction over her § 1983 claim. In Harkless v. Sweeney Independent School District, 5 Cir., 1970, 427 F.2d 319, 321, we held that “the school district, under Texas law, is of the nature of a municipality”. Municipalities are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983. City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 93 S.Ct. 2222, 37 L.Ed.2d 109 (1973); Cason v. City of Jacksonville, 5 Cir., 1974, 497 F.2d 949, 951. Thus, the District Court did not have jurisdiction over the cause of action under 42 U.S.C.A., § 1983.

Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court must be

AFFIRMED.

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COLEMAN, Circuit Judge.

In this suit Mrs. Patsy Ruth White alleged that the former maternity leave policy of the Dallas Independent School District had subjected her to unlawful sex discrimination.¹ The District Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Although Mrs. White argued below that jurisdiction existed on many grounds, her appeal is restricted to claims for relief under Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e, and Section 1983, 42 U.S.C.A. We affirm the dismissal.

The Title VII cause of action was dismissed because Mrs. White had failed to exhaust her Texas state remedies as required by the federal statute, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(c), (f). Before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) can sue or issue a right to sue letter to a charging party, it must comply with the requirements of deferral to state established mechanisms for eliminating discrimination. Such a deferral is initiated by the charging party filing a written statement with, or by the EEOC transmitting a copy of, the charge to the appropriate state officer or agency. Love v. Pullman, 404 Ú.S. 522, 92 S.Ct. 616, 30 L.Ed.2d 679 (1972). No deferral is involved if the state has no law prohibiting the discrimination in question. The section requiring deferral to the state and outlining the requirements for the states’ laws reads in part:

In the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring in a State, or political subdivision of a State, which has a State or local law prohibiting the unlawful employment practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a State or local authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, no charge may be filed under subsection (b) of this section by the person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State or local law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated . . . . (Emphasis added.)

[908]*90842 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(c). Thus, if a state has a law meeting the requirements of § 2000e-5(c), consideration of a discrimination charge by EEOC must be stayed for sixty days to allow the state authority time to act.

The Texas legislature enacted Article 6252-16,² Vernon’s Ann. Texas St., to provide relief from discrimination by officials or “employees of the state or its political subdivisions”. The statute prohibits the type of discrimination claimed by White and provides civil relief and criminal sanctions against those who do so discriminate. The language of the Texas statute was “chosen to take advantage of the deferral provision” of Title VII in certain instances. Nueces County Hosp. Dist. v. E. E. O. C., 5 Cir. 1975, 518 F.2d 895, 897.

In Nueces County, id., we addressed the issue of whether the EEOC must defer investigation of a charge to state officials for the requisite time when the charge claims that an employer, there a Hospital District, had retaliated against the charging party because of her efforts to be relieved from employment discrimination. We held that Article 6252-16 failed to meet Title VII’s requirements for deferral in that instance because the statute was “narrowly drawn to cover specific acts of discrimination, and it obviously does not prohibit an employer from retaliating for an employee’s attempts to be relieved from the consequences of the employer’s discrimination”. Id. at 897-898. Nueces County, was specifically limited to a retaliation charge. We did not address the broader question of whether a charge, alleging discrimination within the limits of the statute, must be filed with the state before the EEOC can investigate or the charging party can sue. Id. at 897, fn. 1.

Congress has seen fit to require claimants to go first to the state whenever a state has enacted legislation providing a remedy or authorizing criminal prosecution [909]*909for discrimination.³ We are of the opinion that the Texas statute meets this Title VII requirement for deferral. Before a charging party can be given authority to sue the state or one of its subdivisions, the proper local officials must be notified by either the EEOC or the aggrieved party. The first opportunity to act is to be afforded the state. Nueces County Hospital District v. E. E. O. C., 371 F.Supp. 1126 (S.D.Tex., 1974).

Mrs. White never pursued her remedies under Texas law and urges that notifying the proper officials would have been futile. Mrs. White’s argument overlooks the injunctive relief authorized under § 2 of the Texas act, which would seem to have been an ideal way to seek to prevent the enforcement of an unlawful maternity leave requirement, the impending effect of which can be easily predicted far enough in advance to make injunctive relief realistic. Even so, Title VII requires notifying the proper state official and allowing him sixty days to act in the criminal alternative permitted by the Act. The appellant also asserts that our decision should be controlled by General Insurance Company v. E. E. O. C., 9 Cir., 1974, 491 F.2d 133. In General Insurance, the Ninth Circuit held that a Washington state statute declaring wage discrimination illegal was not sufficient to require EEOC deferral to local prosecutors. Unlike the Washington statute, however, the Texas statute specifically addresses itself to Title VII notification and designates the local prosecutors as the recipients of the discrimination charges.

Therefore, the District Court did not err when it held that Mrs. White must first exhaust her state remedies in the criminal alternative permitted by the Act.

The appellant also asserts that the District Court had jurisdiction over her § 1983 claim. In Harkless v. Sweeney Independent School District, 5 Cir., 1970, 427 F.2d 319, 321, we held that “the school district, under Texas law, is of the nature of a municipality”. Municipalities are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983. City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 93 S.Ct. 2222, 37 L.Ed.2d 109 (1973); Cason v. City of Jacksonville, 5 Cir., 1974, 497 F.2d 949, 951. Thus, the District Court did not have jurisdiction over the cause of action under 42 U.S.C.A., § 1983.

Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court must be

AFFIRMED.

²

. Article 6252-16 Discrimination against persons because of race, religion, color, sex or national origin

Section 1. (a) No officer or employee of the state or of a political subdivision of the state, when acting or purporting to act in his official capacity, may:

(1) refuse to employ a person because of the person’s race, religion, color, sex, or national origin;

(2) discharge a person from employment because of the person’s race, religion, color, sex, or national origin;

(3) refuse to issue a license, permit, or certificate to a person because of the person’s race, religion, color, sex, or national origin;

(4) revoke or suspend the license, permit, or certificate of a person because of the person’s race, religion, color, sex, or national origin;

(5) refuse to permit a person to use facilities open to the public and owned, operated, or managed by or on behalf of the state or a political subdivision of the state, because of the person’s race, religion, color, sex, or national origin;

(6) refuse to permit a person to participate in a program owned, operated, or managed by or on behalf of the state or a political subdivision of the state, because of the person’s race, religion, color, sex, or national origin;

(7) refuse to grant a benefit to, or impose an unreasonable burden upon, a person because of the person’s race, religion, color, sex, or national origin;

(8) refuse to let a bid to a person because of the person’s race, religion, color, sex, or national origin.

Section 2. Whenever a person has engaged, or there are reasonable grounds to believe that a person is about to engage in a act or practice prohibited by Section 1 of this Act, a civil action for preventive relief, including an application for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order, may be instituted by the person aggrieved. In an action commenced under this Section, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the state, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs, and the state is liable for costs the same as a private person.

Section 3. A person who knowingly violates a provision of this Act is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction is punishable by a fine of not more than One Thousand Dollars ($1,000) or by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year or by both.

Section 4. The District Attorneys and/or County Attorneys of this state are hereby designated as the appropriate state or local official to receive the notice of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring in this state from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as provided for in Public Law 88-352, Title VII, Section 706(c); 78 Stat. 241 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5).

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566 F.2d 906, 45 A.L.R. Fed. 338, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 12890, 15 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 8072, 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 739, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mrs-patsy-ruth-white-v-dallas-independent-school-district-ca5-1978.

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