SCHWELB, Associate Judge:
Aaron L. Morris was convicted by a jury of involuntary manslaughter1 in connection with the death, on or about February 3,1995, of three-year-old Rhonda Morris. On appeal, Morns contends that the trial judge committed reversible error by denying Morris’ motion to suppress
1. an inculpatory statement made by Morris prior to being advised of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 [86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694] (1966); and
2. a videotaped confession which Morris made after he had invoked his right to counsel.
Morris further claims that his trial testimony, which was also inculpatory, was induced by the allegedly erroneous admission of his videotaped confession and of the statement that preceded it.
The trial judge gave full and thoughtful consideration to the issues raised in Morris’ motion to suppress. The judge found that Morris was not in custody at the time he made his initial inculpatory statement, and that no Miranda warning was required. The judge further found that after declining to answer questions without an attorney, Morris voluntarily re-initiated discussions with the police and intentionally waived his right to counsel. We conclude that these findings are supported by the evidence, and we discern no error of law. Accordingly, we affirm Morris’ manslaughter conviction.2
I.
THE EVIDENCE
A. The initial investigation.
The evidence at the hearing on Morris’ motion to suppress statements revealed that on the night that Rhonda Morris died, her mother3 had left Rhonda, as well as the mother’s three other small children, in Aaron Morris’ care while she went in and out of her apartment with various men. At about 7:45 a.m. on February 4, 1995, the police received a report of an unconscious child. Officers proceeded to Rhonda’s mother’s apartment, which was in unsanitary condition,4 and found paramedics “working on” Rhonda. The little girl was not breathing, and she had no pulse. Rhonda’s mother was screaming that “he killed my baby.”
The officers discovered Morris with the mother’s three other children. Morris told them that he had heard Rhonda crying in the bedroom, and that on checking on her, he had found that she was choking. After he [1213]*1213was unable to revive the child, he asked a neighbor to call 911. Morris denied that he had killed Rhonda and professed not to know why the mother was claiming that he had. The officers also questioned Morris about whether any of the mother’s male associates had contact with Rhonda.
As the investigation proceeded, additional officers arrived and questioned Morris further. Morris told them that he sometimes disciplined the children with a belt, but denied that he had spanked Rhonda that night. The officers took custody of Morris’ belt.
While the police were questioning Morris, they learned from Sergeant Evelyn Randall of the Homicide Division that Rhonda had died and that the case was being treated as a homicide. Sergeant Randall requested the officers to bring any witnesses to police headquarters. Detective Jeffrey Owens then asked Morris “if he would mind coming down to the police station to give a formal statement.” Morris replied, “Sure.” Indeed, according to Owens, Morris appeared to have “no problem” with Owens’ request.
At about 10 a.m. on February 4, Detective Owens drove Morris to police headquarters. Morris was not handcuffed or otherwise restrained, and he rode in the passenger seat of Owens’ vehicle. Upon arrival at their destination, Detective Owens placed Morris, still unrestrained, in an unlocked interview room. According to Owens, Morris was not then under arrest.
B. Morris’first inculpatory statement.
At approximately noon, Sergeant Randall came in to the interview room and introduced herself. Sergeant Randall told Morris that Rhonda had died, that the little girl had suffered “trauma to the stomach,” and that she appeared to have been burned and sexually molested.5 Sergeant Randall asked Morris what he knew about the injuries that Rhonda had suffered. Morris initially repeated the account that he had given at Rhonda’s mother’s apartment, namely, that Rhonda had been choking, that he had tried to help her, and that he had requested a neighbor to call 911.
While the interview was proceeding, Detective Willie Jefferson of the Homicide Division entered the room and joined in the questioning. Jefferson repeatedly contradicted various statements made by Morris,6 and he confronted him in an accusatory manner.7 Ultimately, Morris admitted that Rhonda had been crying and that he had punched her in the stomach.
As soon as Morris made this admission, Sergeant Randall stopped the interview and advised Morris of his Miranda rights. Morris stated that he understood his rights and that he did not want to answer any questions without a lawyer. At 2:35 p.m., Morris so indicated on a PD-47 “advice of rights” card. Sergeant Randall and Detective Jefferson then left the room.
