Opinion
MOON, C.J.
Timothy W. Morton appeals his conviction of possession of cocaine in violation of Code § 18.2-250. Because we hold that probable cause existed to issue a warrant authorizing the search of Apartment 320 at 100 Princess Anne Street in the Hazel Hill Complex and all the persons present therein, we affirm.
On February 28, 1992, Officer Pennock of Fredericksburg stated under oath in a search warrant affidavit that a search was requested for 100 Princess Anne Street, in the Hazel Hill Complex, Apartment 320. The persons to be searched were Melonie Jones “and all other persons inside of said apt. [sic] at the time of execution of the warrant.” The material facts constituting probable cause, as stated in the search warrant affidavit, were as follows:
On February] 27, 1992 [Pennock] received information from a confidential reliable informant that he/she has witnessed crack cocaine inside 100 Princess Anne Street, apt. 320 within the past 48 hours. This informant has given information in the past that through investigation has proven reliable. In the past this same informant has given information that has led to the arrest of suspects. In the past two weeks the manager of the complex has had complaints about this same apt. in regards to the distribution of crack cocaine and prostitution. The manager has given information in the past which led to arrests of suspects involved in the drug trade. Many surveillances have been conducted by the Fredericksburg Narcotics Unit in the past sixty days . . . [and have] revealed several known and convicted drug users, and on two occasions persons being sought by police have sought refuge inside of said apartment.
At 6:45 p.m., the magistrate determined that the facts stated in the search warrant affidavit established probable cause and issued a search warrant authorizing the search for cocaine, and any other illegal drugs, money, records, and paraphernalia related to the possession and distribution of cocaine, at “100 Princess Anne Street, in the Hazel Hill Complex, Apartment 320,” including all persons inside at the time of the execution.
[948]*948At 8:20 p.m., Officer Pennock and Brent Taylor executed the search warrant on the above apartment, which was a small, two-bedroom town house apartment leased to Melonie Jones.
When Jones admitted the officers into the apartment, the officers observed Timothy Morton, appellant, at the top of the steps in close proximity to an adult male. Officer Taylor escorted the two men downstairs and detained them along with Jones and two other adults present in the house. A search of appellant’s rear pants pocket revealed a Tylenol bottle containing cocaine residue, matches, a lighter, and a piece of wire.
Prior to trial, conceding that the search warrant affidavit established probable cause to search the premises, the appellant moved to suppress the items seized from his pants pocket. He argued that the “any persons present” language in the search warrant was unconstitutional for lack of specificity, that the facts stated in the search warrant affidavit were inadequate to establish probable cause for a search of all persons present, and that the affidavit was so deficient when the search was executed, that it could not be saved by the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule.
The trial court ruled that the information in the search warrant affidavit established probable cause to search the private residence, and that the totality of the facts, including the allegation that the apartment was a private residence and that drug trading was allegedly taking place in the apartment, justified the search of all persons present when the search warrant was executed.
Appellant was convicted after a bench trial of possession of cocaine in violation of Code § 18.2-250 and received a sentence of five years in the penitentiary with all but nine months suspended.
Although Virginia has not ruled on the validity of “all persons present” clauses in search warrants, many other jurisdictions have had the opportunity to do so and have upheld such search warrants. See Minnesota v. Hinkel, 365 N.W.2d 774 (1985); Pennsylvania v. Graciani, 554 A.2d 560 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989); Massachusetts v. Smith, 348 N.E.2d 101, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 944 (1976); Willis v. Georgia, 177 S.E.2d 487 (Ga. Ct. App. 1970); New Jersey v. De Simone, 288 A.2d 849 (N.J. 1972); People v. Easterbrook, 350 N.Y.S.2d 442 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973), aff'd, 324 N.E.2d 367 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975).
[949]*949In Graciani, the affidavit stated that a confidential, reliable informant, who had been proven reliable in the past, informed police that within the past three days he had personally observed cocaine sales at the residence and that cocaine was being hidden in the house. The Court held that a nexus was established between the suspected distribution of cocaine, the private residence, and persons to be searched and justified a warrant to search the residence and “all persons present.” 554 A.2d at 561-62. The Court explained that
[tjhough it is certainly possible, even probable, that innocent third parties who happen to be at the wrong place at the wrong time may be subjected to searches under such warrants, the nexus between the person to be searched and the nature and the seriousness of the criminal conduct suspected on probable cause, nonetheless, renders the probability of their culpable participation in the crime suspected sufficient to warrant a search of their person. . . .
