OPINION
RABINOWITZ, Justice.
The major question presented by this appeal is whether the superior court erred in granting summary judgment against appellant Mountain View on the theory that it was not entitled to relief against any of the appellees. The rationale for the superior court’s ruling is that the insured, Mountain View, failed to comply with specific fire insurance policy provisions which required it to make periodic reports as to the amount of its inventory on hand. Thus, both the insurance broker and his agency, as well as the insurance company, were held not liable for any loss caused by fire damages to the insured in excess of the last value of inventory reported.
The significant facts as developed in the context of the cross-motions for summary judgment are as follows. In 1974, appellant Mountain View purchased a provisional, or monthly reporting (stock value) type of fire insurance policy which was issued by appel-lee Commercial Union Assurance Company. The maximum coverage of the policy, as issued, was $250,000, and the purpose of the policy was to insure the physical inventory of Mountain View. The policy was obtained through the services of appellee Alfred Opp, an insurance broker and employee of Alexander & Alexander, an insurance brokerage corporation.
In December 1975, Mountain View, during the course of taking a year-end stock inventory, discovered that the value of its stock had significantly increased. According to Mountain View, it ascertained that the value of its physical inventory at the time exceeded $350,000. During the first two weeks of January 1976, Chris Goll, an employee of Mountain View who was authorized to obtain and alter insurance coverage for the corporation, attempted unsuccessfully on several occasions to contact Alfred Opp at his office for the purpose of increasing the inventory coverage to $350,-000.
On January 15, 1976, Goll succeeded in reaching Opp at the latter’s home. According to Goll, the following telephone conversation took place:
Chris Goll ‘Jesus Christ, you’re a hard guy to get a hold of.’
Alfred Opp ‘Why?’
Chris Goll T have been leaving messages for weeks with no response.’
Alfred Opp ‘I’ve been quite busy and have been meaning to get by and talk with you.’
Chris Goll ‘We’ve just finished a year-end inventory, found our stock levels were up and want to increase our coverage levels by $100,000.’
Alfred Opp ‘All right, coverage is bound, I’ll send you a copy of the binder later.’
Chris Goll ‘We’re all set then?’
Alfred Opp ‘Yes.’
Opp’s version is that Goll “told me that he had just completed their year-end audit, found that their inventory was higher than their insurance limit and wanted me to increase the insurance limit to $350,000.” Opp agreed to “take care of it.” The next morning Opp wrote the following memorandum:
Mountain View Sports Center Increase inventory (stock reporting) to $350,000. Coverage bound 1/15/76,
/&/
Alfred P. Opp.
Opp handed the memorandum to an employee of Alexander & Alexander and told her to “take care of it.” Mountain View’s file could not be located at that time and consequently no action was taken on the memorandum until after the fire occurred. On January 21,1976, a fire destroyed inventory of Mountain View valued in excess of $350,000.
Pursuant to the terms of the original provisional fire insurance policy, Commercial Union paid approximately $245,000 to Mountain View.
The last written report of Mountain View’s physical inventory on file with Commercial Union at the time the loss occurred was for September 1975, with a stated inventory valuation of $250,000.
Mountain View filed suit against Commercial Union, Alexander & Alexander and Alfred Opp, contending, in part, that Goll’s January 15th telephone conversation with Alfred Opp was in effect both an oral report of inventory value in the amount of $350,000, and a request to Opp for an increase in the coverage under the provisional fire insurance policy from $250,000 to $350,-000. Mountain View further contended that Opp’s action, as agent for Commercial Union, bound the latter both as to increased coverage and the inventory value as reported by Goll to Opp.
Thereafter, all parties moved for summary judgment.
The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Commercial Union, Alexander & Alexander and Alfred Opp. In its oral opinion, the superior court stated:
I find that there was a requirement to fill out these inventory report forms, there was a failure to do so, that that was one of the conditions which all parties knew concerning the binding of . providing of coverage, and therefore I grant summary judgment to all 3 of the defendants.
Two issues are raised in this appeal, namely, whether the superior court erred in granting summary judgment for appellees by holding that a written inventory value report was required in the circumstances; and whether the superior court was correct in awarding appellees full attorney’s fees.
In the superior court, and in their respective briefs before this court, appellees place primary reliance upon the value reporting clause of the policy that Commercial Union had issued to Mountain View. This portion of the policy provided:
It is a condition of this policy that the insured shall report in writing to this Company not later than thirty (30) days
after the last day of each calendar month, the exact location of all property covered hereunder, the total actual cash value of such property at each location on the last day of each calendar month. At the time of any loss, if the insured has failed to file with this Company reports of values as above required, this endorsement, subject otherwise to all of its terms and conditions, shall cover only at the locations and for not more than the amounts included in the last report of values filed prior to the loss. . . .
