M.R. v. Christopher LaRose, Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center, et al.

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: January 6, 2026
• Docket: 3:25-cv-03710
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 M.R., Case No.: 25-CV-3710 JLS (BLM)

12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING IN PART 13 v. PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 14 CHRISTOPHER LAROSE, Warden, Otay

Mesa Detention Center, et al., 15 (ECF No. 1) Respondents. 16 17 18 Presently before the Court is Petitioner M.R.’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 19 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Pet.,” ECF No. 1). Also before the Court is Respondents 20 Christopher J. LaRose’s (Senior Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center), Patrick Divver’s 21 (Field Office Director, San Diego Office of Detention and Removal), Todd M. Lyons’s 22 (Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement), and Kristi Noem’s 23 (Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security) (collectively, “Respondents”) 24 Response to Petition (“Ret.,” ECF No. 4) and Petitioner’s Traverse (“Traverse,” ECF 25 No. 5). For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART Petitioner’s 26 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 BACKGROUND 2 Petitioner, a citizen of Russia and national of Uzbekistan, alleges that she has been 3 detained by the United States Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and 4 Customs Enforcement division at the Otay Mesa Detention Center since May 2025, when 5 she was arrested at a hearing at the San Diego Immigration Court. Pet. ¶ 35. Petitioner 6 entered the United States on December 27, 2023, to seek asylum, withholding of removal, 7 or protection under the Convention Against Torture after fleeing persecution in Russia. Id. 8 ¶ 33. Petitioner was arrested by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) in December 9 2023, and was “later released into the U.S., where she lived free from immigration 10 detention in Illinois and California.” Id. ¶ 34. Petitioner “worked, made friends, and built 11 a community” all while diligently complying with the terms of her release. Id. Petitioner 12 now argues her re-detention without notice or an opportunity to be heard violates the Due 13 Process Clause and the Administrative Procedure Act. Id. at 21. 14 LEGAL STANDARD 15 A federal prisoner challenging the execution of his or her sentence, rather than the 16 legality of the sentence itself, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district of 17 his confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The sole judicial 18 body able to review challenges to final orders of deportation, exclusion, or removal is the 19 court of appeals. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252; see also Alvarez–Barajas v. Gonzales, 20 418 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 21 231, § 106(a)). However, for claims challenging ancillary or collateral issues arising 22 independently from the removal process—for example, a claim of indefinite detention— 23 federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district court. Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 24 443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 25 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018); Alvarez v. Sessions, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal. 26 2018) (citations omitted). 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 DISCUSSION 2 I. Jurisdiction 3 Respondents argue that this Court lacks jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). Ret. 4 at 2. Section 1252(g) provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or 5 claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney 6 General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any 7 alien under this chapter.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). Respondents argue that Petitioner’s claims 8 arise from DHS’s decision to commence removal proceedings. Ret. at 2. The Court 9 disagrees. 10 Section 1252(g) should be read “narrowly” as to apply “only to three discrete actions 11 that the Attorney General may take: her ‘decision or action’ to ‘commence proceedings, 12 adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’” Ibarra-Perez v. United States, No. 24-631, 13 2025 WL 2461663, at *6 (9th Cir. Aug. 27, 2025) (quoting Reno v. American-Arab Anti- 14 Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471, 482, 487 (1999)). Section 1252(g) “does not 15 prohibit challenges to unlawful practices merely because they are in some fashion 16 connected to removal orders.” Id. at *7. Section 1252(g) does not bar due process claims. 17 Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 1052–53 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that the petitioners’ 18 objective was not to review the merits of their proceeding, but rather “to enforce their 19 constitutional rights to due process in the context of those proceedings”). 20 Here, Petitioner does not challenge the decision to commence removal proceedings 21 or any act to adjudicate or execute a removal order. Rather, Petitioner is challenging her 22 re-detention without notice or justification. Traverse at 2. Petitioner is enforcing her 23 “constitutional rights to due process in the context of the removal proceedings—not the 24 legitimacy of the removal proceedings or any removal order.” Garcia v. Noem, No. 25- 25 CV-2180-DMS-MMP, 2025 WL 2549431, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2025). Therefore, 26 § 1252(g) does not strip the Court of jurisdiction. 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 II. Due Process 2 Petitioner argues that the summary revocation of her parole without notice or a 3 hearing violates the Due Process Clause. Pet. ¶ 56. The Court agrees. 4 The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, 5 liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “[T]he Due 6 Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether 7 their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 8 U.S. 678, 693 (9th Cir. 2001). “[I]t is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles 9 aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 10 306 (1993). The Due Process Clause generally “requires some kind of a hearing before the 11 State deprives a person of liberty or property.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 12 (1990). “Even individuals who face significant constraints on their liberty or over whose 13 liberty the government wields significant discretion retain a protected interest in their 14 liberty.” Pinchi v. Noem, No. 25-cv-5632-PCP, 2025 WL 2084921, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 15 25, 2025) (citations omitted). Although the initial decision to detain or release an 16 individual may be within the government’s discretion, “the government’s decision to 17 release an individual from custody creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon which that 18 individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will be revoked only if [they] fail[] to live up to the 19 . . . conditions [of release].’” Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)). 20 “Thus, even when ICE has the initial discretion to detain or release a noncitizen pending 21 removal proceedings, after that individual is released from custody [he] has a protected 22 liberty interest in remaining out of custody.” Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *3 (citing 23 Romero v. Kaiser, No. 22-cv-20508, 2022 WL 1443250, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2022)). 24 Respondents suggest that because of Maldonado Bautista, Petitioner is detained 25 under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and is only entitled to a bond hearing—making her other 26 constitutional claims moot. See Ret. at 2. The Court disagrees. In December 2023, 27 Petitioner was determined to not be a danger to the community or a flight risk and was 28 released. Pet. ¶ 34. Petitioner has complied with all conditions of her release. Id. 1 Petitioner works, has friends, and has developed a community. Id. The relief Petitioner is 2 entitled to is not limited to a bond hearing; Petitioner has a protected liberty interest in 3 remaining out of custody. See, e.g., Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *4 (“[Petitioner’s] 4 release from ICE custody after her initial apprehension reflected a determination by the 5 government that she was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community, and 6 [Petitioner] has a strong interest in remaining at liberty unless she no longer meets those 7 criteria.”); Noori, 2025 WL 2800149, at *10 (“Petitioner is not an ‘arriving’ noncitizen but 8 one that has [been] present in our country for over a year. This substantial amount of time 9 indicates he is afforded the Fifth Amendment’s guaranteed due process before removal.”); 10 Matute v. Wofford, No. 25-cv-1206-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 2817795, at *5 (E.D. Cal. 11 Oct. 3, 2025) (finding petitioner had a protected liberty interest in his release). 12 As Petitioner has a protected liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires 13 procedural protections before she can be deprived of that interest. See Matthews v. 14 Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). To determine which procedures are constitutionally 15 sufficient to satisfy the Due Process Clause, the Court must apply the Matthews factors. 16 See Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335. Courts must consider: (1) “the private interest that will be 17 affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest 18 through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 19 procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the [g]overnment’s interest, including the function 20 involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 21 procedural requirement would entail.” Id. 22 The Court finds that all three factors support a finding that the government’s 23 revocation of Petitioner’s parole without notification, reasoning, or an opportunity to be 24 heard, denied Petitioner of her due process rights. First, as discussed above, Petitioner has 25 a significant liberty interest in remaining out of custody pursuant to her parole. “Freedom 26 from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical 27 restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process Clause] protects.” Zadvydas, 533 28 U.S. at 690. Petitioner has an interest in remaining with her community, working, and 1 continuing the process of seeking asylum. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471 at 482 (“Subject 2 to the conditions of his parole, he can be gainfully employed and is free to be with family 3 and friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal life.”). 4 Second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest is high as Petitioner’s 5 parole was revoked without providing her a reason for revocation or giving her an 6 opportunity to be heard. Pet. ¶ 56. Since DHS’s initial determination that Petitioner should 7 be paroled because she posed no danger to the community and was not a flight risk, there 8 is no evidence that these findings have changed. See Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 9 1168, 1760 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“Release reflects a determination by the government that the 10 noncitizen is not a danger to the community or a flight risk.”). Petitioner has no criminal 11 record, has not been arrested or otherwise in criminal trouble, has an established 12 community, and is working towards asylum status. Pet. ¶ 52. “Once a noncitizen has been 13 released, the law prohibits federal agents from rearresting him merely because he is subject 14 to removal proceedings.” Saravia, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 1760. “Rather, the federal agents 15 must be able to present evidence of materially changed circumstances—namely, evidence 16 that the noncitizen is in fact dangerous or has become a flight risk. . . .” Id. 17 Respondents, failing to address Petitioner’s Due Process argument in their response, 18 do not point to any material circumstances that have changed that would warrant 19 reconsideration of her parole. See generally Ret. “Where, as here, ‘the petitioner has not 20 received any bond or custody hearing,’ ‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty is 21 high’ because neither the government nor [Petitioner] has had an opportunity to determine 22 whether there is any valid basis for [his] detention.” Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *5 23 (quoting Singh v. Andrews, No. 25-cv-801-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 1918679, at *7 (E.D. 24 Cal. July 11, 2025)) (cleaned up). 25 Third, the government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without notice, reasoning, 26 and a hearing is “low.” See Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *5; Matute, 2025 WL 2817795, 27 at *6; Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2019) (“If the 28 government wishes to re-arrest [Petitioner] at any point, it has the power to take steps 1 toward doing so; but its interest in doing so without a hearing is low.”). Respondents fail 2 to point to any burdens on the government if it were to have provided proper notice, 3 reasoning, and a pre-deprivation hearing. See generally Ret. 4 Therefore, because Respondents detained Petitioner by revoking her parole in 5 violation of the Due Process Clause, her detention is unlawful. See, e.g., Alegria Palma v. 6 Larose et al., No. 25-cv-1942 BJC (MMP), slip op. at 14 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2025) 7 (granting a TRO based on a procedural due process challenge to a revocation of parole 8 without a pre-deprivation hearing); Navarro Sanchez, 2025 WL 2770629, at *5 (granting 9 a writ of habeas corpus releasing petitioner from custody to the conditions of her 10 preexisting parole on due process grounds).1 11 III. Attorney’s Fees 12 Petitioner has requested costs and attorney’s fees in this action pursuant to the Equal 13 Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Pet. at 35. The EAJA provides in part: 14 A party seeking an award of fees and other expenses shall, within 15 thirty days of final judgment in the action, submit to the court an 16 application for fees and other expenses which shows that the party is a prevailing party and is eligible to receive an award 17 under this subsection, and the amount sought, including an 18 itemized statement from any attorney . . . representing or appearing in behalf of the party stating the actual time expended 19 and the rate at which fees and other expenses were 20 computed. The party shall also allege that the position of the United States was not substantially justified. Whether or not the 21 position of the United States was substantially justified shall be 22 determined on the basis of the record . . . which is made in the civil action for which fees and other expenses are sought. 23

