Morris A. Kent, Jr. v. United States

401 F.2d 408, 130 U.S. App. D.C. 343, 1968 U.S. App. LEXIS 5929

• Court: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
• Decided: October 23, 1968
• Docket: 20922
• Status: Published

Opinions

BAZELON, Chief Judge:

The Supreme Court has recently revolutionized the procedural aspects of juvenile court proceedings.¹ Today we face the more fundamental issue of the substantive role of juvenile courts. In particular we must determine what obligations juvenile authorities, acting as parens patriae, have with respect to mentally disturbed adolescents.

I

At the age of sixteen the appellant, Morris Kent, was accused of committing several robberies and rapes. He was waived by the juvenile court and indicted on three counts of housebreaking, three counts of robbery, and two counts of rape. A jury returned a verdict of guilty on the housebreaking and robbery counts and not guilty by reason of insanity on the rape counts. The district court sentenced him to thirty to ninety years, with credit for the time spent in Saint Elizabeths Hospital pursuant to D.C.Code § 24-301(d).²

Kent appealed his conviction, contending that the juvenile court had waived him without an adequate hearing. After this court affirmed his conviction, the Supreme Court reversed and directed the district court to hold a full-dress de novo hearing to determine whether Kent should have been waived in 1961.³

At the remand hearing, the district court, sitting as a juvenile court, found that the 1961 waiver was “appropriate and proper.” We conclude that, due to inaccuracies in several of the district court’s findings, its decision cannot be sustained. We conclude further that, in view of the district court’s finding that Kent was suffering from a serious mental illness, waiver was inappropriate.

II

Many of the findings below are incontestable. Morris Kent had “engaged in extensive criminal activity characterized by aggressiveness and violence” and had not responded satisfactorily to his previous contacts with the juvenile court. He “was suffering from a psychosis known as schizophrenic reaction, chronic undifferentiated type” and “there was reason to believe that a period of time beyond the limits of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction was required for reasonable prospects of rehabilitation”. Moreover, the juvenile court’s long-term confinement facilities could not provide adequate psychiatric treatment for psychotic children.

Because of the obvious inadequacy of the juvenile detention facilities, Kent urged that the juvenile court should have taken steps to civilly commit him to Saint Elizabeths Hospital. The district court found that Kent was indeed civilly committable in 1961. But it determined that “because of the defendant’s potential danger to himself and/or others his civil commitment in 1961 was an inappropriate alternative to waiver in the district court.” This finding turns civil commitment law on its head. Under D.C.Code § 21-541, a person may be involuntarily committed only if “[he] is likely to injure himself or other persons” due to mental illness. Dangerousness does not make civil commitment “inappropriate;” it makes civil commitment appropriate.

In rejecting civil commitment, the court relied on a series of Government-proposed findings to the effect that civil commitment did not provide adequate protection for society. The reliance is misplaced since these findings are based on erroneous assumptions and unwarranted speculations. One finding divined that on civil commitment, Saint Elizabeths Hospital would have committed defendant to a nonsecurity facility from which he could elope, rather than to the maximum security facility, John Howard Pavilion. But the record does not convince us that Saint Elizabeths would be so negligent and incompetent as to knowingly place a person who needed a secure setting in a nonsecure one.⁴ Another finding was that a “person who is civilly committed to Saint Elizabeths Hospital may be released by the doctor in charge of the case without any prior court authorization,” the implication being that the doctor may act negligently or ignorantly. Pursuing this speculation further, the court found that if the defendant were released before age twenty-one the juvenile court could not have reinstated charges because “as a matter of practice” it would drop charges against a child committed to Saint Elizabeths. There is no support in the record for a determination that Saint Elizabeths’ doctors will prematurely recommend release for criminally dangerous psychotics.⁵ And if they did release Kent before age twenty-one, the juvenile court could have reinstated charges. The fact that charges had been dropped in a few cases in the past does not mean they had to be dropped in Kent’s case.

Since the district court’s decision that waiver “was appropriate and proper” was based heavily on these defective findings, the decision must be vacated and set aside.