C. The videotaped confession.
After the interrogation of Morris had been discontinued following his refusal 'to answer questions without an attorney, Detective Daniel Whalen went into the interview room to obtain non-substantive processing information from Moms. Whalen testified that Morris then asked Whalen if he (Morris) could speak to Sergeant Randall.
Sergeant Randall returned to the interview room, and Morris indicated that he wanted to talk to her. Sergeant Randall responded that she could not discuss his ease, and Morris asked her why. In response to Morris’ inquiry, Sergeant Randall explained that Morris had “indicated he didn’t want to answer any further questions without a lawyer” and that “I had to abide by that.” Morris said “OK.” Sergeant Randall then called in Detective Jefferson, explaining to Jefferson [1214]*1214that Morris “wanted to tell us about his life.”8
Morris began to talk about his family background,9 and he mentioned that he had lived somewhat unhappily with his grandfather in North Carolina. Detective Jefferson, suspecting that the grandfather may have molested Morris, suddenly asked Morris if his penis was dripping, and accused him of having gonorrhea and passing on the disease to Rhonda. Morris denied the allegation. Jefferson also asked Morris if Morris had ever been in prison, and he observed that Morris was “light in the pants.”
Morris continued to discuss his family situation and, in particular, his relationship with Rhonda and with her siblings. Remarking that Rhonda was a nice little girl, Morris stated that “I might as well tell you what happened to Rhonda.”10 Sergeant Randall explained that if that was what Morris wanted to do, he would first have to complete another adviee-of-rights card and agree to answer questions without a lawyer. Morris agreed to do so.
In the videotaped interview that followed,11 Detective Jefferson re-advised Morris of his Miranda rights, and Morris signed a new Form PD-47 waiving those rights. Morris then stated that Rhonda had “used the bathroom on herself,” and that he had “put her in the tub with the hot water and it pulled the skin off her feet.” Morris acknowledged that he had grabbed and squeezed the little girl’s neck as he pulled her out of the tub and that he had punched her in the stomach. Morris denied having sexually molested Rhonda, and he explained that he had been “stressed out” and that he was sorry for what he had done.
D. Proceedings in the trial court.
Following his confession, Morris was indicted on charges of first degree murder, indecent liberties with a minor child, and cruelty to a minor child. The defense filed a pretrial motion to suppress statements which, as we have noted, the trial judge denied.
The government dismissed the indecent liberties charge before trial. At the trial, after the prosecution proved the facts described above, Morris testified in his own defense. Morris reiterated that he had punched Rhonda,12 but emphasized that he had attempted to resuscitate her, that he had not wanted her to die, and that he was sorry for what he had done.
The jurors apparently credited Morris’ testimony regarding his intent, for Morris was acquitted of the murder charge. He was, however, convicted of the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter and of cruelty to a minor child. This appeal followed.
II.
LEGAL DISCUSSION
A. The standard of review.
Morris contended in his pretrial motion to suppress, and continues to maintain in.this [1215]*1215court, that the police unlawfully elicited his first inculpatory statement — namely, that he had punched Rhonda — through custodial interrogation conducted by the officers before Morris was advised of his rights pursuant to Miranda. Morris also claims that his videotaped confession was improperly obtained by the police by questioning him after he had invoked his right to counsel, and that the judge’s refusal to suppress that confession was contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). Before addressing these contentions, we turn first to the standard of review.
This is a case in which the trial judge made especially detailed and extensive factual findings relevant to the disposition of Morris’ motion. The judge’s findings were predicated in substantial part on his observation of the witnesses and on his first-hand assessment of the credibility and intent of the various actors in the drama. The judge had a front-row seat as the testimony unfolded. We, on the other hand, are limited to a paper transcript which, while capturing the words of a case, may often miss its heart and soul. Cf. In re S.G., 581 A.2d 771, 774-75 (D.C.1990). Indeed, as Judge Jerome Frank has recognized,
[a] stenographic transcript correct in every detail fails to reproduce tones of voice and hesitations of speech that often make a sentence mean the reverse of what the words signify. The best and most accurate record is like a dehydrated peach; it has neither the substance nor the flavor of the fruit before it was dried.
Broadcast Music Inc. v. Havana Madrid Restaurant Corp., 175 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir.1949) (quoting Ulman, The Judge Taxes the Stand 267 (1933)).
