Morris Byrd v. Hansen Beverage Company d/b/a Monster Beverage Corporation; Monster Energy Company; Monster Energy International Company; Monster Energy US, LLC

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: April 7, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-00767
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES 1

7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 AT SEATTLE

9 MORRIS BYRD, an individual, Case No. 2:25-cv-00767-RAJ

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 HANSEN BEVERAGE COMPANY d/b/a MONSTER BEVERAGE 13 CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation; MONSTER ENERGY 14 COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation; MONSTER ENERGY 15 INTERNATIONAL COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation; and 16 MONSTER ENERGY US, LLC, a Delaware Corporation, 17 Defendants. 18 MONSTER ENERGY COMPANY, 19 a Delaware Corporation,

20 Third-Party Plaintiff, v. 21 LEICHHARDT GROUP, INC., a 22 Washington Corporation, dba THE DILLER ROOM; ALEKSANDAR 23 LONCAR, an individual; JONASA RYDER, an individual, and DOES 24 1–10,

25 Third-Party Defendants. 26 1 I. INTRODUCTION 2 THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Third-Party Defendants’ Motion to 3 Dismiss, Dkt. # 28. The Court has reviewed the motion, the submissions in support of 4 and in opposition to the motion, and the balance of the record. For the reasons set forth 5 below, the Court GRANTS the Third-Party Defendants’ motion. 6 II. BACKGROUND 7 On March 27, 2022, a bar brawl broke out outside a bar called The Diller Room. 8 Dkt. # 19 at 3–5. The fight was between bar employees and bar patrons. Id. The bar 9 employees involved in the fight were bartender Aleksandar Loncar, bouncer Morris Byrd, 10 and bouncer Jonasa Ryder. Id. The patrons were employed by Monster Energy Company 11 (“Monster”). Dkt. # 1-2 at 6. While there were three Monster employees at the bar, only 12 two of the three were involved in the fight: Ben Hysong and Bradley Hoagland.1 Dkt. # 13 19 at 3–5. 14 Plaintiff Byrd was injured in the fight and filed a civil complaint against Monster 15 in King County Superior Court. Dkt. # 1-2. Mr. Byrd alleges that (1) Monster breached 16 its duty by placing others in danger; (2) Monster breached its duty by placing its 17 employee Mr. Hysong in a position to cause injuries; (3) Monster negligently allowed 18 Mr. Hysong to continue his employ at Monster, which caused Mr. Byrd’s injury and 19 damages; (4) Monster negligently hired, trained, and supervised Mr. Hysong; and (5) 20 Monster is vicariously liable for Mr. Hysong’s conduct. Id. at 8–9. 21 Monster filed a notice of removal, Dkt. # 1, and a Third-Party Complaint against 22 Leichhardt Group, Inc., dba The Diller Room; Mr. Loncar; Mr. Ryder; and other 23 unnamed Defendants. Dkt. # 19. In the Third-Party Complaint, Monster alleges (1) 24 negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention against The Diller Room and the

25 1 The Third-Party Complaint does not contain allegations to show that Rhiana Coomara was involved. 26 1 unnamed Defendants; (2) negligence against The Diller Room and the unnamed 2 Defendants; (3) negligence against Mr. Loncar, Mr. Ryder, and the unnamed Defendants; 3 (4) contribution against all Third-Party Defendants; (5) apportionment against all Third- 4 Party Defendants; and (6) comparative indemnity against all Third-Party Defendants. Id. 5 at 5–10. 6 The Diller Room, Mr. Loncar, and Mr. Ryder filed a motion to dismiss the Third- 7 Party Complaint, arguing that (1) Monster failed to state a claim upon which relief can 8 be granted, and (2) they are immune under the Washington Industrial Insurance Act (IIA), 9 Wash. Rev. Code §§ 51.04.010 et seq.2 Dkt. # 28. Monster filed a response, Dkt. # 31, 10 and the Third-Party Defendants filed a reply, Dkt. # 35. Without the Court’s leave, 11 Monster filed a “Supplemental Opposition to Motion to Dismiss,” Dkt. # 61, and Third- 12 Party Defendants filed a reply to the supplemental opposition, Dkt. # 63. 13 III. LEGAL STANDARD 14 Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint may be 15 dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must point to factual allegations in 17 the complaint that “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 18 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “The court may dismiss a complaint as a matter of 19 law for ‘(1) lack of a cognizable legal theory or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable 20 legal claim.’” SmileCare Dental Grp. v. Delta Dental Plan of California, Inc., 88 F.3d 21 780, 783 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 22 534 (9th Cir. 1984)). In analyzing a motion to dismiss, courts “accept all factual 23 allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable 24