Id. at 562-63.
In De Simone, speaking for a unanimous Court, Justice Weintraub stated:
On principle, the sufficiency of a warrant to search persons identified only by their presence at a specified place should depend upon the facts. A showing that lottery slips are sold in a department store . . . obviously would not justify a warrant to search every person on the premises, for there would be no probable cause to believe that everyone there was participating in the illegal operation. On the other hand, a showing that a dice game is operated in a manhole or in a bam should suffice, for the reason that the place is so limited and the illegal operation so overt that it is likely that everyone present is a party to the offense. Such a setting furnishes not only probable cause but also a designation of the persons to be searched which functionally is as precise as a dimensional portrait of them.
288 A.2d at 850.
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania used a De Simone analysis to uphold an “all persons present” warrant in which the accused was found to possess drugs while visiting the subject’s apartment. Pennsylvania v. Heidelberg, 535 A.2d 611 (1987). The Court in Heidelberg stated as follows:
[950]*950We do not sanction the blind issuance of “all persons present” warrants and have scrutinized strictly the one under consideration. However, the facts contained in this affidavit include: 1) the observation of . . . cocaine available ...
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Opinion
MOON, C.J.
Timothy W. Morton appeals his conviction of possession of cocaine in violation of Code § 18.2-250. Because we hold that probable cause existed to issue a warrant authorizing the search of Apartment 320 at 100 Princess Anne Street in the Hazel Hill Complex and all the persons present therein, we affirm.
On February 28, 1992, Officer Pennock of Fredericksburg stated under oath in a search warrant affidavit that a search was requested for 100 Princess Anne Street, in the Hazel Hill Complex, Apartment 320. The persons to be searched were Melonie Jones “and all other persons inside of said apt. [sic] at the time of execution of the warrant.” The material facts constituting probable cause, as stated in the search warrant affidavit, were as follows:
On February] 27, 1992 [Pennock] received information from a confidential reliable informant that he/she has witnessed crack cocaine inside 100 Princess Anne Street, apt. 320 within the past 48 hours. This informant has given information in the past that through investigation has proven reliable. In the past this same informant has given information that has led to the arrest of suspects. In the past two weeks the manager of the complex has had complaints about this same apt. in regards to the distribution of crack cocaine and prostitution. The manager has given information in the past which led to arrests of suspects involved in the drug trade. Many surveillances have been conducted by the Fredericksburg Narcotics Unit in the past sixty days . . . [and have] revealed several known and convicted drug users, and on two occasions persons being sought by police have sought refuge inside of said apartment.
At 6:45 p.m., the magistrate determined that the facts stated in the search warrant affidavit established probable cause and issued a search warrant authorizing the search for cocaine, and any other illegal drugs, money, records, and paraphernalia related to the possession and distribution of cocaine, at “100 Princess Anne Street, in the Hazel Hill Complex, Apartment 320,” including all persons inside at the time of the execution.
[948]*948At 8:20 p.m., Officer Pennock and Brent Taylor executed the search warrant on the above apartment, which was a small, two-bedroom town house apartment leased to Melonie Jones.
When Jones admitted the officers into the apartment, the officers observed Timothy Morton, appellant, at the top of the steps in close proximity to an adult male. Officer Taylor escorted the two men downstairs and detained them along with Jones and two other adults present in the house. A search of appellant’s rear pants pocket revealed a Tylenol bottle containing cocaine residue, matches, a lighter, and a piece of wire.
Prior to trial, conceding that the search warrant affidavit established probable cause to search the premises, the appellant moved to suppress the items seized from his pants pocket. He argued that the “any persons present” language in the search warrant was unconstitutional for lack of specificity, that the facts stated in the search warrant affidavit were inadequate to establish probable cause for a search of all persons present, and that the affidavit was so deficient when the search was executed, that it could not be saved by the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule.
The trial court ruled that the information in the search warrant affidavit established probable cause to search the private residence, and that the totality of the facts, including the allegation that the apartment was a private residence and that drug trading was allegedly taking place in the apartment, justified the search of all persons present when the search warrant was executed.
Appellant was convicted after a bench trial of possession of cocaine in violation of Code § 18.2-250 and received a sentence of five years in the penitentiary with all but nine months suspended.
