Morrisdale Coal Mining Co. v. Commissioner

21 T.C. 393, 1953 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 8
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedDecember 24, 1953
DocketDocket No. 34214
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 21 T.C. 393 (Morrisdale Coal Mining Co. v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Morrisdale Coal Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 393, 1953 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 8 (tax 1953).

Opinion

OPINION.

Van Fossan, Judge:

At the outset, petitioner challenges the propriety of respondent’s action in effecting an adjustment of the credit allowed it under section 26 (e)1 of the Code. Specifically, petitioner contends that section 721 of the Internal'Revenue Code provides for relief from excess profits tax after all other issues are disposed of, and that it is so limited and does not comprehend any adjustment to income tax liability as a result of such relief. In reply to the argument, respondent points to section 26 (e), supra., itself, and maintains that such section clearly authorizes the procedure employed by him.

Neither party cites any authority in support of the views respectively held by them. It is our opinion that the position taken by respondent is correct. Section 26 (e) specifically provides that in the case of any corporation, subject to the excess profits tax and computing same under section 721, the credit allowable for income subject to excess profits tax shall be the amount of which such tax is 90 per cent. In the instant case, it cannot be denied that petitioner was, during the taxable year, a corporation subject to the excess profits tax, nor that such tax was determined and computed under section 721. Thus, the factual situation before us would seem to fall squarely within the scope and intendment of the statute in question. Certainly nothing appears therpin which would restrain or proscribe the procedure employed by respondent. To the contrary, such action seems clearly in pursuit of the statutory mandate.

Petitioner, however, advances the view that regardless of whether respondent’s action is authorized under the statute, he, nevertheless, is barred by the statute of limitations from assessing and collecting the deficiency in dispute. Respondent agrees that such would be the case but for section 3807,2 Internal Revenue Code, on which section he says the present notice of deficiency relies for its validity. On brief, he points up the items which are a prerequisite to the application of such statute, all of which items appear to be present here. Thus, there has heretofore been a determination by this Court of an overpayment of petitioner’s excess profits, or chapter 2, tax for 1943. Further, the application of the law or facts determined in the ascertainment of such overpayment to any other tax of petitioner under chapter 1, here its income tax, for the same taxable year results in an increase in the amount of such tax over that previously determined. And finally, the assessment of the deficiency in petitioner’s income tax thus determined is prevented by the statute of limitations. Under such circumstances, section 3807, supra, would seem clearly to apply and operate to lend validity to the notice of deficiency in controversy.

Furthermore, our research of the legislative history of the statute in question and our reading of the congressional committee reports attendant upon its passage, leaves us with no doubt as to the intent of Congress in this respect. The income tax and the excess profits tax are related taxes within the scope and intendment of section 3807, and respondent’s procedure finds authority therein. See Conference Rept. No. 1079, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 72, et seq.; Uni-Term Stevedoring Co., 3 T. C. 917, 920, footnote 6. See also Morrisdale Coal Mining Co., 19 T. C. 208; Hadley Furniture Co. v. United States, 87 F. Supp. 590. The statement to the contrary found in Southern Sportswear Co., 10 T. C. 402, remanded to vacate partially, 175 F. 2d 779, cannot be regarded as correct in view of the clear exposition of the congressional intent appearing in the cited conference report.

Petitioner also argues that the issue as to the income tax deficiency in dispute should have been raised by respondent in Docket No. 16270, the prior section 721 proceeding upon which it is based, and, respondent not having done so, he may not now assert such deficiency, that proceeding having become final. Petitioner’s argument on this point appears to be addressed principally to the extent of our jurisdiction in the prior case and to what could or could not have properly been done therein. The short answer is that regardless of what may have been the extent of our jurisdiction there, or what perhaps could or could not have been done therein, the fact remains that section 3807, in our view, operates to give respondent 1 year following the entry of our decision therein, within which to make any necessary adjustments to a related tax and collect or refund the deficiency or overpayment consequent thereon. The notice of deficiency involved, we have found, was mailed within such period of time.

There remains for disposition petitioner’s contention that if its income tax is to be adjusted after refund of excess profits tax is granted under section 721 by virtue of section 3807, then and in that event and by virtue of the same statute, it is entitled to recompute its excess profits tax liability to give effect to the 80 per cent overall limitation provided in section 710 (a) (1) (B).3

We do not feel that the question thus presented is properly before us in this proceeding. In the absence of a deficiency in petitioner’s excess profits tax for 1943, or the denial of a refund thereof under one of the relief provisions, we are without jurisdiction in the premises. The question whether section 3807 would operate to allow petitioner 1 year hereafter in which to file its claim for refund, if our holding herein causes a corresponding adjustment in the excess profits tax of petitioner, is beyond the province of this opinion. But see Conference Rept. No. 1079, supra.

Reviewed by the Court.

Decision will be entered wnder Rule 50.

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Morrisdale Coal Mining Co. v. Commissioner
21 T.C. 393 (U.S. Tax Court, 1953)

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Bluebook (online)
21 T.C. 393, 1953 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 8, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/morrisdale-coal-mining-co-v-commissioner-tax-1953.