Ill

Both the Supreme Court and this court have stated that “[I]t is implicit in [the juvenile court] scheme that noncriminal treatment is to be the rule — and the adult criminal treatment, the exception which must be governed by the particular factors of individual cases.” Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 560, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 1057, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966) quoting with approval Harling v. United States, 111 U.S.App.D.C. 174, 177-178, 295 F.2d 161, 164-165 (1961). We believe that on the facts of this case waiver was inappropriate.⁶

It is true that the juvenile court has “a substantial degree of discretion” in determining whether to retain jurisdiction over a child. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. at 554, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 1054. But this discretion must be exercised in accordance with the spirit of the Juvenile Court Act. As the Supreme Court said in Kent:

The theory of the District’s Juvenile Court Act, like that of other jurisdictions, is rooted in social welfare phi-lospohy rather than in the corpus juris. Its proceedings are designated as civil rather than criminal. The Juvenile Court is theoretically engaged in determining the needs of the child and of society rather than adjudicating criminal conduct. The objectives are to provide measures of guidance and rehabilitation for the child and protection for society, not to fix criminal responsibility, guilt and punishment. The State is parens patriae rather than prosecuting attorney.

Congress had made clear that the waiver provision (D.C.Code § 11-1553) is not excluded from this fundamental philosophy of parens patriae. D.C.Code § 16-2316 states:

Sections 11-1551 to 11-1554 * * * shall be liberally construed so that, with respect to each child coming under the court’s jurisdiction: * * *

(3) when the child is removed from his own family, the court shall secure for him custody, care, and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to that which should have been given him by his parents.

Parens patriae requires that the juvenile court do what is best for the child’s care and rehabilitation so long as this disposition provides adequate protection for society.⁷ In the instant case, no concern was shown for Kent’s care and rehabilitation, and mechanisms by which society could be protected were ignored.

The juvenile authorities who waived Kent knew that he was seriously ill and .in need of treatment.⁸ The Government argues, however, that their decision to waive does not indicate a lack of concern for Kent’s care and rehabilitation. It emphasizes that “if a waived juvenile is found not guilty by reason of insanity, the psychiatric facilities of the district court are, of course, at least as adequate as those available to the Juvenile Court. * * * ” ⁹ -phe argument is, at best, disingenuous. It overlooks the fundamental point that waiver is a judgment that an adult criminal prosecution should be instituted against the juvenile. The purpose of this exercise is to obtain a conviction for which the juvenile may be penalized as an adult. The exercise succeeded when the jury convicted Kent on several counts even though it recognized full well that he was suffering from a serious mental illness.

Treatment of a sick juvenile is not a concern of an adult criminal proceeding. Kent’s case bears this out. Before trial the district court sent him to District of Columbia General Hospital and then to , Saint Elizabeths Hospital for mental examinations, not treatment. Upon completion of these examinations on April 9, 1962, he spent eleven months in a prison prior to trial without any psychiatric attention.¹⁰

To all intents, psychiatric care was withheld from this schizophrenic juvenile for eighteen months from the date of his arrest while he was undergoing the trauma inherent in the incidents of a criminal prosecution. When he finally entered a hospital for treatment, a thirty to ninety year prison sentence loomed over him, undoubtedly impairing his chances of recovery.

It seems clear that the chief reason for waiver was that the juvenile court could retain jurisdiction over Kent for only five years and that he was unlikely to recover within this period. The paradoxical result is that the sicker a juvenile. is, the less care he receives from the juvenile court. Since it may not be possible to guarantee that a very sick adolescent will recover by the time he is twenty-one, he will invariably be subjected to all the strains and stresses of a criminal prosecution, with only the hope that the Government will not succeed in its effort and that he may ultimately receive treatment pursuant to D.C.Code § 24-301 (d).¹¹

Perhaps even this harsh result might be justified if there is no other way to protect society. But it is clear that society can be protected without departing from civilized standards for the prompt and adequate care of disturbed children. The juvenile court can institute civil commitment proceedings against the youngster. If commitment ensues, he will be confined and treated until he is no longer dangerous due to mental illness.¹² If not, the juvenile court will be free to follow its usual procedures.

