Moss v. GoDaddy.com CA2/4

California Court of Appeal

Moss v. GoDaddy.com CA2/4

California Court of Appeal·Decided July 23, 2026·No. B346188·Unpublished

Opinion

Filed 7/23/26 Moss v. GoDaddy.com CA2/4 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

MICHAEL MOSS et al., B346188, B347269 (Los Angeles County

Plaintiffs and Appellants, Super. Ct. No. 23STCV31166)

v.

GODADDY.COM, LLC, et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from judgment of the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles, Carolyn B. Kuhl, Judge. Affirmed.

Singleton Schreiber, Benjamin Siminou, Jonna D. Lothyan, Christopher R. Rodriguez and Andrew D. Bluth, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Cozen O’Connor, Robert S. Clark and Nathan M. Dooley, for Defendants and Respondents.

Plaintiffs Michael Moss, Jaeis Chon, William Vaz, and Fuad Ahwal appeal from a judgment of dismissal following an

order sustaining the demurrer of defendants GoDaddy.com, LLC (GoDaddy), GoDaddy Payments, LLC, and Poynt, LLC (collectively, defendants) to the operative first amended class action complaint. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants violated Civil Code section 1670.8.1 This statute, sometimes known as the “Yelp law,” provides that contracts for the sale of consumer goods or services may not include provisions waiving a consumer’s right to make statements about the seller or the purchased goods or services. (§ 1670.8, subd. (a)(1).) The law makes it unlawful for a seller to threaten or seek to enforce such waivers (id., subd. (a)(2)) and permits consumers to recover certain civil penalties (id., subd. (c)).

Plaintiffs alleged that defendants violated the statute by requiring them to agree to terms of service that included prohibited waiver language. They did not, however, allege that defendants made threats or took actions to enforce the terms of service or otherwise penalize them. We conclude that plaintiffs failed to state a claim entitling them to civil penalties and affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND We draw the following facts from the allegations in the first amended complaint.

GoDaddy, a domain registrar and web hosting company, operated an online store through which it sold products and services such as domain names, web hosting, and security services.

1 Undesignated statutory references in this opinion are to the Civil Code.

Plaintiffs were consumers who made purchases through the online store. During the checkout process, they were required to accept GoDaddy’s Universal Terms of Service. According to plaintiffs, the terms of service forbade them from “making any statement that ‘contains false or deceptive language or unsubstantiated or comparative claims regarding GoDaddy or GoDaddy’s Services.’” They also prohibited plaintiffs from posting “any ‘content on [GoDaddy’s] website that could result in damage to GoDaddy’s business, operations, reputation or shareholders . . . .’”

Plaintiffs asserted a single cause of action for violation of section 1670.8. They alleged the above-quoted language was prohibited by the statute, and by including it in the terms of service, defendants sought to have plaintiffs waive their rights to make protected statements.2 They alleged entitlement to civil penalties for defendants’ repeated violations of the law.

Defendants demurred to the first amended complaint.

Among other grounds, they contended that section 1670.8 did not provide a private right of action for violations of subdivision (a)(1) alone. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend.

2 Plaintiffs do not claim they were dissatisfied with any product or service they purchased from defendants or that they wished to express such dissatisfaction. They also do not allege defendants threatened or sought to enforce any purportedly unlawful provision against them. Instead, they contend that “each and every customer” who purchased products or services from defendants’ online store during the period covered by the statute of limitations is entitled to recover civil penalties solely because defendants’ Universal Terms of Service allegedly contained language prohibited by section 1670.8, subdivision (a)(1).

Plaintiffs appealed from the ensuing judgment of dismissal.3

DISCUSSION

A. Request for Judicial Notice On appeal, both parties filed requests for judicial notice.

The requests are denied. (Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison (1998) 18 Cal.4th 739, 748, fn. 6 [declining to take judicial notice of materials that were not “necessary, helpful, or relevant”]; see Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 45, fn. 9 [noting it is unnecessary to request judicial notice of published legislative history material; citation to the material is sufficient].)

B. Standard of Review We review an order sustaining a demurrer de novo.

(California Logistics, Inc. v. State of California (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 242, 247.) “We assume the truth of the allegations in the complaint, but do not assume the truth of the contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law.” (Ibid.)

C. Overview of Section 1670.8 Subdivision (a) of section 1670.8 provides:

“(1) A contract or proposed contract for the sale or lease of consumer goods or services may not include a provision waiving the consumer’s right to make any statement regarding the seller or lessor or

3 Plaintiffs filed two notices of appeal, one from the order and the judgment and one from the judgment only. On our own motion, we consolidate the appeals.

its employees or agents, or concerning the goods or services.

“(2) It shall be unlawful to threaten or to seek to enforce a provision made unlawful under this section, or to otherwise penalize a consumer for making any statement protected under this section.”

Subdivision (c) provides that “[a]ny person who violates this section shall be subject to a civil penalty not to exceed two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) for the first violation, and five thousand dollars ($5,000) for the second and for each subsequent violation, to be assessed and collected in a civil action brought by the consumer . . . .”

D. Section 1670.8 Does Not Afford a Private Right of Action for Violations of Subdivision (a)(1) Alone Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in finding that a violation of subdivision (a)(1) was insufficient to state a cause of action for violation of section 1670.8 absent allegations that the defendants also violated subdivision (a)(2). They argue the text and legislative history make it clear that the law created a private right of action for violations of either subdivision.

1. Text of Section 1670.8 “A private party can sue for violation of a statute only where the statute in question allows it.” (Mayron v. Google LLC (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 566, 571 (Mayron).) “The burden of persuasion is with the party claiming a statutory right to sue.” (San Diegans for Open Government v. Public Facilities Financing Authority of City of San Diego (2019) 8 Cal.5th 733, 739 (San Diegans).)

Courts first examine the text of the statute to determine if there is a “‘clear, understandable, unmistakable’ indication of intent to allow a private right of action.” (Mayron, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 571, quoting Lu v. Hawaiian Gardens Casino, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 592, 597.) “It is not enough that the statutory text suggests such a right. [Citation.] A clear indication means the text cannot be reasonably susceptible of competing interpretations.” (Id. at pp. 571–572, italics added.)

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