Appellate Case: 24-9508 Document: 65 Date Filed: 07/10/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT July 10, 2025 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court FONKA AROUNA MOUNDIH,
Petitioner,
v. No. 24-9508 (Petition for Review) PAMELA J. BONDI, United States Attorney General,∗
Respondent. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT** _________________________________
Before HARTZ, PHILLIPS, and EID, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
Fonka Moundih, a native and citizen of Cameroon, entered the United States
and became a lawful resident. Years later, Moundih was convicted of fraud, and the
government initiated removal proceedings against him based on that aggravated
felony. During the removal proceedings, Moundih sought withholding of removal
and protection under the Convention Against Torture, arguing that he would likely be
subjected to torture in Cameroon.
∗ On February 5, 2025, Pamela J. Bondi became Attorney General of the United States. Consequently, her name has been substituted for Merrick B. Garland as Respondent, pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2). ** This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 24-9508 Document: 65 Date Filed: 07/10/2025 Page: 2
The immigration judge denied Moundih’s application for relief from removal,
finding that Moundih failed to show it was more likely than not that he would be
tortured in Cameroon. On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. This
petition for review followed. Because substantial evidence supports the BIA’s
finding that Moundih failed to show that it was more likely than not that he would be
tortured, we affirm the BIA’s decision and deny Moundih’s petition for review. We
also grant Moundih’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
I.
Fonka Moundih, a Cameroonian citizen, entered the United States in 2005 and
was eventually afforded legal permanent resident status in 2013. In 2017, Moundih
was arrested in connection with a currency counterfeiting scheme; he was convicted
and sentenced in the United States District Court for the Central District of California
in 2020.
Then, in 2023, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal
proceedings against Moundih. Specifically, DHS charged Moundih as removable
from the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) based on the prior 2020
conviction of an aggravated felony involving fraud or deceit, as defined in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(U). At the removal proceedings, the immigration judge (“IJ”)
sustained DHS’s factual allegations and the charge of removability, finding that
Moundih was removable for committing an aggravated felony involving fraud or
deceit that caused losses exceeding $10,000.
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Moundih thereafter applied for relief from removal, requesting asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”). At the immigration hearing, Moundih testified that he first came to the
United States in 2005 because he believed his life was in danger due to a conflict
with a high-ranking Cameroonian official, Colonel Emile Joel Bamkoui, who dated
the same woman as Moundih (a woman with whom Moundih also shares a child).
Moundih testified that he had never personally encountered Colonel Bamkoui––and
had only seen him on television––but nevertheless believed he was under a threat of
death from Colonel Bamkoui because his partner had told him so.
Moundih also testified that he had another threatening encounter related to
Colonel Bamkoui in 2014. That year, Moundih visited Cameroon, and the apartment
he rented there was surrounded by Cameroonian police, who may or may not have
had a warrant for his arrest. According to Moundih, a neighbor alerted him that the
“Rapid Intervention Brigade” (a police unit led by Colonel Bamkoui, which Moundih
claimed is “like the CIA,” A.R. at 147) came “looking” for him at his apartment. Id.
Moundih testified that he believed the officers were looking for him because Colonel
Bamkoui was “still mad” at him. Id. at 169. That incident drove Moundih into
hiding and led him to return to the United States. Moundih now believes he would be
arrested and harmed in Cameroon because Colonel Bamkoui remains a high-ranking,
“powerful” officer there and still holds a grudge against Moundih. Id. at 167–69,
173.
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Moundih also stated that he believes he would be harmed in Cameroon based
on political opinions imputed to him, because the Cameroonian police discovered
videos of police brutality that Moundih had previously sent his sister. Moundih’s
sister was arrested in Cameroon after she took her own video of police brutality.
According to Moundih, authorities searched his sister’s phone, discovered the videos
Moundih had sent to her, and told his sister to tell Moundih to stop sending these
videos. The authorities also detained and assaulted his sister, causing her to spend
two days in the hospital.
Nevertheless, Moundih testified that the Cameroonian police never returned to
his sister’s home to inquire about Moundih or the videos. And according to Moundih
himself, his political activity is limited to following one Cameroonian social justice
group online and supporting it passively as a member.