Since waiver was not necessary for the protection of society and not conducive to Kent’s rehabilitation, its exercise in this case violated the social welfare philosophy of the Juvenile Court Act. Of course, this philosophy does not forbid all waivers. We only decide here that it does forbid waiver of a seriously ill juvenile.

IV

Since Morris Kent should not have been waived in 1961, the subsequent criminal proceedings were invalid and must be vacated. This does not mean, however, that he will be released from Saint Elizabeths Hospital. The Government can institute civil commitment proceedings against Kent to ensure that he remains in the Hospital. We think the institution of commitment proceedings is demanded by appellant’s long history of serious illness accompanied by sordid behavior. Such proceedings will assure his confinement for treatment for as long as the public safety requires. And to avoid any gap in Kent’s confinement, we stay our mandate in this case until the commitment proceedings have been completed, provided they are instituted within thirty days.¹³

We reverse the decision of the district court and direct it to vacate the prior judgment of the district court in accordance with this opinion.

Reversed.

1 . In re Gault, 887 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967).

2 . He has been in Saint Elizabeths Hospital ever since trial.

3 . Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966). The Supreme Court did not consider several substantive issues raised by Kent. In view of our present disposition of the ease, we do not consider them either.

4 . Dr. Owens testified that “ordinarily” civilly committed patients are not placed in John Howard unless they have escaped from or caused trouble in other wards. But we cannot assume that persons requiring maximum security in John Howard will not be placed there simply because they were civilly committed or, conversely, that persons not requiring maximum security will be placed in John Howard simply because their commitment arose out of criminal proceedings. If the Hospital is following erroneous practices, the court should expressly reject them, rather than rely on them. We note that there may be many situations in which criminally dangerous persons enter Saint Elizabeths via civil commitment. See, e. g., Cameron v. Mullen, 128 U.S.App.D.C. 235, 387 F.2d 193 (1967) ; Naples v. United States, 127 U.S.App.D.C. 249, 382 F.2d 465, 466 n. 1 (1967).

5 . We note also that this court has heard numerous D.C.Code § 24-301 (d) cases in which Saint Elizabeths’ doctors oppose the release of persons whose stay at the Hospital far exceeds the maximum sentence for the offense with which they were charged. See e. g., Ragsdale v. Overholser, 108 U.S.App.D.C. 308, 281 F.2d 943 (1960); Overholser v. O’Beirne, 112 U.S.App.D.C. 267, 302 F.2d 852 (1961).

6 . We view our role here as being similar to that in habeas corpus proceedings. In habeas corpus proceedings, the appellate court can examine the record and, without remanding, reach a conclusion contrary to that reached below. See e. g., United States ex rei. Bloeth v. Denno, 313 F.2d 364 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 372 U.S. 978, 83 S.Ct. 1112, 10 L.Ed.2d 143 (1963); Bailey v. Henslee, 287 F.2d 936 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 368 U.S. 877, 82 S.Ct. 121, 7 L.Ed.2d 78 (1961).

7 . The director of social work for the Juvenile Court testified below that “the Juvenile Court is obligated to deal with children who have violated the law and to arrive at a disposition wherever possible, which is in the best interest of the ' child and not inconsistent with the best interest of the community as a whole. * * * »

8 . The juvenile authorities had received a letter from a respected psychiatrist stating that Kent was “suffering from a severe psychopathological state. * * * ” The judge who waived Kent noted that he “needs long-term close supervision and perhaps residential psychiatric treatment.”

9 . Brief for Appellee, p. 15.

10 . Long delays, especially in capital cases, are virtually inevitable. For this reason, the present director of social work for the juvenile court testified that he would not recommend waiver if the juvenile had mental problems because “we would consider this a more urgent consideration in the ease and attempt to secure the necessary medical care.”

11 . If convicted, a person can obtain extensive psychiatric care only if the director of the Department of Corrections transfers him to a mental hospital. See D.C. Code § 24-302.

12 . See D.C.Code §§ 21-546, 548.

13 . See Barry v. Hall, 68 App.D.C. 350, 98 F.2d 222 (1938).