Although Virginia has not ruled on the validity of “all persons present” clauses in search warrants, many other jurisdictions have had the opportunity to do so and have upheld such search warrants. See Minnesota v. Hinkel, 365 N.W.2d 774 (1985); Pennsylvania v. Graciani, 554 A.2d 560 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989); Massachusetts v. Smith, 348 N.E.2d 101, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 944 (1976); Willis v. Georgia, 177 S.E.2d 487 (Ga. Ct. App. 1970); New Jersey v. De Simone, 288 A.2d 849 (N.J. 1972); People v. Easterbrook, 350 N.Y.S.2d 442 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973), aff'd, 324 N.E.2d 367 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975).
[949]*949In Graciani, the affidavit stated that a confidential, reliable informant, who had been proven reliable in the past, informed police that within the past three days he had personally observed cocaine sales at the residence and that cocaine was being hidden in the house. The Court held that a nexus was established between the suspected distribution of cocaine, the private residence, and persons to be searched and justified a warrant to search the residence and “all persons present.” 554 A.2d at 561-62. The Court explained that
[tjhough it is certainly possible, even probable, that innocent third parties who happen to be at the wrong place at the wrong time may be subjected to searches under such warrants, the nexus between the person to be searched and the nature and the seriousness of the criminal conduct suspected on probable cause, nonetheless, renders the probability of their culpable participation in the crime suspected sufficient to warrant a search of their person. . . .
Id. at 562-63.
In De Simone, speaking for a unanimous Court, Justice Weintraub stated:
On principle, the sufficiency of a warrant to search persons identified only by their presence at a specified place should depend upon the facts. A showing that lottery slips are sold in a department store . . . obviously would not justify a warrant to search every person on the premises, for there would be no probable cause to believe that everyone there was participating in the illegal operation. On the other hand, a showing that a dice game is operated in a manhole or in a bam should suffice, for the reason that the place is so limited and the illegal operation so overt that it is likely that everyone present is a party to the offense. Such a setting furnishes not only probable cause but also a designation of the persons to be searched which functionally is as precise as a dimensional portrait of them.
288 A.2d at 850.
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania used a De Simone analysis to uphold an “all persons present” warrant in which the accused was found to possess drugs while visiting the subject’s apartment. Pennsylvania v. Heidelberg, 535 A.2d 611 (1987). The Court in Heidelberg stated as follows:
[950]*950We do not sanction the blind issuance of “all persons present” warrants and have scrutinized strictly the one under consideration. However, the facts contained in this affidavit include: 1) the observation of . . . cocaine available ... at the residence within twenty-four hours of the issuance of the warrant; 2) observations by three informants of drug sales at the residence; 3) a private residence to be searched; and 4) contraband which can easily be hidden on the body. Given these facts, we uphold the magistrate’s determination that probable cause existed to believe that anyone at the residence on the night in question would be involved in illegal drug-related activities.
Id. at 615.
In this case, the affidavit contained the following facts: (1) a reliable informant had seen crack cocaine inside the apartment within the past forty-eight hours; (2) the manager of the complex had received complaints of distribution of crack cocaine from this same apartment; (3) the apartment was a private residence; (4) surveillance within the past sixty days had revealed known and convicted drug users inside the apartment; and (5) the contraband could be easily hidden on the body.
(2) Based on the totality of the circumstances, we hold that probable cause existed to search all of the persons found inside the apartment when the warrant was executed. The facts in this case established a substantial “nexus” between the observation of cocaine in the apartment, the observation of the distribution of cocaine, the private nature of the apartment, and the easily concealable contraband sufficient to support an “all persons present” warrant.
The standard which we apply in reviewing a magistrate’s probable cause determination is whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.... We are further mindful that a magistrate may draw reasonable inferences from the material supplied to him and that his determination of probable cause “should be paid great deference by reviewing courts.” “A deferential standard of review is appropriate to further the Fourth Amendment’s strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant.”
[951]*951Williams v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 53, 68, 354 S.E.2d 79, 87 (1987) (citations omitted).
In sum, we hold the information in the affidavit supported a finding of probable cause that those persons present in the private residence would be engaged in criminal activity. We give the magistrate’s determination great deference. Williams, 4 Va. App. at 68, 354 S.E.2d at 87.
Having held that the warrant was issued upon probable cause, we need not decide whether the good faith exception in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), would apply in this case.
Accordingly the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Fitzpatrick, J., concurred.