25 2 Third-Party Defendants refer to this as the Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act (“WISHA”). See Dkt. # 28 at 4. However, WISHA is under Title 49, Chapter 49.17. 26 1 to the nonmoving party.” Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005). 2 “Conclusory allegations and unreasonable inferences, however, are insufficient to defeat 3 a motion to dismiss.” Sanders v. Brown, 504 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2007). 4 IV. DISCUSSION 5 A. Employer Immunity Under the Industrial Insurance Act 6 The IIA “grant[s] injured employees ‘swift, no-fault compensation’ for on-the-job 7 injuries and grant[s] employers immunity from civil suits arising from such injuries.” 8 Cockrum v. C.H. Murphy/Clark-Ullman, Inc., 569 P.3d 287, 290 (Wash. 2025) (quoting 9 Birklid v. Boeing Co., 904 P.2d 278, 282 (Wash. 1995)). RCW 51.04.010 provides: 10 The state of Washington, therefore, exercising herein its police and sovereign power, declares that all phases of the premises are withdrawn 11 from private controversy, and sure and certain relief for workers, injured in 12 their work, and their families and dependents is hereby provided regardless of questions of fault and to the exclusion of every other remedy, proceeding 13 or compensation, except as otherwise provided in this title; and to that end 14 all civil actions and civil causes of action for such personal injuries and all jurisdiction of the courts of the state over such causes are hereby abolished, 15 except as in this title provided. 16 Wash. Rev. Code § 51.04.010. The IIA “bars all independent causes of action against 17 the employer for damages arising out of unintentional injury to an employee.” Provost 18 v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 696 P.2d 1238, 1239 (Wash. 1985). 19 The Washington Supreme Court has interpreted the IIA to immunize employers 20 from claims by third parties that arise from an employee’s on-the-job injury. See Seattle- 21 First Nat. Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co., 588 P.2d 1308, 1316 (Wash. 1978). In Seattle- 22 First, the boom of a truck on which an employee was working came in contact with a 23 power line, resulting in the employee’s injury and death. Id. at 1311. Seattle-First, as 24 the employee’s estate’s personal representative, filed a lawsuit against the owner- 25 operator of the truck and the boom manufacturer. Id. These two defendants then filed 26 1 third-party complaints for indemnity, contribution, or apportionment against the 2 employer. Id. The employer moved for summary judgment to dismiss the third-party 3 complaints, arguing that the IIA barred the claims, and the trial court denied the motion. 4 Id. On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court reversed the trial court ruling and 5 explained that an “employer may no longer be looked to for recourse” when the employer 6 pays its premiums pursuant to the IIA because the IIA fund “is the sole source of 7 recovery.” Id. at 1316. The court further explained that “[i]n effect, the Act ‘immunizes’, 8 from judicial jurisdiction, all tort actions which are premised upon the ‘fault’ of the 9 employer vis-a-vis the employee.” Id. Therefore, the court held that (1) courts do not 10 have jurisdiction over actions “premised upon or necessarily involving this ‘immunized’ 11 area of tort law,” (2) the employer’s “fault may not be considered in the reduction” of 12 damages, and (3) impleader of the employer “by third-parties cannot be used as a device 13 to permit the court to assume jurisdiction over such conduct.” Id. 14 The court also explained that an employer’s voluntary assumption of “an 15 independent duty or obligation to the third party” presents a different situation. Id. Even 16 then, to be judicially cognizable, these claims cannot stem from immunized conduct and 17 must be based only on independent obligations: 18 Nonetheless, for these actions to be judicially cognizable, the third party's theory of Employer liability cannot stem from conduct “immunized” by the 19 Act, E. g., that which necessarily involves the employer’s conduct vis-a- 20 vis the employee. Any such action must be based solely upon an independent obligation existing between the employer and the third-party 21 claimant. 