Morrison v. Mayorkas

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: September 16, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2024-1765
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

BRUCE A. MORRISON,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 1:24-cv-01765 (TNM)

KRISTI NOEM, in her official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and

RODNEY SCOTT, in his official capacity as Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection,

Defendants. 1

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Travelers who are part of the Global Entry program can breezily sweep through airline

security. The same is not necessarily true of federal courthouse doors. Bruce Morrison sued

senior officials in the Department of Homeland Security (collectively, “the Secretary”) for

revoking his Global Entry status a few years ago. DHS has since reinstated his Global Entry

credentials. So the Secretary argues that this case is moot because Morrison has already gotten

everything he wanted. The Court agrees. The Secretary’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-

matter jurisdiction will be granted.

1 These Defendants have been substituted as the current officials leading the Department of Homeland Security and Customs and Border Protection under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d).

1 I.

The Global Entry program allows pre-approved, low risk travelers to pass more quickly

through airport processing lines. Global Entry, U.S. Customs & Border Prot. (2025). 2 Congress

directed the Department of Homeland Security to establish an “international registered traveler

program” that would “[e]xpedit[e] the travel of previously screened and known travelers across

the borders of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1365b(k). DHS then promulgated regulations

creating the Global Entry program and allowing certain U.S. residents to apply. 8 C.F.R.

§ 235.12(b). Travelers hoping to enroll must apply, pay a nonrefundable fee, and undergo an

interview. Id. § 235.12(d)–(e).

Those regulations give DHS a lot of say about who enters the country. A Global Entry

application may be denied or revoked if Customs and Border Protection “determines,” “at its

sole discretion,” that a person is “not a low-risk traveler.” 8 C.F.R. § 235.12(b)(2). CBP may

make that decision for many reasons, including violating criminal or civil laws or regulations,

providing false application information, failing to follow program terms and conditions, being

investigated by law enforcement, or simply that “CBP, at its sole discretion, determine[d] that

such action is otherwise necessary.” Id.; id. § 235.12(j)(2)(i)–(v).

When CBP removes a traveler from the program, it must “notify the participant of his or

her suspension or removal in writing. Such suspension or removal is effective immediately.” Id.

§ 235.12(j)(3). To be clear, a traveler denied Global Entry may still enter the United States; he

simply may not use the expedited airport lines the program otherwise opens. Mot. Dismiss, ECF

No. 14, at 4.

2 https://perma.cc/4AA3-3GFV.

2 Bruce Morrison first became a Global Entry traveler in 2014. Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶ 1.

He received a five-year extension in 2019. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 19. Morrison is a former member of the

U.S. Congress from Connecticut, serving his state from 1983 to 1991. Am. Compl. ¶ 9. During

that time, he chaired the House Immigration Subcommittee and sat on the U.S. Commission on

Immigration Reform. Am. Compl. ¶ 9.

In October 2022, CBP notified Morrison that his Global Entry had been suspended,

effective immediately. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 18. It said simply, “You do not meet program eligibility

requirements,” then listed the possible revocation bases in the regulation. Mot. Dismiss at 4

(citing A.R. at CBP000028). Morrison believes that CBP revoked his Global Entry status in

retaliation for his “representation and advocacy on behalf of clients as an attorney or lobbyist.”

Compl. ¶ 35. As evidence, he alleges that his son was detained and questioned about his father’s

business at Newark Airport. Compl. ¶ 22.

Morrison filed a new application for Global Entry in February 2024. Mot. Compel at 8.

After no response for three months, he filed suit in this Court. Compl. (filed June 18, 2024). In

August 2024, CBP approved his re-application. Mot. Dismiss at 5 (citing AR 000042). His

Global Entry membership has been in effect since then. Id. When CBP reinstated Morrison, the

risk assessor “reviewed the derogatory information [responsible for the October 2022 revocation]

and deemed it currently insufficient to deny the reapplication.” Opp. Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 16,

at 4 (citing AR 000036).

The Secretary argues that Morrison’s claims are moot after his reinstatement. Mot.

Dismiss, ECF No. 14, at 6–7. Morrison opposes dismissal. Opp. Mot. Dismiss at 8–9. He also

moved to compel CBP to reveal the redacted information and any other reasoning underlying his

Global Entry revocation. Mot. Compel, ECF No. 15. These motions are ripe for consideration.