In
Alaska Foods, Inc. v. American Manufacturer’s Mutual Insurance Co.,
482 P.2d 842, 848 (Alaska 1971), we had occasion to explain the purpose of a “value reporting” type of insurance policy similar to the policy involved in this litigation. In part, we observed:
Under this type of policy an annual premium is paid. The amount of the premium is flexible, depending on the value of the inventory reported each month by the insured as being on hand at the insured location. .
.
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OPINION
RABINOWITZ, Justice.
The major question presented by this appeal is whether the superior court erred in granting summary judgment against appellant Mountain View on the theory that it was not entitled to relief against any of the appellees. The rationale for the superior court’s ruling is that the insured, Mountain View, failed to comply with specific fire insurance policy provisions which required it to make periodic reports as to the amount of its inventory on hand. Thus, both the insurance broker and his agency, as well as the insurance company, were held not liable for any loss caused by fire damages to the insured in excess of the last value of inventory reported.
The significant facts as developed in the context of the cross-motions for summary judgment are as follows. In 1974, appellant Mountain View purchased a provisional, or monthly reporting (stock value) type of fire insurance policy which was issued by appel-lee Commercial Union Assurance Company. The maximum coverage of the policy, as issued, was $250,000, and the purpose of the policy was to insure the physical inventory of Mountain View. The policy was obtained through the services of appellee Alfred Opp, an insurance broker and employee of Alexander & Alexander, an insurance brokerage corporation.
In December 1975, Mountain View, during the course of taking a year-end stock inventory, discovered that the value of its stock had significantly increased. According to Mountain View, it ascertained that the value of its physical inventory at the time exceeded $350,000. During the first two weeks of January 1976, Chris Goll, an employee of Mountain View who was authorized to obtain and alter insurance coverage for the corporation, attempted unsuccessfully on several occasions to contact Alfred Opp at his office for the purpose of increasing the inventory coverage to $350,-000.
On January 15, 1976, Goll succeeded in reaching Opp at the latter’s home. According to Goll, the following telephone conversation took place:
Chris Goll ‘Jesus Christ, you’re a hard guy to get a hold of.’
Alfred Opp ‘Why?’
Chris Goll T have been leaving messages for weeks with no response.’
Alfred Opp ‘I’ve been quite busy and have been meaning to get by and talk with you.’
Chris Goll ‘We’ve just finished a year-end inventory, found our stock levels were up and want to increase our coverage levels by $100,000.’
Alfred Opp ‘All right, coverage is bound, I’ll send you a copy of the binder later.’
Chris Goll ‘We’re all set then?’
Alfred Opp ‘Yes.’
Opp’s version is that Goll “told me that he had just completed their year-end audit, found that their inventory was higher than their insurance limit and wanted me to increase the insurance limit to $350,000.” Opp agreed to “take care of it.” The next morning Opp wrote the following memorandum:
Mountain View Sports Center Increase inventory (stock reporting) to $350,000. Coverage bound 1/15/76,
/&/
Alfred P. Opp.
Opp handed the memorandum to an employee of Alexander & Alexander and told her to “take care of it.” Mountain View’s file could not be located at that time and consequently no action was taken on the memorandum until after the fire occurred. On January 21,1976, a fire destroyed inventory of Mountain View valued in excess of $350,000.
Pursuant to the terms of the original provisional fire insurance policy, Commercial Union paid approximately $245,000 to Mountain View.
The last written report of Mountain View’s physical inventory on file with Commercial Union at the time the loss occurred was for September 1975, with a stated inventory valuation of $250,000.
Mountain View filed suit against Commercial Union, Alexander & Alexander and Alfred Opp, contending, in part, that Goll’s January 15th telephone conversation with Alfred Opp was in effect both an oral report of inventory value in the amount of $350,000, and a request to Opp for an increase in the coverage under the provisional fire insurance policy from $250,000 to $350,-000. Mountain View further contended that Opp’s action, as agent for Commercial Union, bound the latter both as to increased coverage and the inventory value as reported by Goll to Opp.
Thereafter, all parties moved for summary judgment.
The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Commercial Union, Alexander & Alexander and Alfred Opp. In its oral opinion, the superior court stated:
I find that there was a requirement to fill out these inventory report forms, there was a failure to do so, that that was one of the conditions which all parties knew concerning the binding of . providing of coverage, and therefore I grant summary judgment to all 3 of the defendants.
