Morgan v. Applied Med. Technology, Inc.

2026 Ohio 119

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: January 15, 2026
• Docket: 114963
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Morgan v. Applied Med. Technology, Inc., 2026-Ohio-119.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

LAWANDA MORGAN, ET AL., :

Plaintiffs-Appellees, : No. 114963 v. :

APPLIED MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY, INC., :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: January 15, 2026

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CV-23-984222

Appearances:

Mastandrea Law LLC, Rod R. Mastandrea, and Kelly L. Wilson, for appellees.

Walter │ Haverfield LLP, Mark S. Fusco, and Lorraine M. Catalusci, for appellant.

MARY J. BOYLE, P.J.:

Defendant-appellant Applied Medical Technology, Inc. (“AMT”)

appeals the trial court’s denial of its motion for sanctions. AMT contends that the court should have held an evidentiary hearing prior to denying its motion. For the

reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History

Plaintiffs-appellees Lawanda Morgan (“Lawanda”) and Onisha

Morgan (“Onisha”) (collectively “plaintiffs”) are African American. They are mother

and daughter and were former employees of AMT. Following their termination from

AMT, plaintiffs filed their initial complaint in August 2023, and their amended

complaint in December 2023. In their amended complaint, plaintiffs allege the

following two causes of action brought against AMT under R.C. 4112.02: race

discrimination and a retaliatory discrimination claim by Lawanda.

Plaintiffs allege that Lawanda had been employed by AMT for over

seven years, from September 2013 through August 2021, and Onisha was hired by

AMT in July 2021. In August 2021, Onisha’s father passed away. Consequently, she

requested bereavement leave and unpaid and excused time off from her supervisor.

Onisha was still in her probationary period at that time. Plaintiffs allege that while

probationary employees were not automatically entitled to bereavement leave, AMT

had made exceptions to this policy, in the past, for white employees. AMT denied

Onisha’s request for unpaid leave and counted the absences related to her father’s

death as unexcused. Ultimately, AMT fired Onisha for attendance violations on

August 24, 2021.

Plaintiffs further allege that within two days of Onisha being fired,

Lawanda complained to her supervisor that Onisha had been treated unfairly when compared to white employees. Lawanda’s supervisor advised Lawanda to report her

concerns to Human Resources (“HR”). Lawanda informed her supervisor that she

intended to pursue her complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission instead. According to plaintiffs, within one day of informing her

supervisor, AMT fired Lawanda.

With regard to their race-discrimination claim, plaintiffs allege that

both Onisha and Lawanda were fully competent to perform their essential job

duties; they were treated differently than other similarly situated employees on the

basis on their race; AMT had a history and pattern of treating African American

employees differently than other similarly situated non-African American

employees based on race; AMT violated R.C. 4112.02 by discriminating against

plaintiffs because of their race; and AMT terminated them based on their race. As

to Lawanda’s retaliation claim, plaintiffs allege that Lawanda complained about

AMT’s discriminatory conduct and AMT fired her as a result of her complaint.

Plaintiffs allege that AMT’s actions were retaliatory in nature and based on

Lawanda’s opposition to disparate treatment on the basis of race that occurred at

AMT.

In December 2024, AMT filed separate motions for summary

judgment against Onisha and Lawanda. In its motions, AMT sought judgment on

the basis that plaintiffs’ race-discrimination claim fails as a matter of law and

Lawanda cannot establish she was retaliated against. In order to establish a prima

facie case of race discrimination, a plaintiff must prove that he or she (1) belongs to a racial minority; (2) was discharged; (3) was qualified for the position; and (4) was

treated disparately from similarly situated minority employees. Janezic v. Eaton

Corp., 2013-Ohio-5436, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.), citing Courie v. ALCOA, 2005-Ohio-3483

¶ 20 (8th Dist.). To establish a prima facie claim of retaliation, a plaintiff must

demonstrate that: (1) he or she engaged in a protected activity; (2) his or her

employer knew of his or her participation in the protected activity; (3) he or she

suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) a causal link existed between the

protected activity and the adverse action. Meyers v. Goodrich Corp., 2011-Ohio-

3261, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.), citing Wille v. Hunkar Laboratories, Inc., 132 Ohio App.3d

92, 107-108 (1st Dist. 1998).