Following the immigration proceedings, the IJ issued an oral decision denying
Moundih’s application for relief and protection from removal and ordering his
removal to Cameroon. As to his request for withholding of removal, the IJ
determined that Moundih’s conviction for conspiracy to commit fraud was an
aggravated felony and a particularly serious crime––thereby making Moundih
ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal.1
Next, the IJ considered Moundih’s request for CAT protection. The IJ found
that Moundih had never been tortured in Cameroon in the past and that there was “no
1 The IJ also found, in the alternative, that Moundih failed to meet his burden on the merits of his claim for withholding of removal. 4 Appellate Case: 24-9508 Document: 65 Date Filed: 07/10/2025 Page: 5
evidence that he will be tortured if he returns to Cameroon.” Id. at 60. Further, the
IJ concluded that Moundih’s claims that Colonel Bamkoui has been targeting him
and that government officials went to his home when he visited Cameroon in 2014 to
look for him were both unduly “speculative.” Id. The IJ noted that Moundih “was
able to fly into Cameroon” in 2014, which was “closer to the time that he fled
Cameroon, [and] nothing happened to him.” Id. at 61. Indeed, he was able to “rent
an apartment[] and live there.” Id.
The IJ also rejected Moundih’s claim that, based on reports of government
abuses and mistreatment in Cameroon, the government would torture him. While
acknowledging the existence of civil strife in the country, the IJ concluded that
Moundih’s “limited political activism” was insufficient to show he would more likely
than not be in a similar situation to other Cameroon citizens who have suffered
mistreatment. Id. The IJ noted also that Moundih’s sister, who still lives in
Cameroon, was “labeled” as a political opponent based on the videos she took of
police brutality but had not been subjected to harm that amounted to torture. Id.
Furthermore, the IJ found that there is “no reason to believe” that Moundih would be
tortured, as he is even less politically involved than his sister. Id. at 62.
Accordingly, the IJ denied Moundih’s application for relief and CAT deferral and
ordered his removal to Cameroon.
Moundih then appealed the IJ’s decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals
(“BIA”). The BIA dismissed the appeal. As an initial matter, the BIA found that
Moundih waived any challenge to the IJ’s finding that his conviction was for a
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particularly serious crime, which rendered Moundih ineligible for asylum and
withholding of removal. As to Moundih’s request for CAT protection, the BIA
agreed with the IJ that Moundih failed to meet his burden to show that he would more
likely than not suffer torture upon his return to Cameroon by or with the
acquiescence of a government official. The BIA concluded that the IJ drew
“permissible inferences” from the facts, the evidence of poor conditions in
Cameroon, and other evidence in the record, and the BIA accordingly affirmed the
IJ’s findings and upheld the denial of CAT protection.
This petition for review followed. We have jurisdiction to review Moundih’s
petition under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.
II.
We review the BIA’s legal determinations de novo and its findings of fact for
substantial evidence. Xue v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir. 2017). Under the
substantial-evidence standard, we evaluate whether the BIA’s “factual determinations
are supported by reasonable, substantial and probative evidence considering the
record as a whole.” Elzour v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 1143, 1150 (10th Cir. 2004). We
reverse these determinations only if “the evidence not only supports [a contrary]
conclusion, but compels it.” INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1 (1992);
Dallakoti v. Holder, 619 F.3d 1264, 1267 (10th Cir. 2010).
“Our scope of review directly correlates to the form of the BIA decision.”
Sidabutar v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1116, 1123 (10th Cir. 2007). Where, as here, a
single member of the BIA affirms an IJ’s decision, we review the BIA’s opinion and
6 Appellate Case: 24-9508 Document: 65 Date Filed: 07/10/2025 Page: 7
the grounds for its conclusion, but “we are not precluded from consulting the IJ’s
more complete explanation of those same grounds.” Neri-Garcia v. Holder, 696 F.3d
1003, 1008–09 (10th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
A.