25 1 The Court need not address Petitioner’s claim arising under the APA because the Petition can be resolved 26 on due process grounds. However, the Court notes that other courts have found violations of the APA based on similar grounds. See, e.g., Navarro Sanchez, 2025 WL 2770629, at *4 (finding revocation of 27 petitioner’s parole arbitrary and capricious because respondents did not state any reasons for the 28 revocation); Noori, 2025 WL 2800149, at *3 (“Petitioner’s parole was revoked without an individualized 1 }}28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). 2 The Court will consider an application requesting reasonable fees and costs under 3 EAJA that is filed within thirty days of the judgment. 4 CONCLUSION 5 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS IN PART Petitioner’s Petition for Writ 6 ||of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1), and ORDERS Respondents to immediately release 7 || Petitioner from custody subject to the conditions of her preexisting parole. The Court 8 || ORDERS, prior to any re-detention of Petitioner, that Petitioner is entitled to notice of the 9 ||reasons for revocation of her parole and a hearing before a neutral decision maker to 10 ||determine whether detention is warranted. The government shall bear the burden of 11 |/establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a danger to the 12 ||community or a risk of flight. The Parties are ORDERED to file a Joint Status Report by 13 January 12, 2026, confirming that Petitioner has been released. Lastly, Petitioner’s 14 || attorney is directed to submit an attorney fee application and corresponding billing records 15 || within thirty (30) days of this Order, and Respondents are instructed to file any opposition 16 || within fourteen (14) days of Petitioner’s attorney fee application. 17 IT IS SO ORDERED. 18 ||Dated: January 6, 2026

0 on. Janis L. Sammartino United States District Judge 21 22 23 24 25 26 || ——____—__- 27 This relief has been granted in similar matters. See, e.g., Matute, 2025 WL 2817795, at *8; Pinchi, 2025 28 || WL 2084921, at *5; Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1097 (E.D. Cal. 2025); Martinez Hernandez y. Andrews, No. 25-CV-1035 JLT HBK, 2025 WL 2495767, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2025).