22 Id. 23 The court then addressed each claim as follows: (1) the noncontractual indemnity 24 claims were not judicially cognizable insofar as they were “based upon the ‘immunized’ 25 conduct of [the employer] vis-a-vis [the employee]”; and (2) the claims for contribution 26 1 or for an apportionment of liability based on “fault” of all defendants and third-party 2 defendants were “not judicially cognizable insofar as they [were] delictual in nature and 3 necessarily ar[o]se from the underlying ‘immunized’ conduct of [the employer] vis-a-vis 4 [the employee].” Id. 5 Similarly, in a court of appeals case, which the Washington Supreme Court relied 6 on in deciding Seattle-First, the court reached the same conclusion. See Olch v. Pac. 7 Press & Shear Co., 573 P.2d 1355, 1359 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978). In Olch, an employee 8 was injured while operating a hydraulic power press. Id. at 1356. After receiving 9 worker’s compensation for the injury, the employee filed a lawsuit against both the 10 manufacturer and the seller of the hydraulic power press, who in turn filed a third-party 11 complaint and cross-claim against the employer for indemnity. Id. The employer then 12 moved for summary judgment, arguing that the IIA was the exclusive remedy and barred 13 actions for indemnity against employers covered by the IIA in the absence of an 14 independent agreement to indemnify. Id. The court agreed that the IIA does bar such 15 actions. Id. at 1357. However, the court explained that where “an independent duty or 16 obligation is owed by the employer to a third party the exclusivity provisions of the 17 workmen's compensation act will not bar recovery by the third party.” Id. 18 The court’s analysis thus shifted to “whether a contract of indemnification may be 19 implied under [these] circumstances.” Id. The court held that pursuant to the IIA, “the 20 employer [was] not liable directly to the employee and no liability exist[ed] from the 21 employer to the manufacturer-seller from the contract of sale.” Id. at 1358. The court 22 reasoned that independent duties “should not be implied to exist where the parties have 23 not contracted for such duties expressly.” Id. Further, before its use as a basis for 24 indemnity against an employer, an alleged breach of the “independent duty must be 25 shown to exist as a specific and defined duty.” Id. The court did not find a duty of 26 1 indemnity and provided an example of a contract where such a duty could be implied. 2 Id. at 1359. Therefore, the court held that the action involving the employer as a third- 3 party defendant could not be maintained because the action “ar[o]se out of the 4 employee’s injury” and not “an independent duty or a contract of indemnity.” Id. 5 Here, Monster’s claims arise from the injuries sustained by Mr. Byrd, an employee 6 of The Diller Room. Among the claims Monster asserts are claims for contribution, 7 apportionment, and comparative indemnity. As in Seattle-First, these claims are 8 premised on the immunized area of tort law under the IIA. Seattle-First, 588 P.2d at 9 1316. The noncontractual indemnity claim is not judicially cognizable because it is based 10 on the immunized conduct of the employer vis-à-vis the employee. Id. Similarly, the 11 contribution and apportionment claims are not judicially cognizable because they are 12 “delictual in nature” and “necessarily arise from the underlying ‘immunized’ conduct” 13 of the employer vis-à-vis the employee. Id. 14 Monster cites Seattle-First for the proposition that an exception exists “where an 15 employer voluntarily assumes an independent duty or obligation to the third party.” Dkt. 16 # 31 at 8; Seattle-First, 558 P.2d at 1316. As Monster acknowledges, such an action 17 must be based only on an independent obligation that exists between the employer and 18 the third-party. Dkt. # 31 at 8; Seattle-First, 558 P.2d at 1316. Monster argues, that “an 19 independent, special duty” existed between The Diller Room and Monster because 20 Monster—through its employee Mr. Hysong—was an invitee at The Diller Room. Dkt. 21 # 31 at 9. The Court finds this argument unpersuasive. See discussion infra Section 22 IV.C. Importantly, the Court finds that this is not the kind of independent obligation that 23 fits within the exception. 24 The independent obligation contemplated in Seattle-First is different from what 25 Monster proposes. That case relied on Olch in stating that a different situation exists 26 1 “where an employer voluntarily assumes an independent duty or obligation to the third 2 party.” Seattle-First, 588 P.2d at 1316. The court in Olch explained that “third party 3 actions against insured employers have been allowed when an express written contract 4 of indemnification existed,” and focused its analysis on whether indemnification may be 5 implied. Olch, 573 P.2d at 1357; see also Hatch v. City of Algona, 167 P.3d 1175, 1179– 6 80 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that no effective waiver of immunity under the IIA 7 existed in the contract between the employer and the third-party because the employer 8 did not clearly express its intent to waive its immunity under the IIA). The court in 9 Seattle-First emphasized that even where the employer voluntarily assumes an 10 independent obligation to the third party, the third party’s theory of liability “cannot stem 11 from conduct ‘immunized’ by the” IIA and it “must be based solely upon an independent 12 obligation existing between the employer and the third-party claimant.” Seattle-First, 13 588 P.2d at 1316. Here, not only is there not a contract between Monster and The Diller 14 Room, Monster’s theory of liability is also not independent and stems from The Diller 15 Room’s immunized conduct. Therefore, this argument fails to rescue Monster’s claims. 