Removable noncitizens have three avenues to lawfully remain in the United
States: (1) asylum via refugee status, 8 U.S.C. § 1158; (2) withholding of removal
(i.e., executive stay on the removal order), id. § 1231; or (3) protection under CAT,
1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 23 I.L.M. 1027, see Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681,
2681–823 (1998), codified as note to 8 U.S.C. § 1231; 8 C.F.R. § 208.17 (2002)
(implementing regulations). Here, Moundih has waived any challenge to the IJ’s
determination that he is ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal.2 Thus,
only the third avenue––protection under CAT––is at issue.
The eligibility requirements for CAT relief differ from the requirements for
asylum or withholding of removal. See Uanreroro v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1197, 1202
(10th Cir. 2006). Unlike the latter two forms of relief, CAT eligibility does not
require a showing of mistreatment motivated by a protected characteristic (such as
race or political opinion), but instead is determined by the likelihood and severity of
the potential mistreatment. See Ritonga v. Holder, 633 F.3d 971, 978 (10th Cir.
2 As explained, the IJ held that Moundih was ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal because of his felony conviction for aggravated fraud in relation to a currency scheme, which the IJ found was a “particularly serious crime” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2). A.R. at 54–55. Moundih did not challenge that determination before the BIA, see id. at 3, and he likewise does not challenge it in this appeal. 7 Appellate Case: 24-9508 Document: 65 Date Filed: 07/10/2025 Page: 8
2011). Specifically, to receive protection under CAT, a noncitizen must establish
that “it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the
proposed country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). Torture, in turn, is defined
as “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted . . . when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person
acting in an official capacity.” Id. § 1208.18(a)(1).
In assessing the likelihood of future torture for CAT eligibility purposes, the IJ
must consider all relevant evidence. This includes (1) evidence of past torture,
(2) evidence concerning whether the petitioner could safely relocate to a part of the
country of removal where he would not likely be tortured, (3) evidence of “gross,
flagrant or mass violations of human rights within the country of removal,” and
(4) “[o]ther relevant information regarding conditions in the country of removal.” Id.
§ 1208.16(c)(3)(i)–(iv).3
Furthermore, the standards for CAT eligibility are higher than those required
for other forms of asylum. This Court has held that if a noncitizen cannot establish a
“well-founded fear under the asylum standard,” he “will necessarily fail to meet the
higher standards required for . . . withholding of removal under [CAT].” Solomon v.
Gonzales, 454 F.3d 1160, 1163 (10th Cir. 2006). Likewise, a noncitizen cannot
3 An IJ’s determination as to whether there is a likelihood of future torture is a finding of fact that we review under the substantial-evidence standard. See Xue, 846 F.3d at 1104. 8 Appellate Case: 24-9508 Document: 65 Date Filed: 07/10/2025 Page: 9
demonstrate a likelihood of future torture (as is required under 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.16(c)(2)) merely by showing instances of past torture (although, as explained,
evidence of past torture may be relevant to the determination). Niang v. Gonzales,
422 F.3d 1187, 1196 (10th Cir. 2005).
Nor can a noncitizen establish eligibility for CAT protection simply “by
stringing together a series of suppositions to show he will more likely than not be
tortured. Instead, he must prove each ‘step in th[e] hypothetical chain’ of events
between his removal and the torture he fears.” Medina-Moreno v. Barr, 841 F.
App’x 72, 75 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting In re J-F-F-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 912, 917–18
(A.G. 2006)). Finally, although a noncitizen can point to evidence of a pattern of
human rights violations in the country of removal, such evidence alone is insufficient
to demonstrate CAT eligibility; instead, “[s]pecific grounds must exist that indicate
the individual would be personally at risk.” In re S-V-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1306, 1313
(B.I.A. 2000) (citation omitted), overruled on other grounds, Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332
F.3d 1186, 1188–89 (9th Cir. 2003).
B.
On appeal, Moundih argues that the IJ and the BIA failed to adequately
consider four categories of evidence: (1) evidence of government corruption and
poor country conditions in Cameroon; (2) evidence of his sister’s own encounters
with and mistreatment by the Cameroonian government; (3) evidence that Moundih
has been labeled as a political dissident in Cameroon; and (4) evidence that Colonel
Bamkoui is seeking out Moundih in order to harm him. We consider each in turn.
