Morin v. State

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas

Morin v. State

800 S.W.2d 552, 1990 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 205, 1990 WL 208087

CourtCourt of Criminal Appeals of Texas

DecidedDecember 19, 1990

DocketNo. 843-89

StatusPublished

Cited by9 cases

This text of 800 S.W.2d 552 (Morin v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Morin v. State, 800 S.W.2d 552, 1990 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 205, 1990 WL 208087 (Tex. 1990).

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Opinion

OPINION ON APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

PER CURIAM.

Appellant was released on a bail bond conditioned on his appearance in district court. After he failed to appeal, his bond was forfeited and judgment entered against appellant and his surety. Appellant contended on appeal that Article 22.16, V.A.C.C.P., required a waiting period of 18 months before a final judgment could be entered, thus the judgment was premature. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Morin, et al. v. State, 770 S.W.2d 599 (Tex.App-Houston [14th] 1989). We granted appellant’s petition to decide three grounds: whether the entry of judgment before 18 months had elapsed was error; whether the 1987 amendment to Article 22.16 was procedural or substantive; and whether the Legislature may relinquish rights held by the State.

We now find this petition was improvidently granted. We have reviewed the grounds raised and determine that the Court of Appeals reached the correct result and that to address these issues would not contribute to the jurisprudence of this State. Tex.R.App.Proc. 200(c). See also, Armadillo Bail Bonds v. State, 802 S.W.2d 237 (Tex.Cr.App.1990).

Therefore, appellant’s petition is ordered dismissed.

TEAGUE, J., dissents.

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OPINION ON APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

PER CURIAM.

Appellant was released on a bail bond conditioned on his appearance in district court. After he failed to appeal, his bond was forfeited and judgment entered against appellant and his surety. Appellant contended on appeal that Article 22.16, V.A.C.C.P., required a waiting period of 18 months before a final judgment could be entered, thus the judgment was premature. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Morin, et al. v. State, 770 S.W.2d 599 (Tex.App-Houston [14th] 1989). We granted appellant’s petition to decide three grounds: whether the entry of judgment before 18 months had elapsed was error; whether the 1987 amendment to Article 22.16 was procedural or substantive; and whether the Legislature may relinquish rights held by the State.

We now find this petition was improvidently granted. We have reviewed the grounds raised and determine that the Court of Appeals reached the correct result and that to address these issues would not contribute to the jurisprudence of this State. Tex.R.App.Proc. 200(c). See also, Armadillo Bail Bonds v. State, 802 S.W.2d 237 (Tex.Cr.App.1990).

Therefore, appellant’s petition is ordered dismissed.

TEAGUE, J., dissents.

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Bluebook (online)

800 S.W.2d 552, 1990 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 205, 1990 WL 208087, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/morin-v-state-texcrimapp-1990.

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