Two issues are raised in this appeal, namely, whether the superior court erred in granting summary judgment for appellees by holding that a written inventory value report was required in the circumstances; and whether the superior court was correct in awarding appellees full attorney’s fees.
In the superior court, and in their respective briefs before this court, appellees place primary reliance upon the value reporting clause of the policy that Commercial Union had issued to Mountain View. This portion of the policy provided:
It is a condition of this policy that the insured shall report in writing to this Company not later than thirty (30) days
after the last day of each calendar month, the exact location of all property covered hereunder, the total actual cash value of such property at each location on the last day of each calendar month. At the time of any loss, if the insured has failed to file with this Company reports of values as above required, this endorsement, subject otherwise to all of its terms and conditions, shall cover only at the locations and for not more than the amounts included in the last report of values filed prior to the loss. . . .
In
Alaska Foods, Inc. v. American Manufacturer’s Mutual Insurance Co.,
482 P.2d 842, 848 (Alaska 1971), we had occasion to explain the purpose of a “value reporting” type of insurance policy similar to the policy involved in this litigation. In part, we observed:
Under this type of policy an annual premium is paid. The amount of the premium is flexible, depending on the value of the inventory reported each month by the insured as being on hand at the insured location. .
. In the event of fire damage, the amount that the insurers agree to pay is based on the value of merchandise stated on the last monthly value report submitted by the insured prior to the loss.
With this background in mind, we now turn to the merits of this appeal. Both appellant and appellees moved for summary judgment in the superior court. As indicated in our summary of the record above, the facts in this case were substantially agreed to by all parties. The superior court granted summary judgment in ijavor of ap-pellees based on the insurance policy’s requirement that monthly inventory report forms be submitted in writing to Commercial Union Assurance Company. We reverse and direct that summary judgment should be entered instead in favor of appellant Mountain View Sports Center against appellees Opp and Alexander & Alexander.
We have reached this conclusion based on our assessment of the January 15, 1976, telephone conversation between Chris Goll and Alfred Opp and our further conclusion that Opp, acting as the purported agent of Commercial Union, waived the reporting requirement in the insurance policy.
By Opp’s own admission, it is established that he represented to Goll that Mountain View Sports Center was “covered” as of January 15th by the additional $100,000 of insurance which Goll had requested. Opp led Goll to believe that there was nothing further that he needed to do in order to assure that “coverage is bound.” Thus, we think it is established on the undisputed record in this case that the telephone conversation of January 15,1976, included both a report on Mountain View’s increased inventory values and a request to increase the insurance policy limit on coverage to $350,-000, and further that Opp did, in fact, agree to provide the requested coverage. The only question which remains for us to decide is whether, as a matter of law, Opp’s actions constituted a waiver of the written inventory reporting requirement in the insurance policy.
A number of courts have held that the doctrines of waiver and estoppel
should not be applied to the monthly reporting clause of inventory value-reporting insurance policies similar to the one at issue in the present case.
The rationale of those cases seems to be that value-reporting clauses, with their attendant limitations on liability based on the last inventory value reported prior to the loss, are provisions going to the coverage or scope of the insurance policy. It is a general rule of insurance law that “[t]he doctrine of waiver does not pertain to matters of coverage so as to extend the scope of the contract beyond its express terms through the acts of an agent not authorized or approved by the company.”
The courts adhering to this view reason that if an agent of the insurance company could by his own actions waive the requirement of filing
monthly inventory value reports with the insurance company, such that the insured is protected by the maximum coverage of the policy regardless of his noncompliance with the reporting clause, a new primary liability might be created, bringing within the coverage of the policy risks not included or contemplated by its terms.
The broad exemption of insurance policy provisions concerning coverage from the doctrines of estoppel and waiver has been criticized as unreasonable.
Moreover, we have previously expressed our reluctance to adopt a per se rule that there can never be a waiver of monthly reporting and related provisions of an insurance policy.
Most of the courts which have taken this position have dealt with factual situations in which a waiver is alleged based on the acceptance of delinquent reports on a regular basis by the insurance company without termination of the policy. In this situation in
Alaska Foods, Inc. v. American Manufacturer’s Mutual Insurance Co.,
482 P.2d 842 (Alaska 1971), we held that an insurance company’s act of requesting and accepting delinquent monthly reports alone does not evidence such an “intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege” as to waive its right to determine its liability with reference to the last written inventory report filed.