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Moundih begins by arguing that the IJ and the BIA ignored evidence of
government corruption and other poor “country conditions” in Cameroon. Aplt. Br.
at 9. As he did in the proceedings below, Moundih points to human-rights reports
describing “arbitrary and unlawful killings through the use of [government] force,” as
well as the arrests and torture of “[m]ore than a hundred” political dissidents in the
past five years. Id. at 9–10. These reports, Moundih claims, evince a “landscape of
torture of political dissenters in Cameroon.” Id. at 11. The IJ, on the other hand,
described Cameroon as undergoing only “some civil strife”––a description Moundih
claims is “a wildly unfair characterization [of] atrocities” occurring in the country.
Id. at 9. And because of that “unfair characterization,” Moundih contends, the IJ and
the BIA must have ignored the reports altogether. Id. at 11.
But the IJ and the BIA did consider those reports––they just found the reports
to be unsupportive of Moundih’s claim. In its decision, the IJ expressly stated that it
“looked at all 521 pages filed by [Moundih] in support of the Country Reports in
Cameroon,” including specific reports related to an “activist who returned to
Cameroon and was labeled as an enemy of the state and was detained.” A.R. at 61.
The IJ did not ignore these reports, nor did the IJ discredit their veracity, as Moundih
insists; rather, the IJ found that the civil unrest that the reports described was not
likely to affect Moundih himself, given that Moundih did not show “that he even
belongs to any of those regions [affected by government corruption] or that any harm
will come to him because he belongs to those regions.” Id. Further, the IJ found that
Moundih had only “limited political activism,” such that he was not in a position
10 Appellate Case: 24-9508 Document: 65 Date Filed: 07/10/2025 Page: 11
similar to other Cameroonian citizens who had been subjected to government
mistreatment. Id.
The IJ’s conclusions on this score are supported by evidence in the record. For
instance, at a hearing before the IJ, Moundih testified that although he became a
member of one particular political organization in 2015 and still “like[s] their
activities,” he has never protested, has never become familiar with details of the
organization’s mission, and has not visited the organization’s website since the time
he first joined. Id. at 150–51, 154–56. And, as the IJ pointed out, no evidence
suggests that Moundih has been so involved with the political organization as to be at
a risk of government mistreatment––in fact, some of Moundih’s own evidence
suggests he was hardly involved in politics at all.
Accordingly, it was reasonable for the IJ to conclude that Moundih’s evidence
of poor country conditions could not establish a likelihood that he personally would
be tortured in Cameroon. Although a noncitizen can point to evidence of a pattern of
human rights violations in the country of removal, such evidence alone is insufficient
to demonstrate CAT eligibility; instead, “[s]pecific grounds must exist that indicate
the individual would be personally at risk.” In re S-V-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1313
(citation omitted); see Hernandez-Torres v. Lynch, 642 F. App’x 814, 818–19 (10th
Cir. 2016) (affirming IJ’s conclusion that evidence of generally poor country
conditions, coupled with an individual’s limited political involvement, was
insufficient to demonstrate a likelihood of future torture).
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Next, Moundih argues that the IJ and the BIA gave improper weight to the
evidence he presented regarding his sister’s own mistreatment by the Cameroonian
government. Specifically, Moundih argues that the IJ and the BIA erred in finding
that Moundih’s sister, who remains in Cameroon, “has not been tortured or
subject[ed] to any forms of punishment or treatment that the Court can find amounts
to torture.” See Aplt. Br. at 11 (referencing A.R. at 62). According to Moundih, the
evidence regarding his sister demonstrates that she was “assaulted, threatened,
intimidated,” and subjected to other mistreatment by the Cameroonian government,
which resulted in chest trauma and two days of hospitalization. Id. at 12. And
Moundih suggests that the IJ and the BIA did not properly consider this evidence,
given that they did not find that she had been tortured.
