Morgan v. United States (In Re Morgan)

255 B.R. 247, 2000 Bankr. LEXIS 1371, 86 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6928, 2000 WL 1721645
United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Georgia·Decided November 1, 2000·No. 19-51638·Published

Opinion

ORDER ON DEBTORS’ OBJECTION TO CLAIM

ROBERT E. BRIZENDINE, Bankruptcy Judge.

Before the Court is the objection of the above-named Debtor-Movants to the claim of Respondent, the United States of America, by and through the Internal Revenue Service, for unpaid income taxes (including interest and penalties) for the years 1987, 1988, and 1989. This matter comes before the Court on remand from the United States Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals for a determination of whether appropriate facts exist to support this Court’s exercise of its equitable powers under 11 U.S.C. § 105 for tolling the three-year period set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(i) during the Debtors’ prior bankruptcy case. See Morgan v. United States (In re Morgan), 182 F.3d 775 (11th Cir.1999). Upon consideration of the evidence and argument presented at a hearing held on October 3, 2000, and for the reasons given on the record, the Court concludes that the objection should be granted in part and denied in part. 1

As discussed in previous orders, the legal effect of Debtors’ prior bankruptcy case on the operation of the three-year *249 time period contained in Section 507(a)(8)(A)(i) dictates whether or not a substantial portion of the government’s claim for unpaid income taxes is treated as a priority claim in the present bankruptcy case. 2 Based on a review of the record, the Court finds and concludes, as a matter of equity, that the government did have a reasonable time to pursue collection of unpaid federal income taxes for 1987 and 1988 before Debtors filed their first bankruptcy case in August 1990. Thus, the Court concludes that the three-year period provided in Section 507(a)(8)(A)(i) should not be equitably tolled with respect to Debtors’ tax liability for 1987 and 1988, and therefore, the priority status for such taxes is denied in this case.

Regarding Debtors’ tax liability for 1989, however, the Court finds that the government did not have sufficient time to pursue collection efforts against Debtors. The Debtors’ income tax return for 1989 was due on April 15, 1990 and taxes were assessed on May 28, 1990, but the government had only 70 days from the date of assessment until the Debtors filed their first bankruptcy case on August 6, 1990 to collect the unpaid taxes. Thereafter, the government had to look solely to payments under Debtors’ confirmed Chapter 13 plan for satisfaction of its claim. As previously noted, this case was later dismissed and the tax claim was not satisfied.

The Court finds that Debtors did not engage in dilatory conduct or act in bad faith in filing successive cases, but it is not necessary under the ruling of the Eleventh Circuit to establish such conduct before the equities can be adjudged in favor of the government. Morgan, 182 F.3d at 779-80 & 780 n. 8. The fact remains that the government was denied a sufficient period of time to collect the unpaid 1989 income taxes before the Debtors’ prior filing and, while that case was pending, except for Chapter 13 plan payments, the government was prohibited by reason of the automatic stay from exercising collection efforts against the Debtors for approximately four years.

As a consequence of the dismissal and the filing of the second case by Debtors, the government was placed in a position of disadvantage in terms of the priority status treatment for its unsatisfied 1989 tax claim in two ways. First, due to the relatively short period between dismissal and the filing of the second ease herein, the government had little time to exert full collection activity and had only started the process of sending the series of notices required to collect Debtors’ 1989 tax obligation. Secondly, even if these events did not constitute an abuse or manipulation of the bankruptcy process by Debtors, the timing and effect of these successive filings resulted in the government’s apparent loss of priority status in the present case based on operation of the three-year time limit provision. The filing of this case following dismissal of the prior case brought this time limit to bear on the government’s aging claim, even though the three-year period was exhausted during the ultimately unsuccessful first ease when the government was stayed in its efforts to collect the full amount of its claim. On these facts, *250 the Court concludes that equity should be applied to toll the three-year period for determining priority claim status for Debtors’ 1989 income tax liability. Therefore, the Court will exercise its equitable powers under Section 105 to toll the three-year period set forth in Section 507(a)(8)(A)(i) with regard to the Debtors’ federal income tax obligation for 1989.

Accordingly, based on the above reasoning, and as stated on the record, it is

ORDERED that the Debtors’ objection to the claim of the United States of America, by and through the Internal Revenue Service, be, and hereby is, granted in part and denied in part as follows:

The amount of $1,050.00 is allowed as a secured claim; the amount of $7,312.67 is allowed as an unsecured priority claim; and the amount of $16,857.79 is allowed as an unsecured claim. 3

The Clerk is directed to serve a copy of this Order upon those persons identified on the attached distribution list.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Morgan v. United States (In Re Morgan), 255 B.R. 247, 2000 Bankr. LEXIS 1371, 86 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6928, 2000 WL 1721645 (Ga. 2000).

255 B.R. 247 (Morgan v. United States (In Re Morgan)) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Morgan v. United States
182 F.3d 775 (Eleventh Circuit, 1999)