The applicable standard of review reflects these realities. On appeal from the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress a confession on Miranda (and Edwards) grounds, “our role is to ensure that the trial court had a substantial basis for concluding that no constitutional violation occurred.” McIntyre v. United States, 634 A.2d 940, 943 (D.C.1993) (citations omitted). The trial court’s legal conclusions regarding whether the defendant was in custody and whether the facts, as found by the trial judge, established an Edwards violation, are reviewed de novo. See, e .g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 287, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991); Reid v. United States, 581 A.2d 359, 363 (D.C.1990). Indeed, our overall scrutiny must reflect the reality that we are dealing here with alleged violations of Morris’ constitutional rights. See, e.g., Griffin v. United States, 618 A.2d 114, 118 (D.C.1992).
The trial court’s underlying factual findings, however, are reviewed under the “clearly erroneous” standard, and they will only be set aside if they lack substantial support in the record. See, e.g., Hawkins v. United States, 461 A.2d 1025, 1030 n. 6 (D.C.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1052, 104 S.Ct. 734, 79 L.Ed.2d 193 (1984) (finding as to whether officer’s comment was custodial interrogation); Rogers v. United States, 483 A.2d 277, 283 (D.C.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1227, 105 S.Ct. 1223, 84 L.Ed.2d 363 (1985) (decision as to the validity of a waiver). Finally, we view the record in the light most favorable to the party that prevailed in the trial court — here, the United States' — and we must sustain any reasonable inference that the trial judge has drawn from the evidence. See, e.g., Peay v. United States, 597 A.2d 1318, 1320 (D.C.1991) (en banc).
B. Morris’ first inculpatory statement.
The judge found that Morris was not in police custody at the time he disclosed, during his first interview at the police station, that he had punched Rhonda in the stomach. The judge based this decision on a number of different factors in the record. First, the government conceded, and the judge found, that the police lacked probable cause to arrest Morris at the time he voluntarily accompanied them to the police station “because they didn’t know what the underlying predicate was for the mother’s accusation against him.”13 The judge pointed out that Morris rode to the police station unrestrained in the [1216]*1216front seat of Detective Owens’ vehicle — hardly the conventional means of transporting an individual under arrest for murder. The judge also noted that Morris was not handcuffed during the interview in the interrogation room. As the judge viewed the record, there was no evidence, notwithstanding the prolonged questioning, that Morris was badgered or threatened or that any trickery was used. The judge then stated:
I think, yes, the police were pressing to try and find out information. Obviously, they thought, I’m sure, that the defendant had something to contribute in reference to what had happened to this child since based upon what they knew he was the person who was in control of the children when the injury occurred.
I’m sure they weren’t desirous of him leaving, but the testimony was that if he had pressed to leave or had been adamant about leaving that they felt that they would have had no alternative other than to let him go.14
So, based upon the testimony that’s presented I would have to conclude that up to that point there was no custody for the purposes of Miranda in that it was only after he made a statement to the effect that he had punched the child in the stomach that the police then decided to arrest him, and I would conclude that it was after he made that statement that there was in fact custody.
He was at that point fully advised of his rights....
We perceive no error, factual or legal, in the judge’s analysis. Morris asserts that a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave once Detective Jefferson had accused and confronted him, but the trial judge expressly credited Sergeant Randall’s testimony that, if pressed, the police would have felt obliged to release Morris. Moreover, even if we were to assume, notwithstanding the judge’s finding, that a Fourth Amendment “seizure” had occurred and that Morris was not free to leave, that hypothetical state of affairs would not render the interrogation “custodial.”
Seizure and custody are not synonymous. Patton v. United States, 633 A.2d 800, 815 n. 7 (D.C.1993) (per curiam).15 On the contrary, interrogation is custodial, and Miranda warnings are required, “only in those cases in which there has been a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with formal arrest.” In re E.A.H., 612 A.2d 836, 838 (D.C.1992) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983) (per curiam)) (internal quotations omitted). Even if he had been seized, Morris “was not in custody to the degree associated, with formal arrest.” McIlwain v. United States, 568 A.2d 470, 473 (D.C.1989) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984)).16 At the very least, the trial judge could reasonably so find.17
Morris relies on United States v. Gayden, 492 A.2d 868 (D.C.1985), but that decision, carefully analyzed, does not support his posi[1217]*1217tion. In Gayden, the defendant was questioned by the police in a hostile and confrontational manner for more than five hours without being advised of his Miranda rights. During that time, he made three statements. The trial judge found that the defendant was in custody when he made the third statement. Specifically, the judge stated in his written opinion that, by then, “the confrontation [was not only] sharply accusatory in character, but it was also done in such a manner as to imply that Gayden’s situation had changed so significantly that he was no longer free to go.” Id. at 873 (quoting trial court’s Memorandum Order). Invoking the standard of review that we have described in Part II A, above, this court affirmed:
Giving deference to the court’s finding of fact as to the circumstances surrounding Gayden’s encounter with the police, (citation omitted), we hold that Gayden must have understood he was under arrest when Sgt. Daly confronted him.