If we held that acceptance of late value reports waives the value reporting provisions of the policy and reinstates full coverage up to the policy limits, we would be creating an entirely new contract for the parties. The flexible nature of the policy indicates that the parties intended that late value reports could be filed as often as desired by the insured, and that the result of this would not be full coverage up to the policy limits, but coverage limited to the amount stated on the last, although tardy, value report filed.
The decision as to the waiver of insurance policy provisions in the last analysis rests upon sound equitable considerations. In reaching our conclusion that a waiver was effectuated by the acts of Alfred Opp, we are cognizant that the factual circumstances giving rise to this action are sympathetic to the insured’s point of view. According to an affidavit which was filed by Goll, the Mountain View Sports Center originally obtained a fire insurance policy through Opp, an employee of Alexander & Alexander. Goll averred that all dealings concerning Mountain View’s fire insurance policy were conducted with Alfred Opp and Alex
ander & Alexander, and that all inventory valuation forms were supplied by Opp and Alexander & Alexander and subsequently returned to them by Mountain View. Of particular significance is the following portion of Goll’s affidavit:
That Chris Goll on January 15, 1976, demanded increased coverage for Mountain View Sports Center’s inventory of $100,000, which Chris Goll reported to Alfred P. Opp, was approximately $350,-000, as valued by a year end inventory, such coverage was believed by Chris Goll to have been accepted by Alfred P. Opp on behalf of Alexander & Alexander, Inc. and Commercial Union Assurance Company.
That after January 15,1976, Chris Goll sought no further insurance coverage for the Mountain View Sports Center inventory which exceeded insurance coverage by $100,000, it being approximately $350,-000, since he believed from A1 Opp’s representations, ‘I’ll take care of it, Chris,’ that Mountain View Sports Center’s insurance coverage through Commercial Union Assurance Company had been extended to $350,000 and all conditions of coverage met.
In addition to the foregoing, in his supplemental affidavit, Goll further asserted that in his January 15, 1976, conversation with Opp, which we quoted above, Opp gave Goll assurances that the increased coverage was confirmed. Finally, Opp’s memorandum the day after this conversation also stated that the coverage was bound.
Two federal cases lend support to our decision that the agent’s actions in this case constituted a waiver of the reporting requirement. In
American Eagle Fire Insurance Co. v. Burdine,
200 F.2d 26 (10th Cir. 1952), a suit upon an insurance policy similar in terms and conditions to the one before us, the court of appeals held that a similar oral report to the insurance agent of the amount of inventory on hand constituted the last monthly report of values under the policy prior to the loss. In so holding, the court relied, in part, on the trial court’s findings that the agent of the insurer had “both implied and apparent power to assist in the preparation of monthly reports of values by insurance customers with monthly report form policies.”
The agent was apparently authorized to receive the reports and hold them in his office or transmit them to the insurance company’s home office as he saw fit.
The second case,
Columbia Fire Insurance Co. v. Boykin & Taylor,
185 F.2d 771 (4th Cir. 1950), involved a similar issue. In that case the question was whether the liability of the insurance company was to be determined by the last value report prepared by the agent from information obtained from the insured and actually received by the company before the loss, or by the last report prepared by the agent using information supplied by the insured but not transmitted to the company until after the fire. The agent apparently routinely attended to all the details of the policy, including the obtaining of information respecting the insured’s monthly inventories. The inquiries by the agent, in person or by telephone, were understood by the insured to comprise the only reports or method of reporting required by the insurance policy. In those circumstances, the court held that the company was equitably estopped to plead the reporting requirements as a defense to the insured’s suit.
Though a continuing practice of making oral reports to the agent of the insurance company was of note in both the
American Eagle
and
Columbia
cases, we are not persuaded that the present case should be distinguished on the ground that the oral report was not a routine occurrence at the time of the January 15, 1976, telephone conversation which is critical to this case. Both of the federal cases discussed additionally emphasized the insured’s reliance on the agent’s assistance in securing and maintaining adequate insurance coverage and the active role of the agent in the collection and transmittal of the monthly inventory value report forms to the insurance company.
These factors all were present in this case, and we think they gave rise to a reasonable expectation on behalf of Mountain View Sports Center and Chris Goll that appellant could in good faith rely on the representations and assurance of coverage made by the insurer’s agent, Alfred Opp.
The judgment of the superior court is therefore Reversed, and the case is Remanded with directions to enter summary judgment in favor of appellant Mountain View Sports Center against Opp and Alexander & Alexander, and to determine remaining issues as to the claim against Commercial Union.