16 For these reasons, Monster’s claims for indemnification, contribution, and apportionment 17 are dismissed. 18 In addition to the claims for indemnification, contribution, and apportionment, 19 Monster also makes claims against The Diller Room for negligence and negligent hiring, 20 training, supervision, and retention. These claims relate to the fault of The Diller Room, 21 stem from immunized conduct, and are not based only on an independent obligation to 22 Monster. Id.; see also Montoya v. Greenway Aluminum Co., 519 P.2d 22, 27 (Wash. Ct. 23 App. 1974) (applying an older version of the IIA and holding that “liability for fault . . . 24 should not be reimposed by an allegation of negligence against the employer coming 25 from a third party.”). Therefore, these claims are dismissed as well. 26 1 B. Fellow Employee Immunity Under the Industrial Insurance Act 2 Under the IIA, “co-workers are immune from common law suit by an injured 3 worker.” Daniels v. Seattle Seahawks, 968 P.2d 883, 886 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998). The 4 IIA provides that an injured employee “shall receive compensation in accordance with 5 this chapter, and, except as in this title otherwise provided, such payment shall be in lieu 6 of any and all rights of action whatsoever against any person whomsoever.” Wash. Rev. 7 Code § 51.32.010. An exception that allows an injured employee to seek recovery of 8 damages for an injury from a third-party exists. RCW 51.24.030(1) provides: 9 If a third person, not in a worker’s same employ, is or may become liable to pay damages on account of a worker’s injury for which benefits and 10 compensation are provided under this title, the injured worker or 11 beneficiary may elect to seek damages from the third person. 12 Wash. Rev. Code § 51.24.030(1). Thus, the IIA permits an injured employee to seek 13 recovery of damages from a third-party who is not a fellow employee. 14 Here, Mr. Byrd is seeking to hold liable and to recover damages from Monster, a 15 third party, who in turn is seeking to hold liable and to recover damages from Mr. Loncar 16 and Mr. Ryder, who are Mr. Byrd’s coworkers. See generally Dkt. # 19. The IIA 17 specifically immunizes coworkers from liability as evidenced by the requirement that the 18 third-party not be “in a worker’s same employ.” Wash. Rev. Code § 51.24.030(1); see 19 also Romanick v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 795 P.2d 728, 730 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) 20 (holding that injured employee cannot recover UIM benefits as a result of injury caused 21 by coworker and that “RCW 51.04.010 abolishes claims against fellow servants for 22 injuries incurred during the course of hazardous employment”); Orris v. Lingley, 288 23 P.3d 1159, 1162 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012) (explaining that an injured employee “would 24 ordinarily be unable to bring a third party action against” another employee in the same 25 employ, unless the negligent employee was not acting in the course of employment at the 26 1 time of the injury); Provost, 696 P.2d at 1240 (“The exclusive remedy provisions of RCW 2 51.32.010 also apply to bar common-law actions against fellow employees.”). 3 Because the IIA specifically provides that an injured employee may not hold 4 fellow employees liable for workplace injury, holding Mr. Loncar and Mr. Ryder liable 5 as third-party defendants would contravene the immunity provided by the IIA. Monster 6 may not work around the IIA to hold Mr. Byrd’s fellow employees liable just like it may 7 not work around the IIA to hold The Diller Room liable. Therefore, Monster’s claims 8 against Mr. Loncar and Mr. Ryder are barred by the IIA and are accordingly dismissed. 9 C. Monster Fails to State a Claim Upon which Relief can be Granted 10 Monster also fails to state a cognizable claim in its Third-Party Complaint for its 11 negligence-based claims (claims 1–3).3 In its response to the motion to dismiss, Monster 12 argues that it was an invitee at The Diller Room because Mr. Byrd alleges that Monster 13 is vicariously liable for his injuries due to Monster’s employees’ conduct at The Diller 14 Room. See Dkt. # 31 at 6–9. Monster further argues that “vicarious liability remains not 15 only at issue, but front and center,” and unless Mr. Byrd’s claims against Monster are 16 dismissed, “Monster remains allegedly in the Diller Room and in Hysong’s shoes.” Id. 17 at 7. Monster does not cite any cases to support its theory that an entity-employer may 18 be considered an invitee through its human employee’s presence on the premises. Even 19 if that were possible, Monster “denies that Hysong was in the course and scope of his 20 employment while out drinking at a bar at 2:00 a.m.” Id. at 7. 21 22