Id. at 874 (emphasis added).
In Gayden, as in this case, the trial judge’s opportunity to assess the encounter first hand was obviously superior to that of the appellate court. In this ease, as in Gayden, we are in no position to second-guess the trial judge’s findings.18
The Supreme Court held in Miranda that if an accused who is subject to custodial interrogation expresses his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, “the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.” 384 U.S. at 474, 86 S.Ct. 1602. In Edwards v. Arizona, supra, the Court expanded upon this limit on interrogation and declared that police questioning of a suspect who has invoked the right to counsel is prohibited “unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” 451 U.S. at 485, 101 S.Ct. 1880. The Court went on to state that if an accused does initiate communication with the authorities after he has refused to answer questions without counsel, the police nevertheless may not interrogate him without an attorney being present unless he has knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. See id. at 486 n. 9, 101 S.Ct. 1880; Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1046, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983) (plurality opinion); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (defining waiver). The “initiation” and “waiver” inquiries are separate, and “clarity of application is not gained by melding them together.” Bradshaw, supra, 462 U.S. at 1045, 103 S.Ct. 2830 (plurality opinion).
In the present case, we entertain no doubt that Morris was questioned by the police after he had declined to answer questions without an attorney. The trial judge found, and we agree, that Morris was being subjected to the substantial equivalent of police interrogation19 when Detective Jefferson accused him of sexually molesting Rhonda. In Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980), the Supreme Court held that “the term ‘interrogation’ under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police ... that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Id. at 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682 (footnotes omitted). At the hearing on Morris’ motion to suppress, Detective Jefferson, who testified as a defense witness, acknowledged that he had decided to accuse Morris of sexually molesting Rhonda in order to see “what kind of reaction I [would] get.” Obviously, Jefferson was seeking to elicit a potentially incriminating response.
Morris contends that this questioning was in violation of his right to counsel, and that the judge was therefore obliged to suppress the videotaped confession. Morris claims that he did not “initiate” conversations with the police as that term was used in Edwards, and that he did not make a knowing and [1218]*1218intelligent waiver of his right to counsel before interrogation resumed. We address these contentions in turn.
(1) Initiation by the accused.
Writing for a plurality of the Court in Bradshaw, Justice Rehnquist wrote that a suspect may be deemed to have “initiated” a conversation with the police, for purposes of the Edwards inquiry, if he has “evinced a willingness and a desire for a general discussion about the investigation.” 462 U.S. at 1045-46, 103 S.Ct. 2830. The plurality recognized that “[t]here are some inquiries, such as a request for a drink of water or a request to use a telephone, that are so routine that they cannot be fairly said to represent a desire on the part of an accused to open up a more generalized discussion relating directly or indirectly to the investigation ... [and] will not generally ‘initiate’ a conversation in the sense in which that word was used in Edwards." Id. at 1045, 103 S.Ct. 2830. But because even the broaching of a subject relating “indirectly” to the ease against the suspect is sufficient, id., the courts have tended to find that the “initiation” prong (as distinguished from the waiver requirement) has been satisfied even in cases in which any link between the accused’s comment or question and the underlying investigation is less than clear. See, e.g., Bradshaw, supra, 462 U.S. at 1045, 103 S.Ct. 2830 (“Well, what is going to happen now?” constituted initiation); Grimm v. State, 556 N.E.2d 1327 (Ind.1990) (suspect’s request to speak with investigator qualified as “initiation” under Edwards); accord, People v. Bradford, 15 Cal.4th 1229, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259, 304 (1997) (“What’s going on?”, combined 'with a willingness to speak with detectives); United States v. Grant, 549 F.2d 942, 945 (4th Cir.1977) (“What happens to me now? Where do I go?”), vacated and remanded on unrelated grounds, Whitehead v. United States, 435 U.S. 912, 98 S.Ct. 1463, 55 L.Ed.2d 502 (1978); United States v. Velasquez, 885 F.2d 1076, 1079 (3d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1017, 110 S.Ct. 1321, 108 L.Ed.2d 497 (1990) (request to speak to investigator, combined with question as to what was going to happen next); but see Jackson v. United States, 404 A.2d 911, 916, 920-25 (D.C.1979) (a '“long, rambling, partially incoherent monologue” by mentally impaired defendant did not permit officers to question him after he had declined to answer questions without an attorney).
