Morgan v. Standard Accident Ins.

51 So. 2d 107, 1951 La. App. LEXIS 600
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedMarch 15, 1951
DocketNo. 3355
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 51 So. 2d 107 (Morgan v. Standard Accident Ins.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Morgan v. Standard Accident Ins., 51 So. 2d 107, 1951 La. App. LEXIS 600 (La. Ct. App. 1951).

Opinion

DORÉ, Judge.

This is a suit for workmen’s compensation wherein plaintiff, William M.' Morgan, claims that while in the course of his employment' by L. O. Raborn, as a pipe-fitter, he sustained an accident on Nov. 1, 1949, as a result of which he was rendered permanently and totally disabled to do work of any reasonable character. He sues the Standard Accident Insurance Company, the workmen’s compensation insurer of his employer, L O. Raborn, for the maximum compensation of Thirty ($30) Dollars per week, with legal interest, during his disability not to .exceed four hundred (400) weeks and for medical expenses not to exceed Five Hundred ($500) Dollars with cost.

The defense is summed up in paragraphs 10 and 11. of the answer, as follows:

. “Respondent admits that on or about February 2, 1950, it received a report from its insured, L. O. Raborn, of an alleged accident and injury of plaintiff herein, but avers that plaintiff did not at any time suffer from any disability resulting from his alleged accident and injury and continued in his employment with the said Raborn and in the performance of the regular duties thereof from the date, of said alleged accident to the completion of the job on which he was working on or about January 31, 1950.

“Respondent further' shows that even if plaintiff was involved ■ in an accident; as alleged by him, and suffered any injury whatsoever as the result thereof, which respondent denies, as aforesaid, that such injury, if any, did not result in any disability which would prevent plaintiff from doing the same work he was doing at the time of the said accident or any other reasonable work.”

After trial of the case the trial judge came to the conclusion that the plaintiff had sustained a twenty-five (25%) per cent loss of function of the right arm and that accordingly under Section 8, subsection 1(d) 15 of the compensation law, LSA-RS 23:1221(4) (o) he concludes that plaintiff is entitled to compensation of twenty-five (25%) of two hundred (200) weeks; that is for fifty (50) weeks. He makes the further observation, however, that since the accident happened on November 1, 1949, and that plaintiff received his full wages from that date to February 1, 1950, that he should not recover for that period both wages and compensation and that the defendant should be allowed credit for these thirteen (13) weeks, leaving the plaintiff entitled to recover compensation for only thirty-seven (37) weeks at the maximum rate of Thirty ($30.00) Dollars per week, or Eleven Hundred Ten ($1110.-00) Dollars, with legal interest from February 1, 1950 until paid. The trial judge further found that plaintiff had expended or [109]*109owed the sum of Twenty ($20.00) Dollars to Dr. McVea for examinations and allowed this item as medical expense. Accordingly he rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant in the sum of Eleven Hundred Ten ($1110.00) Dollars for compensation and Twenty ($20.00) Dollars for medical expenses, plus interest and costs.

The plaintiff has appealed from this judgment, again urging that plaintiff should recover for total and permanent disability at the rate of Thirty ($30.00) Dollars for a period not to exceed four hundred (400) weeks.

The defendant has answered the appeal attacking the item for Twenty ($20.00) Dollars allowed for medical expenses and praying that this, item be set aside and that as thus amended that the judgment be affirmed and that the appellant be condemned to pay the costs before this court.

We agree with the trial judge that the fact of the accident is satisfactorily proved and is in accordance with plaintiff’s version thereof. According to plaintiff, he was engaged in his duties as a pipe-fitter when he slipped on a railing some 30 ■or 40 feet in the air, and to keep from falling to the ground he grabbed an iron ■railing with his right arm. This, he claims, ■caused a rupture of the right pectoralis maj or muscle which has not recovered' and which produces the disability of which he complains. It is shown by the evidence that after the accident the plaintiff, at first, thought that he had broken his arm but that after he removed his shirt and exercised his arm he knew that it was not broken and that he then went ahead and tried to do his work; that he couldn’t move bis arm as he should and that after complaining to his foreman that his arm was hurting the foreman insisted that he go to a doctor and that accordingly he went to .see Dr. Simmons, a company doctor of 'Stone and Webster, building contractors, who he states examined his arm and told him that it was only a sprain, and had his nurse to put the heat light on it and then .discharged him to go back to work.

After the accident, of November 1, 1949, it is admitted that plaintiff remained 'on the job until about February 1, 1950, aiid received the same wage as heretofore, to-wit $102 per week. He says, however, that during that time he was not able to do his regular work and that he had to have the aid and cooperation of his fellow workers in order to' hold down his job, which testimony is corroborated by his fellow workers. After this job was completed on February 1, 1950, he did. no .further work until April 19, 1950, when he was employed as pipe-fitter by Caldwell and McCann for whom he was working when the case was tried at a weekly wage of Ninety-two ($92.00) Dollars per .week. Again, plaintiff contends that although still classified as a pipe-fitter he cannot perform the vario-w tasks required of a-pipe-fitter and that hs is only able to hold his present job because of the ássistance of his fellow employees. In this contention he is amply supported, by the testimony of fellow employees.

With reference to his actual injury, as stated before, the plaintiff was first examined by Dr. Simmons right after the accident who diagnosed the- case as muscle-sprain and who applied heat treatment,. Sometime later he was again, examined by Dr. Simmons who on his .second examination found that he had a ruptured muscle and referred him to Dr. George. There is no report from either of these physicians in the record and neither of them testified in the case. Plaintiff testified that Dr. George told him he would make a report to his employer, but whether he did or did not make such a report is not disclosed by the evidence.

The only expert testimony with reference to the injury in the record consists of the reports and testimony of Dr. Charles Mc-Vea, who examined plaintiff on' January ,10, 1950 and again on January 30, 1950. The first report.is as follows:' .

“On January 9, 1950, I saw Mr. W. M. Morgan, who states that while working on a Gulf States Utilities job for Mr. L; O. Raborn he fell and caught himself with his right arm and at the same time hurt his right arm and chest. This occurred about [110]*110November 1, 1949. He suffered no other injury. He was treated by a local physician and returned to work. He continued to work with the ache and pain in his arm and noticed some swelling and • some discoloration and bruising .in the arm near the .shoulder and in the chest near the junction of the right arm with the chest. The arm improved but continued to hurt him some and then he hurt it again in lifting. He saw his physician again who told him that he had a ruptured muscle. Since that time he has seen several physicians who have discussed his trouble with him.

“This man works as a construction worker and when he is not working in construction he works as a farmer.

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Bluebook (online)
51 So. 2d 107, 1951 La. App. LEXIS 600, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/morgan-v-standard-accident-ins-lactapp-1951.