23 3 The Third-Party Defendants primarily argue Monster fails to state a claim because “there are no allegations in Monster’s Complaint that the Diller Room committed any acts or omissions against Monster.” Dkt. # 28 at 5. This 24 argument applies only to the negligence-based claims because the remaining claims for contribution, apportionment, and comparative indemnity do not require a direct harm to Monster. The Third-Party Defendants also argue “Monster’s claims for ‘Apportionment’ and ‘Comparative Indemnity’ are not valid claims under Washington law, 25 but they provide no case citation in support of this position. Id. at 6. Because the Court is dismissing the apportionment and indemnity claims on other grounds, it declines to reach this issue. 26 1 Additionally, Monster’s argument that it was “allegedly in the Diller Room and in 2 Hysong’s shoes” because Mr. Byrd seeks to hold Monster vicariously liable for his 3 injuries is unpersuasive. Id. Vicarious liability “imposes liability on an employer for the 4 torts of an employee who is acting on the employer’s behalf within the scope of 5 employment.” Garrison v. Sagepoint Fin., Inc., 345 P.3d 792, 810 (Wash. Ct. App. 6 2015). In other words, vicarious liability is a theory used to hold an employer liable for 7 the acts of its employee; it is not a theory used to treat an employer as though it was in 8 the location where the tort occurred because its employee was at that location. Thus, 9 Monster fails to state a cognizable claim for its negligence-based claims and those claims 10 are dismissed. 11 D. The Parties’ Supplemental Briefs 12 Monster and the Third-Party Defendants filed supplemental briefs. On February 13 25, 2026, the Court received Monster’s supplemental response, Dkt. # 61. On March 4, 14 2026, the Court received Third-Party Defendants’ reply to the supplemental response, 15 Dkt. # 63. Neither one of these filings is appropriate because the Parties did not seek the 16 Court’s leave. See Leong v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1117, 1125 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that 17 the district court did not abuse its discretion when it granted a motion to strike a request 18 for an adverse inference made in a supplemental brief because the brief was over-length 19 and filed late, and the party that filed the brief “did not seek leave to file the supplemental 20 brief.”). Therefore, the Court need not consider the supplemental briefs. 21 However, even if the Court were to consider the supplemental briefs, the Court’s 22 decision would not change. In its supplemental response, Monster explains that, through 23 discovery, it discovered new evidence showing that Mr. Byrd did not “clock in” on the 24 night of the fight. See generally Dkt. # 61. Monster argues that this new evidence makes 25 immunity under the IIA inapplicable. Id. The Court need not decide whether the newly 26 1 discovered evidence impacts the resolution of the motion to dismiss because a court 2 generally limits its review “to the complaint’s ‘face’ because, ‘[a]s a general rule, [it] 3 may not consider any material beyond the pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) 4 motion.’” Friedman v. AARP, Inc., 855 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting United 5 States v. Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d 984, 998 (9th Cir. 2011)). 6 In addition, the mere fact that Mr. Byrd did not “clock in” does not change the 7 result of this order. “The IIA provides workers’ compensation benefits to ‘[e]ach worker 8 injured in the course of his or her employment’ while immunizing the employer from 9 responsibility.” Entila v. Cook, 386 P.3d 1099, 1101 (Wash. 2017) (alteration in original) 10 (emphasis added) (quoting Wash. Rev. Code § 51.32.010). The statute defines “course 11 of employment,” in relevant part, as “acting at his or her employer’s direction or in the 12 furtherance of his or her employer’s business . . . .” Wash. Rev. Code § 51.08.013(1). 13 The Third-Party Complaint alleges Mr. Byrd “was one of two bouncers working at The 14 Diller Room” on the night of the incident. Dkt. # 19 at 3. It further alleges that as Mr. 15 Loncar removed Mr. Hysong and others from the bar, he stated he would give Mr. 16 Hysong’s credit card to Mr. Byrd to return to the group. Id. Once the bar patrons were 17 outside, Mr. Byrd, at the bar patrons’ request, delivered messages back and forth between 18 them and Mr. Loncar regarding the credit card. Id. at 4. These allegations depict the 19 actions of an individual carrying out his duties as a bouncer and acting in furtherance of 20 The Diller Room’s business. Monster cites no case for the proposition that IIA immunity 21 applies only if the employee is literally “clocked in” at the time of the injury.4 Therefore, 22

