Moses v. Howard University Hospital

601 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40604
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedFebruary 19, 2009
DocketCivil Action 01-2528 (PLF)
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 601 F. Supp. 2d 1 (Moses v. Howard University Hospital) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Moses v. Howard University Hospital, 601 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40604 (D.D.C. 2009).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

PAUL L. FRIEDMAN, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on several post-judgment motions by plaintiff Vi-jayakumar Moses’ Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee, Janet M. Nesse, and defendant Howard University Hospital’s responses to Ms. Nesse’s motions. For the reasons discussed below, the Court will grant Ms. Nesse’s motion to substitute her for Mr. Moses as the plaintiff in this case; grant in part and deny in part Ms. Nesse’s motion to alter or amend the Court’s July 1, 2008, 567 F.Supp.2d 62, Opinion and Judgment, which granted summary judgment to Howard and dismissed this case from the docket of the Court; deny Ms. Nesse’s motion to enforce an alleged settlement agreement between Ms. Nesse and Howard; and deny Ms. Nesse’s request for a hearing on her motions. 1

I. BACKGROUND

On July 1, 2008, the Court granted summary judgment in Howard’s favor on Mr. Moses’ one remaining claim and dismissed this case from the docket of this Court. The Court concluded that Mr. Moses’ claim was barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel because Mr. Moses had failed to disclose the existence of this lawsuit in two bankruptcy proceedings: one in 2003 (under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code) and one in 2007 (under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code). See Moses v. Howard Univ. Hospital, 567 F.Supp.2d 62, 69 (D.D.C.2008). 2 In the course of rendering its decision, the Court denied Mr. Moses’ motion to add Ms. Nesse as a plaintiff. As the Court explained:

[T]he authority and discretion to intervene in Mr. Moses’ lawsuit belongs to Ms. Nesse; Mr. Moses may not unilater *3 ally inject her into this matter. Not only has Ms. Nesse not attempted to intervene, Mr. Moses has offered no evidence suggesting that she wishes to do so.

Id. In other words, the Court did not conclude that substituting Ms. Nesse as a plaintiff was improper. Indeed, as Ms. Nesse correctly observes, “[u]pon filing a bankruptcy petition [under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code], a debtor [loses] standing to pursue a cause of action that predates the filing”; at that point, “the bankruptcy trustee assumes the status of the real party in interest” and may choose to intervene as a plaintiff in the action and pursue the debtor’s claim on behalf of the bankruptcy estate. Mot. Substitute at 3 (citing Detrick v. Panalpina, Inc., 108 F.3d 529, 535-36 (4th Cir.1997)). The Court merely concluded that Mr. Moses was not entitled to decide, on Ms. Nesse’s behalf, whether Ms. Nesse would exercise her discretion to pursue his claim on behalf of the bankruptcy estate.

Unbeknownst to this Court, however, Ms. Nesse — and Howard — had begun acting as if Ms. Nesse was a party to this case long before the Court issued its Opinion and Judgment of July 1, 2008. According to Ms. Nesse, Mr. Moses filed and

the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland (“Bankruptcy Court”) granted [his] Motion to Reopen Chapter 7 Case on January 24, 2008. Shortly thereafter, the Trustee and Stephen Baskin, counsel for Howard, began to discuss a potential settlement of this action.
On April 3, 2008, the Trustee met first with Mr. Moses and his counsel and then with Mr. Baskin. At that time, Mr. Baskin presented the outlines of Howard’s settlement offer. The Trustee indicated that the offer was generally acceptable and Mr. Baskin agreed to memorialize the offer in writing with all details and necessary explanations.... Mr. Baskin did not deliver the written settlement proposal to the Trustee until June 5, 2008. The Trustee then telephoned Mr. Baskin to inform him of her agreement to the terms and then prepared a Motion for Approval of Compromise of Controversy Pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr.P. 9019 (“9019 Motion”). The 9019 Motion was filed in the Bankruptcy Court on June 26, 2008.

Mot. Alter at 1-2 (paragraph numbers omitted). Howard does not dispute this account, except to argue that its settlement offer — which it withdrew upon issuance of this Court’s July 1, 2008 Opinion and Judgment — was merely “tentative.” Mot. Alter Opp. at 2. 3

Ms. Nesse now argues that the Court should (1) substitute her for Mr. Moses as a plaintiff in this matter because she is the real party in interest, see Mot. Substitute at 3; (2) alter or amend the July 1, 2008 Opinion and Judgment to indicate that they do not bar Ms. Nesse from pursuing Mr. Moses’ claim on behalf of the bankruptcy estate, see Mot. Alter at 3-5; and (3) order Howard to honor the settlement agreement described in the aforementioned 9019 Motion on the ground that “[t]he writing prepared by Mr. Baskin ... on behalf of Howard constituted an offer, which the Trustee accepted when she telephoned Mr. Baskin and when she filed the 9019 Motion in the Bankruptcy Court.” Mot. Enforce at 3. In response, Howard urges the Court not to substitute Ms. Nesse as a plaintiff because Ms. Nesse did *4 not move to intervene in a timely manner. See Mot. Substitute Opp. at 3-4. Howard also argues that Ms. Nesse “fails to demonstrate grounds for altering or amending the judgment” of July 1, 2008 under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Mot. Alter Opp. at 3. Finally, Howard maintains that the Court should not enforce the settlement agreement for several reasons — one of which is that Howard cannot be forced to perform under the agreement because a condition precedent to its operation (namely, approval by the Bankruptcy Court) has not occurred. See Mot. Enforce Opp. at 6-7 (describing the Bankruptcy Court’s approval as a condition precedent). 4

II. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Substitute Ms. Nesse As Plaintiff

The Court will grant Ms. Nesse’s motion to substitute. While Ms. Nesse could have — and probably should have— sought to intervene in this matter earlier, the Court will excuse her failure to do so for three reasons: First, it would be inequitable to deny Ms. Nesse’s motion because the effect of doing so would be to punish her (and Mr. Moses’ creditors) for the misdeeds of Mr. Moses. Second, it would be inequitable to deny Ms. Nesse’s motion in light of the fact that Howard was perfectly willing to behave as if Ms. Nesse was a party to this action until July 1, 2008 — that is, until it benefited Howard to argue otherwise. Third and finally, the cases cited by Howard in its opposition to Ms. Nesse’s motion to substitute are inap-posite. See Mot. Substitute Opp. at 3 (citing Pavlov v. Ingles Markets, Inc., 236 Fed.Appx. 549 (11th Cir.2007); Lexxus Int’l v. Loghry, 512 F.Supp.2d 647 (N.D.Tex.2007)).

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
601 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40604, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/moses-v-howard-university-hospital-dcd-2009.