AMT argued that neither Onisha nor Lawanda could establish their

prima facie case of discrimination because they had no evidence that AMT treated

similarly situated, nonprotected employees more favorably. According to AMT, the

employees that plaintiffs identified who they believed were treated more favorably

were not valid comparisons. As to Lawanda’s retaliation claim, AMT argued that

Lawanda could not establish she was retaliated against because AMT was not aware

of her race-discrimination claim and she could not prove a causal link between her

protected activity and her termination.

In response, plaintiffs filed a motion for extension of time to submit

their briefs in opposition, which AMT opposed. Before the trial court ruled on

plaintiffs’ motions for extension of time, plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary

dismissal without prejudice on January 15, 2025. Following the voluntary dismissal, AMT filed separate motions for

attorney fees and frivolous conduct against plaintiffs. AMT requested a hearing on

its motions. AMT argued that plaintiffs lacked evidentiary support for their claims,

yet plaintiffs’ counsel continued to take depositions and pursue the matter until

AMT opposed plaintiffs’ motions for extension for time. AMT further argued that

plaintiffs’ counsel’s initial filing of an inaccurate complaint, and subsequent pursuit

of this case “through baseless arguments served only to harass and impose litigation

costs on [AMT]” in violation of Civ.R. 11 and R.C. 2323.51. (Motions for attorney

fees and frivolous conduct, Feb. 13, 2025.) Plaintiffs opposed these motions and

filed a cross-motion for attorney fees. AMT filed a reply in support of its motion and

an opposition to plaintiffs’ motion. The trial court denied all three motions without

holding an evidentiary hearing.1

It is from this order that AMT now appeals, raising the following

single assignment of error for review:

The trial court abused its discretion in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing pursuant to [AMT’s] motion for sanctions and request for hearing.

II. Law and Analysis

AMT argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying its

motion for sanctions under R.C. 2323.51 and Civ.R. 11, without first holding a

1 We note that the trial court retains jurisdiction following a voluntary dismissal to

resolve collateral matters, such as a motion for sanctions. ABN AMRO Mtge. Group, Inc. v. Evans, 2011-Ohio-5654 (8th Dist.). hearing, because plaintiffs’ counsel’s conduct was frivolous and an arguable basis

existed for a sanctions award.

The “decision to grant or deny sanctions under R.C. 2323.51 and

Civ.R. 11 rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.” MRN Ltd. Partnership

v. Gamage, 2023-Ohio-4541, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.), citing Walters v. Carter, 2020-Ohio-

807, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.); Bikkani v. Lee, 2008-Ohio-3130, ¶ 30 (8th Dist.). An abuse of

discretion occurs when a court exercises “its judgment, in an unwarranted way, in

regard to a matter over which it has discretionary authority.” Johnson v. Abdullah,

2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 35. We note that while both Civ.R. 11 and R.C. 2323.51 authorize

the award of attorney fees as a sanction for frivolous conduct, they have separate

standards of proof and differ in application. Grimes v. Oviatt, 2017-Ohio-1174, ¶ 22

(8th Dist.), citing Sigmon v. Southwest Gen. Health Ctr., 2007-Ohio-2117, ¶ 14 (8th

Dist.).

Civ.R. 11 governs the signing of pleadings, motions, and other

documents and provides in pertinent part:

The signature of an attorney . . . constitutes a certificate by the attorney or party that the attorney or party has read the document; that to the best of the attorney’s or party’s knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. . . For a willful violation of this rule, an attorney . . . upon motion of a party or upon the court’s own motion, may be subjected to appropriate action, including an award to the opposing party of expenses and reasonable attorney fees incurred in bringing any motion under this rule. When determining whether a violation is willful, the trial court applies a subjective

bad-faith standard. Grimes at ¶ 24 (8th Dist.), citing Riston v. Butler, 2002-Ohio-

2308, ¶ 12 (1st Dist.).

