Morrow v. Janis

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided August 7, 2023·No. 7:23-cv-03224·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK NEB MORROW, Plaintiff, 23-CV-3224 (LTS) -against- ORDER OF DISMISSAL MARC JANIS, Defendant. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated at Sing Sing Correctional Facility, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendant Marc Janis was deliberately indifferent to his pain when he conducted a prostate biopsy. By order dated July 17, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees.1 For the reasons set forth in this order, the Court dismisses this action, but grants Plaintiff 60 days’ leave to replead his claims in a second amended complaint.2 STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 2 On June 7, 2023, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret

them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. BACKGROUND The following allegations are taken from the amended complaint. On May 28, 2019, Plaintiff was taken from Sing Sing Correctional Facility (“Sing Sing”) to the office of Dr. Marc Janis, a urologist in Mount Vernon, New York, for a “prostate biopsy for cancer due to abnormalities and high PSA.” (ECF 7, at 2.)3 Janis conducted the biopsy without providing

Plaintiff with anesthesia, and extracted with a “needle punch” twelve samples of tissue from Plaintiff’s prostate. (Id.) Because Janis did not apply any “numbing agents,” Plaintiff was in “an extreme amount of pain and anguish” during the procedure; pain “so excruciating” that his “entire body was wracked with tremors that traveled up and down [his] body from his feet to the top of his head and back down.” (Id.) Plaintiff could not move for at least ten minutes after the procedure, and had to lay down in the van that took him back to Sing Sing. At Sing Sing, he

3 The Court quotes from the amended complaint verbatim. All grammar, punctuation, and spelling are in the original unless otherwise indicated. went to the infirmary and was given two Percocet for the pain and was allowed to stay there overnight. Plaintiff contends the following: The fact that Dr. Janis did not administer any pain numbing agent is evidence of his deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s pain, in that clearly Dr. Janis could have stopped the procedure after the first 3 indications of pain and applied a local anesthetic to numb Plaintiff’s prostate before continuing, but failed to do so, which leads Plaintiff to believe that Dr. Janis was deriving some sort of sexual gratification from observing Plaintiff in extreme pain as he was causing the pain thereby evincing deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s anguish and brutal suffering. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff seeks money damages. DISCUSSION A. Statute of Limitations Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 appear to be barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims is found in the “general or residual [state] statute [of limitations] for personal injury actions.” Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989)). In New York, that period is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5). Section 1983 claims generally accrue when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of the claim. Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 518 (2d Cir. 2013). Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Janis was deliberately indifferent to his pain during a procedure that occurred on May 28, 2019. Thus, Plaintiff knew or had reasons to know of his injury on that date. He did not, however, file the original complaint in this action until April 17, 2023, more than three years and ten months after his claims accrued. Therefore, the statute of limitations period for Plaintiff’s claims appears to have expired well before he filed this action.4

4 Plaintiff asserts in the amended complaint that “[t]he deadline for a medical malpractice claim is 2½ years from the date of exhaustion in the state making the deadline to file this matter The doctrine of equitable tolling permits a court, “under compelling circumstances, [to] make narrow exceptions to the statute of limitations in order ‘to prevent inequity.’” In re U.S. Lines, Inc., 318 F.3d 432, 436 (2d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). The statute of limitations may be equitably tolled, for example, when a defendant fraudulently conceals from a plaintiff the fact

that the plaintiff has a cause of action, or when the plaintiff is induced by the defendant to forego a lawsuit until the statute of limitations has expired. See Pearl, 296 F.3d at 82-83. In addition, New York law provides that, where a person “is under a disability because of . . . insanity at the time the cause of action accrues,” the applicable statute of limitations will be tolled. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 208; Gardner v. Wansart, No. 05-CV-3351, 2006 WL 2742043, at *5 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.

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