3 II.

Federal courts must presume that a “cause lies outside [their] limited

jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The plaintiff

bears the burden of overcoming that presumption. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561

(1992). The Court accepts factual allegations in the complaint as true, but those allegations “will

bear closer scrutiny in resolving a 12(b)(1) motion [to dismiss for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction] than in resolving a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim.” Schilling v. Speaker

of U.S. House of Reps., 633 F. Supp. 3d 272, 274–75 (D.D.C. 2022), aff’d sub nom., Schilling v.

U.S. House of Reps., 102 F.4th 503 (D.C. Cir. 2024). The Court “may consider materials outside

the pleadings in deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.” Id. at

275 (quoting Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).

III.

The Secretary contends that this Court has no subject-matter jurisdiction over Morrison’s

suit because he already received the relief that his Complaint requested. Mot. Dismiss at 6–7. 3

His Global Entry status has been fully restored. Id. Morrison responds that he still wants

vindication: This Court should declare that DHS was in the wrong when it revoked his status

and, more, require it to reverse that revocation. Opp. Mot. Dismiss at 8–9.

The relevant question is whether events have “so transpired” after the Complaint’s filing

that the Court’s ruling will not “presently affect the parties’ rights nor have a more-than-

3 Morrison briefly suggests that he requires a letter from the Attorney General authorizing the U.S. Attorney’s position here. Opp. Mot. Dismiss at 7 n.5. He lifts this issue from an Executive Order targeting independent regulatory agencies that expands presidential power over those entities. Exec. Order No. 14215, 90 C.F.R. 10,447, 10,448 (2025). That seems far afield. More, the Executive Order explicitly denies “creat[ing] any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, agents, or any other person.” Id. at 10449. Finally, Morrison does not meaningfully suggest why this Court should doubt the Chief of the Civil Division’s authorization of the briefing to signify proper executive oversight for Defendants’ litigation position. Mot. Dismiss at 11.

4 speculative chance of affecting them in the future.” Clark v. United States, 915 F.2d 699, 701

(D.C. Cir. 1990). Article III confines federal courts’ limited jurisdiction to “adjudicating actual

cases and controversies.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (cleaned up). The principle

is rooted in the “separation of powers” that safeguards “concern about the proper—and properly

limited—role of the courts in a democratic society.” Id.

Plaintiffs must persuade the Court that they have a “case or controversy” by

demonstrating that they have “a personal stake in the outcome” that is “extant at all stages of

review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.” United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 584 U.S.

381, 385, 391 (2018). In this way, federal courts avoid issuing “advisory opinions” that they

have “no power to render.” Nat’l Black Police Ass’n v. District of Columbia, 108 F.3d 346, 349

(D.C. Cir. 1997) (cleaned up).

Once the party invoking the Court’s jurisdiction makes that initial showing, an opposing

party asserting that a case is moot bears the burden to show it. Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 39

F.4th 774, 785 (D.C. Cir. 2022). After that, the party opposing mootness must show that an

exception applies. S. Co. Servs., Inc. v. FERC, 416 F.3d 39, 43 (D.C. Cir. 2005); accord

Alphabet Workers Union-Commc’n Workers of Am. v. NLRB, 134 F.4th 1217, 1225–26 (D.C.

Cir. 2025). As applied here, the Secretary must show that the case is moot, and Morrison must

respond with an exception to that doctrine.

The Secretary has cleared her hurdle. Morrison’s Global Entry status has been fully

active since August 2024. Mot. Dismiss at 6–7 (citing AR 000028). His Complaint requested,

among other things, a writ of mandamus “compelling Defendants and those acting under them to

perform their duty to complete all steps necessary to reinstate Plaintiff’s Global Entry

membership.” Compl. at 11–12, ¶¶ C–D. It is uncontested that Defendants have completed all

5 steps necessary to reinstate his membership. Opp. Mot. Dismiss at 4. Thus, an event has

“transpired” since Morrison filed his Complaint that mooted the relief he requested. Clark, 915

F.2d at 701.

Morrison responds that an exception applies because this harm is “capable of repetition,

yet evading review.” Opp. Mot. Dismiss at 9; S. Pac. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Comm.

Comm’n, 219 U.S. 498, 514–16 (1911). Courts recognize this exception when a short-term harm

repeatedly would evaporate before a litigant could obtain redress in court. S. Pac. Terminal Co.,

219 U.S. at 514–16. Consistently declaring such cases moot would prevent review of such

harms. Id. Classic examples include one-year licenses and pregnancy. Id.; Del Monte Fresh

Produce Co. v. United States, 570 F.3d 316, 325–26 (D.C. Cir. 2009); United States v.