In the present case, the trial judge unequivocally foimd that it was Morris, and not the police, who initiated the conversation which led to Morris’ videotaped confession:
And in the context of this case what we have is [Sergeant] Randall coming in and asking him what did he w'ant and the defendant saying he wanted to talk to her. I think clearly her asking what he wanted, after being told by [Detective] Whalen that the defendant wanted to talk to her, was not an initiation of discussions by the [Sergeant] but it was an initiation in response to her request as to what he wanted, an initiation on his part to reinstitute discussions with her. So, I think the first prong of the Edwards requirement is in fact satisfied.
The judge’s finding surely comports with common sense. Prior to his arrival at the police station, Morris had never met Sergeant Randall. During his first interview with her, their discussion was about the circumstances of Rhonda’s death. The trial judge could properly find it counter-intuitive, to say the least, to suppose that when Morris asked that Detective Randall come and see him, he wanted to speak with her about a completely different subject.
Moreover, the first person to whom Morris communicated his wish to speak to Sergeant Randall was Detective Whalen. If Morris had simply wanted to make a routine request (e.g., for a drink of water or for use of a telephone), cf. Bradshaw, supra, 462 U.S. at 1045, 103 S.Ct. 2830, he could have asked Whalen to accommodate him. Instead, he specifically requested to speak to Sergeant Randall, the individual who had been in charge of the questioning about his case.
When Sergeant Randall came in to see him, Morris continued to act as though his request to speak to her related to the same subject that they had discussed earlier, namely, his role in Rhonda’s death. The reader will recall that, at the beginning of [1219]*1219this conversation, Sergeant Randall told Morris that they could not discuss his case. If it had been Morris’ intention to talk exclusively about matters other than his case, then one might have expected him to say so, e.g.: “Of course, Sergeant Randall; I just told you I would not answer any questions about the case without a lawyer. I just want someone to talk to.” Instead, Morris asked “why” the two of them could not talk about his case — an odd question indeed if he had no interest in doing so.
Morris takes issue with the judge’s assessment of the facts with respect to the initiation prong. He claims primarily that the judge failed adequately to consider Sergeant Randall’s perception of Morris’ state of mind: “I really didn’t think he wanted to talk about the case when he asked me to come back there.”20 But the judge was well aware of Sergeant Randall’s opinion, questioned her about it, and explicitly included it in his calculus:
And she says in her own mind that she thought when he said he wanted to talk that he was only talking about wanting to talk about his life. Well, I mean, while, obviously, I have to give consideration to what was in her mind, obviously, that’s not determinative as to whether or not that was the only reason he was making those statements.
(Emphasis added.) We agree with the trial judge’s analysis in this respect. The judge’s finding that Morris initiated the discussion that led to his videotaped confession was not clearly erroneous.
(2) Waiver.
Having sustained the trial judge’s finding regarding initiation by the accused, we now turn to Edwards’ second prong. The question is whether Morris’ purported waiver of the right to counsel was knowing and intelligent Edwards, supra, 451 U.S. at 486 n. 9, 101 S.Ct. 1880, as well as “voluntary in the sense that it was the product of free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion or deception.” Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986); see also Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979). The “determination ... whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, 304 U.S. at 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019. The inquiry must begin with the presumption that there has been no waiver of a fundamental constitutional right. Id. Here, the burden was on the prosecution to prove that before the second interrogation began — in other words, before Jefferson accused Morris of giving gonorrhea to Rhonda — Morris waived the right to the presence of counsel during that interrogation. See Bradshaw, supra, 462 U.S. at 1044, 103 S.Ct. 2830 (plurality opinion).