24 4 Monster cites Entila, which states “a worker is eligible for workers’ compensation benefits not only when they are ‘on the clock,’ it also encompasses the time going to and from work on the jobsite . . . .” 386 P.3d at 1101. The Court does not read the Entila court’s use of the term “on the clock” as meaning the employee must literally be 25 “clocked in.” Rather, the use of that term is meant to contrast the time spent working versus time going to and from work. 26 1 the newly discovered evidence does not rescue Monster’s Third-Party Complaint from 2 dismissal. 3 E. Leave to Amend 4 Monster requests leave to amend as alternative relief in its supplemental response. 5 Dkt. # 61 at 6. A party may amend its pleading with the court’s leave. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 6 15(a)(2). However, a district court may deny a request for leave to amend if “it is clear . 7 . . that the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.” Thinket Ink Info. Res., Inc. 8 v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 368 F.3d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir. 2004). Assuming, arguendo, 9 the Court accepts Monster’s supplemental brief for purposes of considering the request 10 for leave to amend, Monster still would not be able to cure the existing deficiencies. First, 11 as explained above, The Third-Party Complaint alleges facts demonstrating Mr. Byrd 12 was acting in the course of his employment on the night of the incident, thus triggering 13 IIA immunity. See discussion supra Section IV.D. Monster cannot plead new facts 14 consistent with the existing allegations to bring its claims outside the scope of IIA 15 immunity. Second, Monster’s negligence claims rest on the assumption that it was 16 injured by the conduct of the Third-Party Defendants in relation to Monster’s employees. 17 This argument is based on Monster’s theory that it was an invitee because its employee, 18 Mr. Hysong, was an invitee at the bar. As explained above, this argument fails. See 19 discussion supra Section IV.C. This deficiency also cannot be cured by amendment and 20 leave to amend for Monster’s negligence claims is denied for this additional and 21 independent reason. 22 As a separate matter, the Court notes that Third-Party Defendants footnoted all 23 their citations in the motion to dismiss, Dkt. #28, the reply in support of the motion, Dkt. 24 # 35, and the reply to Monster’s supplemental response, Dkt. # 63. The Court strongly 25 disfavors footnoted citations and legal arguments, as they serve as an end-run around 26 1 page limits and formatting requirements dictated by the Local Rules. See Local Civil 2 Rules, W.D. Wash. LCR 7(e). Additionally, the Court’s Standing Order requires 3 citations to “be included in the body of the briefing − the Court does not allow citations 4 in footnotes or endnotes.” Dkt. # 7. Moreover, several courts have observed that 5 “citations are highly relevant in a legal brief” and including them in footnotes “makes 6 brief-reading difficult.” Wichansky v. Zowine, 2014 WL 289924, at *1 n.1 (D. Ariz. Jan. 7 24, 2014); see also Clark v. Louisville-Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov’t, Kentucky, 2024 WL 8 56938, *3 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 4, 2024). The Court strongly discourages the parties from 9 footnoting their legal citations or arguments in any future submissions. See Kano v. Nat’l 10 Consumer Co-op Bank, 22 F.3d 899, 899–900 (9th Cir. 1994). 11 V. CONCLUSION 12 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Third-Party Defendants’ motion 13 to dismiss, Dkt. # 28, and DISMISSES the Third-Party Complaint WITH PREJUDICE 14 and WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 15 16 Dated this 7th day of April, 2026.

17 A

18 19 The Honorable Richard A. Jones United States District Judge 20 21

22 23

24 25 26