Frumento, 552 F.2d 534, 537 (3d Cir. 1977).

To invoke this exception, Morrison must show that “(1) the challenged action was in its

duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there was a

reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action

again.” Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982). In general, “orders of less than two years’

duration ordinarily evade review.” Burlington N. R.R. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 75 F.3d 685, 690

(D.C. Cir. 1996). Morrison’s Global Entry was revoked in October 2022 and reinstated in

August 2024. Opp. Mot. Dismiss at 3–4. So far, so good.

But the short duration must be “typical of the challenged action.” Del Monte, 570 F.3d at

322. That is not the case here. The regulations do not mention any term limits for revocations.

8 C.F.R. § 235.12. In fact, they call revocation “removal,” suggesting permanency unless the

traveler seeks redress through agency appeal or other inquiry. Id. § 235.12(j)–(k). Morrison

makes no argument that revocations generally are too short to be reviewed. See Opp. Mot.

6 Dismiss at 5–9. He only says that his revocation was too short, and that perhaps the agency

could make them too short. Id.

This case’s own procedural history belies Morrison’s suggestion. He originally received

Global Entry status for five years and the agency renewed it for three before revoking, then that

revocation was not time limited. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 17–20. The D.C. Circuit has been clear that a

short duration must be “typical of the challenged action” to qualify for the mootness exception.

Del Monte, 570 F.3d at 322. Because Morrison has not carried his burden as to the first prong,

the Court need not address the second. See Murphy, 455 U.S. at 482 (establishing a conjunctive

test).

Finally, Morrison also seems to argue that even if his injunctive relief is mooted, his

declaratory relief is not—though his brief is not entirely clear. Opp. Mot. Dismiss at 8 (rebutting

mootness by emphasizing that his “prayer also seeks relief in the form of the [sic] declaring” that

the revocation was unlawful). If Morrison made this argument, the analysis simply re-routes the

Court back to the usual mootness exceptions. If plaintiffs “attack[] an isolated agency action,

then the mooting of the specific claim moots any claim for a declaratory judgment that the

specific action was unlawful, unless the specific claim fits the exception for cases that are

capable of repetition, yet evading review, or falls within the voluntary cessation doctrine.” City

of Houston, Tex. v. Dep’t of Housing & Urb. Dev., 24 F.3d 1421, 1429 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (cleaned

up). The Court has already found that Morrison did not carry his burden to demonstrate that an

exception to mootness applies here. So the same would be true even if he tried to carry forward

just his declaratory relief.

* * *

7 There is another mootness exception— voluntary cessation. But Morrison forfeited any

argument that it applies here. He only mentions it in his reply to an entirely different motion.

Reply Mot. Compel at 5–8. Recall that he bears the burden of showing that a mootness

exception applies. Alphabet Workers Union-Commc’n Workers of Am., 134 F.4th at 1225–26.

“Although a party cannot forfeit a claim that we lack jurisdiction, it can forfeit a claim that we

possess jurisdiction.” Scenic Am., Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 836 F.3d 42, 53 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2016)

(emphasis added); accord Huron v. Cobert, 809 F.3d 1274, 1279–80 (D.C. Cir. 2016). And

“district courts, like th[e D.C. Circuit], generally deem arguments made only in reply briefs to be

forfeited.” MBI Grp., Inc. v. Credit Foncier Du Cameroun, 616 F.3d 568, 575 (D.C. Cir. 2010).

Let alone replies made to unrelated motions.

In the D.C. Circuit, forfeiture applies equally to broader issues and arguments or legal

theories within those issues. Apprio, Inc. v. Zaccari, 104 F.4th 897, 910 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (“This

[forfeiture principle] applies equally to issues and arguments.”). Morrison has thus forfeited any

claim that the legal theory of voluntary cessation applies to the parties’ debate about the

mootness issue.

IV.

In sum, the Secretary has shown that this case is moot. Morrison has not shouldered his

burden to show that an exception applies. So the Court must dismiss the case for lack of subject-

matter jurisdiction. Morrison’s pending Motion to Compel also must be dismissed for lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction. An appropriate Order will issue today.

2025.09.16 16:28:51 -04'00' Dated: September 16, 2025 TREVOR N. McFADDEN, U.S.D.J.