Morgan Stanley High Yield Securities Inc v. Jecklin

District Court, D. Nevada·Decided March 31, 2021·No. 2:05-cv-01364·Unknown

Opinion

* * *

MORGAN STANLEY HIGH YIELD Case No. 2:05-cv-1364-RFB-PAL SECURITIES INC., et al., ORDER ON SANCTIONS

Plaintiffs,

v.

HANS JECKLIN, CHRISTIANE JECKLIN, GEORGE HAEBERLING, JOHN TIPTON, SWISS LEISURE GROUP AG, AND JPC HOLDING AG,

Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION Before this Court is Plaintiff’s Supplemental Submission in Support of Motion for Sanctions against Defendants Hans Jecklin, Swiss Leisure Group AG (“SLG”), and JPC Holdings AG (“JPC”) (collectively, the “Jecklin Defendants”). ECF No. 658.

II. BACKGROUND The Court incorporates by reference the factual background from its May 28, 2020 Order. ECF No. 649. On March 31, 2019, the Court entered its Order: Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law After Court Trial. ECF No. 613. On April 2, 2019, the Court entered a Judgment in a Civil Case. ECF No. 614. Plaintiffs then filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment (ECF No. 621) and a Motion for Attorneys’ Fees. ECF No. 622. Plaintiffs also filed a Motion to Compel Defendants to Respond to Post-Judgment Discovery. ECF No. 640. Defendants opposed the Motion to Compel. ECF No. 641. On May 28, 2020, the Court issued an Order granting the Motion to Compel, denied without prejudice the associated Motion for Attorney’s Fees, and noted that “Plaintiffs may renew the motion [to compel] if Defendants continue to engage in obstructive conduct.” ECF No. 649 at 2. At a status conference on July 1, 2020 the Court issued an Order stating, “For the reasons stated on the record, it is ordered that Plaintiffs may file a supplement to their Motion for Sanctions relating to Defendants’ failure to comply with post-judgment discovery.” ECF No. 656. On July 15, 2020, Plaintiffs filed this instant Supplemental Motion for Sanctions. ECF No. 658. On July 22, 2020, Defendants filed an opposition. ECF No. 659. On July 29, 2020, Plaintiffs replied. ECF No. 660.

III. LEGAL STANDARD a. Rule 37 Sanctions Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A) provides: “If the motion is granted—or if the disclosure or requested discovery is provided after the motion was filed—the court must, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion, the party or attorney advising that conduct, or both to pay the movant's reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney's fees. But the court must not order this payment if: (i) the movant filed the motion before attempting in good faith to obtain the disclosure or discovery without court action; (ii) the opposing party's nondisclosure, response, or objection was substantially justified; or (iii) other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.”

Local Rule 26-6 of the District of Nevada requires that all motions to compel “set forth in full the text of the discovery originally sought and any response to it.” LR 26-6(b). The local rules further provide that discovery motions may not be considered unless the party moving to compel has made a good-faith effort to meet and confer and has included a declaration setting forth the details of the meet-and-confer conference about each disputed discovery request. LR 26-6(c). b. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Courts use the Lodestar method to determine the amount of reasonable attorney fees to award in a civil rights case. To determine the Lodestar, the Court multiplies the number of hours reasonably expended on the case by the market rate “prevailing in the community for similar services of lawyers of reasonably comparable skill and reputation.” Jordan v. Multnomah County, 815 F.2d 1258, 1263 (9th Cir. 1987). The burden is on the fee applicant to produce evidence that demonstrates that the requested hours and hourly rates are reasonable. Id. Factors the Court may consider in reducing the number of hours reasonably expended include inadequate documentation, overstaffing of the case, and the relative novelty and complexity of the issues raised. Cunningham v. County of Los Angeles, 879 F.2d 481, 484-85 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). Once the Lodestar figure has been calculated, the Court then determines whether it is necessary to adjust this amount upwards or downwards based on the Kerr factors: (1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys, (10) the “undesirability” of the case, (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, and (12) awards in similar cases. Kerr v. Screen Guild Extras, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951, 48 L. Ed. 2d 195, 96 S. Ct. 1726 (1976). As the first five Kerr factors are subsumed by the Lodestar calculation, the later factors are the primary focus at this stage. Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 364, n.9 (9th Cir. 1996). c. Civil Contempt of Court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A) i. Civil Contempt The Ninth Circuit has held that “belated compliance with discovery orders does not preclude the imposition of sanctions.” Fair Hous. of Marin v. Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 906 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Nat’l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976) (per curiam)). Under FRCP 37(b), if a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including an order under Rule 26(f), then the court where the action is pending may issue “further just orders,” and may “[treat] as contempt of court the failure to obey any order...” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(vii). “A court has wide latitude in determining whether there has been contemptuous defiance of its order.” Gifford v. Heckler, 741 F.2d 263, 266 (9th Cir. 1984). The moving party shares the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that the nonmoving party violated a “specific and definite order of the court.” Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Enforma Nat. Prods., Inc., 362 F.3d 1204, 1211 (9th Cir. 2004). If the moving party meets this burden, then it shifts to the nonmoving party to show why they were not able to comply. Id. Civil contempt does not require willfulness, and a party should not be held in contempt if their actions “appears to be based on good faith and a reasonable interpretation of the court’s order. In re Dual–Deck Video Cassette Recorder Antitrust Litig., 10 F.3d 693, 695

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Morgan Stanley High Yield Securities Inc v. Jecklin, (D. Nev. 2021).

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