We disagree. To be sure, Moundih submitted a letter from his sister stating
that she had been mistreated by the Cameroonian police. But, as the IJ pointed out,
the letter did not describe any particular police conduct that might satisfy the
statutory definition of torture. Likewise, although the IJ acknowledged that
Moundih’s sister had been labeled as a political opponent and had been arrested, the
IJ also noted that his sister had actually been released by Cameroonian officials, and
that her subsequent medical treatment was relatively minor. Even the BIA
specifically “acknowledge[d] the events asserted by [Moundih’s] sister at the hands
of Cameroonian authorities,” while nevertheless affirming the IJ’s conclusion that
“Cameroonian authorities did not inflict harm that amounts to the narrow legal
definition of torture” provided in the CAT standards. A.R. at 4 n.2.
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Thus, neither the IJ nor the BIA ignored or gave inadequate weight to
Moundih’s evidence regarding his sister. The IJ based its findings on Moundih’s
own evidence, including the fact that Moundih himself was less politically involved
than his sister. Although Moundih’s evidence might suggest his sister was previously
subjected to some form of government mistreatment, that evidence alone provides no
basis to conclude that Moundih himself would likely be subjected to government
torture. Accordingly, the IJ and the BIA’s conclusions to that effect are supported by
substantial evidence in the record.4
Moundih’s third argument is that the IJ and the BIA erred in deeming it
“speculative” that Moundih would be subjected to torture based on his limited
political activism, because—according to Moundih––the fact that “officials found
political correspondence” between him and his sister made him a targeted political
dissident. Aplt. Br. at 13. Moundih also renews a related argument he made before
the IJ and the BIA, claiming that the Cameroonian government will target him based
on his imputed political opinion.
This argument falls short, too. The IJ expressly considered Moundih’s
political activism, but it nevertheless took “issue with the imputed political claim.”
4 Moundih briefly suggests that the IJ’s failure to adequately consider the evidence concerning his sister amounts to a violation of his procedural due process rights. But Moundih’s argument fails for two reasons: (1) first, as indicated by the handful of cases he cites, an IJ’s failure to consider evidence rarely amounts to a procedural due process violation, absent extreme and unique circumstances not present here; and (2) the IJ in this case did not fail to adequately consider Moundih’s evidence, as explained above. 13 Appellate Case: 24-9508 Document: 65 Date Filed: 07/10/2025 Page: 14
A.R. at 57. Moreover, contrary to Moundih’s argument, the IJ acknowledged that
Cameroonian officials found political correspondence between Moundih and his
sister on his sister’s phone, and that those officials told Moundih’s sister to tell him
not to share further information. But the IJ determined that those facts alone were
“not enough . . . to find that [Moundih] has a well-founded fear of returning to
Cameroon based on imputed political opinion.” Id. at 58. Further, the IJ considered
other evidence that might show a political opinion that could be imputed to Moundih
and thereby subject him to torture, but the IJ concluded––based on the evidence––
that Moundih’s political activism was limited. Indeed, as explained above, the IJ
noted that no evidence indicated any active or recent support—including financial
support––for the organization with which Moundih claimed to be involved.
Again, then, the IJ did not “miss[] or ignore[] [Moundih’s] argument that his
imputed political opinion will subject him to the targeting from the Cameroonian
government.” Aplt. Br. at 13. Instead, the IJ simply determined that Moundih’s
communications with his sister and his own limited political involvement were
insufficient to show an imputed political opinion in the first place. Thus, the IJ’s
conclusions as to Moundih’s political activism or possible imputed political opinions
are supported by substantial evidence in the record––the very evidence Moundih
suggests it should have relied on.5
5 Moundih also argues that the IJ and the BIA “ignored” a prior decision of this Court, Takwi v. Garland, 22 F.4th 1180 (10th Cir. 2022). Aplt. Br. at 14. Moundih’s reliance on Takwi is misplaced. In Takwi, we held that while the BIA did not err in concluding that a noncitizen was competent to participate in removal 14 Appellate Case: 24-9508 Document: 65 Date Filed: 07/10/2025 Page: 15
Finally, Moundih argues that the IJ and the BIA erred in concluding that
Moundih’s claims regarding Colonel Bamkoui were too speculative to support CAT
eligibility. Moundih claims that there was a legitimate basis to believe that Colonel
Bamkoui was seeking out Moundih––both because Colonel Bamkoui is generally
reputed as “a person that would seek to torture and eliminate anyone who he deems
an enemy,” and because of Moundih’s relationship with Colonel Bamkoui’s supposed
girlfriend. Id. at 14–15. Moreover, Moundih insists that the only plausible
explanation for why Cameroonian officials came to his apartment in 2014 was that
Colonel Bamkoui was targeting him––rather than that the officials had a warrant for
his arrest, as Moundih’s neighbor claimed––given that Cameroon’s “corrupt law
enforcement system . . . would not have legitimate arrest warrants.” Id. at 15.