R.C. 2323.51(B)(1) authorizes a court to award court costs, reasonable

attorney fees, and other reasonable expenses incurred to a party adversely affected

by “frivolous conduct” in connection with a civil action. Relevant to this appeal,

“frivolous conduct” is defined as:

Conduct of . . . [a] party to a civil action . . . [of the] other party’s counsel of record that . . . is not warranted under existing law, cannot be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, or cannot be supported by a good faith argument for the establishment of new law.

R.C. 2323.51(A)(2)(a)(ii). Frivolous conduct under R.C. 2323.51 is reviewed under

an objective standard and “‘must involve egregious conduct.’” MRN, 2023-Ohio-

4541 at ¶ 24, quoting State ex rel. DiFranco v. S. Euclid, 2015-Ohio-4915, ¶ 15.

“Frivolous conduct is not proved merely by winning a legal battle or by proving that

a party’s factual assertions were incorrect.” DiFranco at ¶ 15, citing Ohio Power Co.

v. Ogle, 2013-Ohio-1745, ¶ 29-30 (4th Dist.). “And the fact that a legal claim was

unsuccessful does not, in and of itself, warrant sanctions.” Internatl. Union of

Operating Engineers, Local 18, 2017-Ohio-1055, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.), citing Halliwell v.

Bruner, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 5896, *24 (8th Dist. Dec. 14, 2000); Miller v. Miller,

2012-Ohio-2905, ¶ 18 (5th Dist.) (“R.C. 2323.51 does not purport to punish a party

for raising an unsuccessful claim.”). This court has previously held that “[n]either Civ.R. 11 nor

R.C. 2323.51 require a trial court to conduct a hearing before denying a motion for

sanctions ‘“when the court determines, upon consideration of the motion and in its

discretion, that [the motion] lacks merit.’”” Internatl. Union at ¶ 18 (8th Dist.),

quoting Lakeview Holding (OH), L.L.C. v. Haddad, 2013-Ohio-1796, ¶ 14 (8th

Dist.), quoting Pisani v. Pisani, 101 Ohio App.3d 83, 88 (8th Dist. 1995) and citing

CM Newspapers, Inc. v. Dawson, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 344, *7 (10th Dist. Jan.

28, 1992). “‘[W]here the court has sufficient knowledge of the circumstances for the

denial of the requested relief and the hearing would be perfunctory, meaningless, or

redundant,’ a hearing is unnecessary.” Id., quoting Pisani.

AMT contends plaintiffs engaged in frivolous conduct under

R.C. 2323.51(A)(2)(a)(ii) because they pursued legal action that no reasonable

attorney would have pursued in light of existing law and there were no good grounds

to assert the retaliation claim as required by Civ.R. 11. The basis of AMT’s contention

is twofold: (1) by arguing that a voluntary dismissal does not divest the trial court

of jurisdiction to consider collateral issues in their brief in opposition to AMT’s

motion for sanctions, plaintiffs’ argument “missed the mark” and was devoid of any

actual opposition to AMT’s position that plaintiffs’ conduct was frivolous under

Civ.R. 11 and R.C. 2323.51, and (2) plaintiffs and their counsel were aware, after

plaintiffs’ depositions, that plaintiffs did not have evidence to establish their race-

discrimination claims and Lawanda’s retaliation claim by virtue of the fact that Lawanda complained about race discrimination only to her supervisor and her

supervisor was not the decision maker involved in Lawanda’s termination.

AMT further contends that the trial court “did nothing more than

state ‘motion denied,’” and while acknowledging that the court is not required to

hold a hearing on every motion before denying sanctions, AMT states that “[t]his

court has found that a trial court abuses its discretion when the trial court arbitrarily

denies a motion for sanctions.” (AMT’s appellate brief, p. 10.) In support of its

argument, AMT relies on Bikkani, 2008-Ohio-3130 (8th Dist.), and Lakeview,

2013-Ohio-1796 (8th Dist.). We find these cases distinguishable.