After giving the question careful consideration, the trial judge first found that Morris’ waiver of the right to counsel was knowing and intelligent. According to the judge, Morris must have known and understood that he had the right to the presence of counsel during interrogation because he had invoked that right, only minutes before his request to speak to Sergeant Randall again, by declining to answer questions without an attorney. In addition, the judge credited the uncontradicted testimony of a Secret Service officer, who related that he had arrested Morris in October 1994 (only four months prior to Rhonda’s death) for armed robbery, and that on that occasion he had advised Morris of his Miranda rights from a PD-47 advice-of-rights card. According to the officer, Morris had stated that he understood his rights and had refused to answer any ques[1220]*1220tions without counsel present.21 There was thus ample evidence to support the judge’s finding that Morris not only knew what his rights were but had also successfully exercised them in the recent past.22
The more difficult question is whether the prosecution proved that prior to Jefferson’s interrogation of him, Morris intentionally waived his right to counsel; i.e., whether he revoked his prior refusal to answer questions without an attorney. Concededly, Morris never expressly stated that this was his intention, although he arguably implied that it was by asking Sergeant Randall why she would not discuss his case with him. Moreover, Morris seemed to accept Sergeant Randall’s ground rules by saying “OK.”23
The trial judge was not insensitive to the difficulty of the issue. But because feelings are facts,24 and because he was the trier of fact, the judge attempted to get to the bottom of the psychological factors that led this nineteen-year-old defendant to ask to talk to the detective so soon after he had declined to answer questions without a lawyer. The judge carefully observed Morris on the videotape, and he saw a basically decent young man who was shocked by the consequences of what he had done and who felt a need to “get it off his chest.” The judge stated:
I mean, I had a chance to watch his demeanor on the tape. I don’t think he’s, you know, some hard core criminal. Circumstances may have [arisen] that, you know, caused this situation to somehow occur. Who knows? But in any event, I think probably he’s a basically] maybe decent human being, I have no reason to think otherwise, and from my observations of him on the tape that was the impression that I got.
He said, “yes, sir,” “no, sir,” in response to questions that were asked of him. He seemed mannerly. He seemed obviously upset about what had taken place and sorry about what had taken place. And I think the evidence indicates in his own mind that he decided after thinking about this that he needed to get this off his chest and talk about it.
(Emphasis added.) Cf. Hawkins, supra, 461 A.2d at 1031 (defendant stated that he “wanted to get it off his chest”).
In other words, working backwards from Morris’ appearance on the videotape, and considering the record as a whole, the judge found that it was this very familiar human motivation — a motivation that Morris shared with Dostoevski’s Raskolnikov, with a succession of otherwise “bad guys” on “NYPD Blue,” and with countless flesh-and-blood defendants who have been unable to “keep the lid on” over their feelings of remorse and guilt — that led Morris to renew his conversation with Sergeant Randall, and thereafter, to “tell the truth about what happened to Rhonda.”
We recognize that the burden was on the government and that waivers of constitutional rights are not readily inferred. Perhaps another trier of fact would have weighed the [1221]*1221evidence differently. But it was the judge’s call, not ours. The type of factual issue here presented, focused as it is on a defendant’s state of mind, trumpets the inadequacy of a paper record and renders it a quintessential example of Judge Frank’s “dehydrated peach.” We therefore sustain the judge’s finding that Morris waived his right to the presence of counsel during questioning.
(3) A comparison with Edwards.
Because Morris’ appeal, at least as to the videotaped confession, rests heavily on Edwards and its progeny, we think it fruitful to compare the facts of Edwards with the record in this case.
Having been arrested and charged with robbery, Edwards was advised of his rights in accordance with Miranda. He initially indicated that he was willing to submit to questioning. After indicating that he might want to negotiate a resolution of the charges, however, Edwards stated that “I want an attorney before making a deal.” The officers discontinued the questioning and took Edwards to jail.
On the following morning, a guard told Edwards that police detectives wanted to speak to him. Adhering to the position he had taken the previous day, Edwards responded that he did not wish to talk to anyone. The guard told Edwards, however, that Edwards “had to” talk to the detectives, and he brought Edwards to them. The detectives told Edwards that they wanted to talk to him and advised him of his rights. After further interrogation, Edwards gave the police an oral statement acknowledging his guilt.
Edwards’ confession was thus obtained by the police after he had been ordered to talk to the detectives notwithstanding his prior refusal to do so without counsel. Indeed, Edwards had twice indicated his unwillingness to talk to the police without a lawyer, once at the original interrogation and once to the guard on the following day. The interrogation which culminated in the confession was initiated by the police, not by Edwards, and Edwards only spoke to the detectives because the guard had told him that he was obliged to do so and had no choice. It was in this context — a scenario in which the defendant may very well have been effectively coerced into waiving his constitutional right to representation by counsel during questioning — that the Court in Edwards fashioned a “prophylactic rule, designed to protect an accused in police custody from being badgered by police officers in the manner in which the defendant in Edwards was.” Bradshaw, supra, 462 U.S. at 1044, 103 S.Ct. 2830 (plurality opinion).
The present case is dramatically different. Here, upon Morris’ refusal to answer questions without an attorney, the police terminated all substantive conversations with him. Thereafter, discussions were resumed only after Morris himself requested that this occur. Even after Morris had made this request — after, as the judge found, Morris was ready to talk to Sergeant Randall about Rhonda’s death — Sergeant Randall attempted to place that subject off limits during the conversation that was to follow. Although Detective Jefferson’s perhaps improvident accusations about transmitting gonorrhea to Rhonda might reasonably be viewed as contrary to Sergeant Randall’s ground rules for the discussion, these ground rules went well beyond anything required by Edwards. In any event, no reasonable person could view this ease as one in which the police attempted to coerce or badger an unwilling Morris into talking to them without the assistance of an attorney.
The prophylactic Edwards rule draws a bright line for those eases in which the suspect has invoked his right to counsel and has not initiated a new discussion with the police. The doctrine of Edwards cannot, however, be uncritically applied where, as here, the conversation which led to the confession occurred at the suspect’s request. When it is the accused who seeks to reopen the dialogue, he creates a situation different in kind from the scenario that gave birth to Edwards’ prophylactic rule.
The Supreme Court has deemed it “timely again to remind counsel that words of our opinions are to be read in the light of the facts of the case under discussion_General expressions transposed to other facts are [1222]*1222often misleading.” Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 132-33, 65 S.Ct. 165, 89 L.Ed. 118 (1944). As one court has aptly stated:
the motivating factor behind the Edwards rule is to protect against and to discourage police interference with the free exercise of the right to counsel_[T]he cases following Edwards are clearly indicative to us that in the absence of some police interference with the exercise of the right to counsel of the accused, the Edwards rule is to be strictly and narrowly applied.... Our court has, in other words, rejected an interpretation of Edwards’ prophylactic rule that is divorced from the context of badgering police conduct from which the rule sprang.
Plazinich v. Lynaugh, 843 F.2d 836, 838-39 (5th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1031, 109 S.Ct. 841, 102 L.Ed.2d 973 (1989) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We find this analysis persuasive.
III.
CONCLUSION
Apparently enraged by a little three-year-old girl’s crying, Aaron Morris punched her in the stomach several times, causing her death. His guilt is not in question. Indeed, he described his crime in some detail in a videotaped statement and subsequently at trial.
There is no doubt that at the time he confessed, Morris was well aware of his right to counsel. Indeed, he had invoked that right earlier in the afternoon, and also in an unrelated case four months earlier. Morris does not claim, nor could he, that his confession was coerced or involuntary in the common everyday sense of these words. In fact, the judge found that Morris resumed his discussions with the police, and thereafter confessed his crime, in order to reheve his sense of guilt and to get his terrible secret off his chest.
Under these circumstances, Morris can prevail, if at all, only upon the theory that the police violated Edwards’ prophylactic rule in seeming his confession. We are satisfied that the Supreme Court did not intend the doctrine of Edwards to apply to facts such as those found by the trial judge here. To extend the Edwards rule to a case so unlike Edwards would not advance Edwards’ basic purpose — to inhibit the badgering by police of suspects who wish to be represented by counsel — but would deny the court and jury access to probative and compelling evidence. That is not a result that we can readily countenance, and we are satisfied that Edwards does not require it.
Morris’ conviction of involuntary manslaughter is affirmed. His conviction of cruelty to children is vacated. The case is remanded to the trial court for resentencing. See note 1, supra.
So ordered.