Once more, Moundih’s arguments fail. Moundih conflates general
suppositions about Colonel Bamkoui and the Cameroonian government with a
personalized basis, grounded in evidence, to believe that he will be tortured. Indeed,
the record confirms that Moundih’s fears regarding Colonel Bamkoui are speculative.
For one thing, Moundih never personally encountered Colonel Bamkoui––having
only ever seen him on television––and he only believed he was under a threat of
proceedings, the BIA did err in failing to afford the noncitizen a presumption of credibility without explicitly making an adverse determination to the contrary. 22 F.4th at 1186–88. Contrary to Moundih’s assertions, we did not conclude that Takwi was credible with regard to his claims about the Cameroonian government’s misconduct; instead, we remanded to the BIA on the credibility issue. Id. at 1188. That result––coupled with several other factual and procedural distinctions from Moundih’s case––makes Takwi irrelevant here. 15 Appellate Case: 24-9508 Document: 65 Date Filed: 07/10/2025 Page: 16
death from Colonel Bamkoui because his partner had told him so. Moreover,
Moundih’s relationship with Colonel Bamkoui’s supposed girlfriend occurred in
2005––nearly two decades ago. At present, nothing indicates that Colonel Bamkoui
is still seeking to harm Moundih (if he ever was at all). And although police went to
Moundih’s apartment in Cameroon during his time there in 2014, nothing suggests
that the police harmed him at that time, nor that they indicated an intent to harm him
in the future. Indeed, the fact that Moundih was able to travel to Cameroon in 2014
without experiencing torture or other mistreatment suggests that his fear of
persecution by Colonel Bamkoui is unfounded.
Lacking evidence of current, particularized government interest in Moundih
personally, it was not error for the IJ and the BIA to conclude that Moundih’s claims
were unduly speculative. See Xue, 846 F.3d at 1111 (affirming, both in the less-
stringent asylum and withholding contexts and in the stricter CAT context, a finding
that a noncitizen’s fear of future persecution was unduly speculative where the
noncitizen presented evidence that the government previously targeted him, but not
that the government was still doing so). Thus, the IJ’s finding that Moundih was not
likely to be tortured by Colonel Bamkoui is supported by substantial evidence in the
record.
Ultimately, Moundih’s arguments––before the IJ, before the BIA, and before
us here––all boil down to a “hypothetical chain” of events that cannot establish CAT
eligibility. See Medina-Moreno, 841 F. App’x at 75 (quoting In re J- F- F- , 23 I. &
N. Dec. at 917–18). To be sure, Moundih’s evidence indicates that Cameroon has
16 Appellate Case: 24-9508 Document: 65 Date Filed: 07/10/2025 Page: 17
experienced some degree of government corruption and abuse. But the evidence is
insufficient to show that Moundih personally was so politically involved––in general
or with Colonel Bamkoui––as to be at a risk of experiencing torture. To the contrary,
the record demonstrates that Moundih’s political activism was limited, and the events
he points to as a basis for his fear of torture are either decades old or unrelated to him
personally. The BIA’s determination that Moundih had not established a likelihood
of torture is therefore supported by substantial evidence.
III.
Moundih also filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. To
proceed in forma pauperis, litigants must show a “reasoned, nonfrivolous argument
on the law and facts in support of the issues raised in the action.” Lister v. Dep’t of
Treasury, 408 F.3d 1309, 1312 (10th Cir. 2005). Because Moundih presented law
and facts to challenge the BIA’s decision, Moundih’s petition for review is
nonfrivolous. We therefore grant his motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
IV.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the BIA’s decision and DENY Moundih’s petition
for review, but we GRANT Moundih’s motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis.
Entered for the Court
Allison H. Eid Circuit Judge