In Bikkani, we recognized that “a trial court abuses its discretion

when it ‘arbitrarily’ denies a request for attorney fees.” Id. at ¶ 31, citing Turowski

v. Johnson, 68 Ohio App.3d 704 (9th Dist. 1990); Mitchell v. W. Res. Area Agency

on Aging, 2004-Ohio-4353, ¶ 27 (8th Dist.). An arbitrary denial occurs if either “the

record clearly evidences frivolous conduct” or “an arguable basis exists for an award

of sanctions[.]” Id., citing Fitworks Holdings, L.L.C. v. Pitchford-El, 2007-Ohio-

2517, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.), citing Capps v. Milhem, 2003-Ohio-5212 (2d Dist.). We

reversed the trial court’s decision to deny defendant’s motion for sanctions without

a hearing. In doing so, we considered the “overwhelming evidence of egregious

conduct throughout the litigation,” such as plaintiff’s refusal to dismiss time-barred

claims, despite ample evidence; plaintiff’s lack of standing; plaintiff’s frivolous

appeals; the Ohio Supreme Court’s determination that plaintiff was a vexatious

litigator; and plaintiff’s refusal to participate in the discovery. Id. at ¶ 32. As a result, we concluded the record “clearly evidence[d] frivolous conduct as well as an

arguable basis to impose sanctions under Civ.R. 11.” Id.

In Lakeview, the trial court commenced a hearing on appellant’s

motion for sanctions, which was recessed and rescheduled, but never resumed.

Ultimately, the trial court denied the motion for sanctions and found that a hearing

was not required. Lakeview, 2013-Ohio-1796, at ¶ 9. On appeal, appellant

challenged the court’s denial. We found that appellant presented enough evidence

to establish an arguable basis for awarding sanctions under R.C. 2323.51 and

Civ.R. 11 and that appellant was entitled to a complete hearing on her motion and

supplemental motion for sanctions. Id. at ¶ 26. We cautioned though, that in

remanding “this case to finish the hearing on [appellant’s] motion for sanctions, we

take no position on whether the trial court should grant or deny it.” Id.

Whereas, the record in this case is starkly different from Bikkani and

Lakeview. Here, the record neither clearly evidences frivolous conduct nor an

arguable basis for award of sanctions under R.C. 2323.51 and Civ.R. 11. Our review

reveals that plaintiffs filed an amended complaint to address AMT’s motion to

dismiss, and the trial court found that the amended complaint mooted AMT’s

motion to dismiss. Furthermore, there is no indication of willful misconduct, delay

tactics, or knowingly false filings. Plaintiffs participated in the discovery process and

anticipated opposing AMT’s motion for summary judgment. According to plaintiffs,

they “were poised to oppose” AMT’s motion for summary judgment, “[b]ut for a

delay in the receipt of [the] transcripts.” (Plaintiffs’ brief, p. 7.) Additionally, despite not being able to file briefs in opposition to AMT’s motions for summary judgment,

plaintiffs argue that the case is not as “clear cut” as AMT contends, pointing to issues

of fact in AMT’s own summary-judgment pleadings.

With regard to Onisha’s claim, plaintiffs contend that questions of

fact existed in AMT’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs cite to the evidence

AMT submitted regarding a white AMT employee to support their claim that white

employees were treated more favorably. AMT hired the white employee in June

2021. In July 2021, the white employee’s father passed away. Both Onisha and the

white employee were full-time temporary employees and were in their orientation

period when bereavement leave was requested. The white employee received one

full week of unpaid leave, while Onisha received less than one full day of leave. And

as to Lawanda, plaintiffs maintained that the HR interviews AMT relied on to

support its claim that it lacked knowledge of Lawanda’s protected activity raised

material questions of fact, because plaintiffs contended that the interviews

contained multiple contradictory witness statements.

In light of the foregoing, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s

decision was arbitrary. The mere fact that plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their

claims is not enough to warrant sanctions, especially when the record is devoid of

any evidence of frivolous conduct. See Halliwell, 2000 Ohio App.LEXIS 5896 at

*23 (8th Dist. Dec. 14, 2000), citing White v. Soo, 65 Ohio App.3d 731 (3d Dist.

1995). Indeed, this case lacks the overwhelming evidence of egregious conduct

throughout the litigation that was present in Bikkani and Lakeview. Therefore, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying AMT’s motions for

sanctions without a hearing.

The sole assignment of error is overruled.

Accordingly, judgment is affirmed.

It is ordered that appellees recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment

into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

______________________________ MARY J. BOYLE, PRESIDING JUDGE

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., and KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR