Moreau v. United States Olympic & Paralympic Committee

District Court, D. Colorado·Decided October 18, 2022·No. 1:20-cv-00350·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO Judge Charlotte N. Sweeney

Civil Action No. 1:20-cv-00350-CNS-MEH

DR. WILLIAM MOREAU,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES OLYMPIC & PARALYMPIC COMMITTEE,

Defendant.

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant United States Olympic & Paralympic Committee’s (“USOPC’s”) Objection (ECF No. 159) to the Magistrate Judge’s April 12, 2021 Order regarding the application of the attorney-client privilege to certain documents (See ECF No. 152). For the reasons set forth below, USOPC’s Objection is OVERRULED. The Magistrate Judge’s Order is AFFIRMED. I. BACKGROUND The relevant background is set forth in the Court’s September 22, 2022 Order (ECF No. 293). After the Magistrate Judge issued his Order granting in part and denying in part USOPC’s Objection to the Special Master’s Recommendation (ECF No. 152), USOPC timely filed its Objection to the Magistrate Judge’s Order (ECF No. 159). Dr. Moreau timely filed his Response (ECF No. 174). II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A motion concerning the applicability of privileges is a non-dispositive motion. A magistrate judge’s order on such a motion will be affirmed unless it is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); Allen v. Sybase, Inc., 468 F.3d 642, 658 (10th Cir. 2006). Under the clearly erroneous standard, the magistrate judge’s order will be affirmed unless, upon review of the evidence, this Court is “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Id. III. ANALYSIS The Court has reviewed the Special Master’s Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge’s Order, USOPC’s Objection to the Magistrate Judge’s Order, Dr. Moreau’s Response, and relevant

legal authority. The Court addresses the arguments in USOPC’s Objection, overruling its Objection and affirming the Magistrate Judge’s Order. A. Corporate Employment and Privilege USOPC argues that the Magistrate Judge erred in concluding Attachments 2, 4-5, 9-13, and 15-20 were not privileged because an employee’s conversations with in-house counsel regarding corporate matters are privileged if the conversations concern the employee’s corporate duties (See ECF No. 159 at 5, 7). The Magistrate Judge erred, USOPC contends, because these documents concerned matters Dr. Moreau was required to address as part of his corporate duties, and therefore they are privileged (See id at 7). The gravamen of Dr. Moreau’s argument is that not

all communications between an employee and in-house counsel are privileged, even if the employee is acting as a corporation’s agent when interaction with in-house counsel (ECF No. 174 at 9-10). Moreover, Dr. Moreau argues, he was not seeking legal advice in his communications, and for this reason they are not privileged (Id. at 12.) The Court agrees with Dr. Moreau. The attorney-client privilege extends only to communications made by or to the client in the course of “gaining counsel, advice, or direction with respect to the client’s rights or obligations.” Gordon v. Boyles, 9 P.3d 1106, 1123 (Colo. 2000) (citation omitted).1 A “mere showing” that the communication was from the client to an attorney “does not suffice” to show that the attorney-client privilege applies. Id. (quotation omitted); see also Pownell v. Credo Petroleum Corp., No. 09-CV-01540-WYD-KLM, 2011 WL 1045418, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 17, 2011) (concluding a communication is privileged when it was made for the “express purpose of securing legal . . . advice” (quotation omitted)). In the corporate setting, the privilege applies to

corporate employees acting within the scope of their corporate duties, see Ryskamp ex rel. Boulder Growth & Income Fund v. Looney, No. 10-CV-00842-WJM-KLM, 2011 WL 3861437, at *4 (D. Colo. Sept. 1, 2011). After reviewing Attachments 2, 4-5, 9-10, 12-13, 15, 17, and 19-20, the Court concludes that Dr. Moreau was not seeking or providing any legal advice or counsel in these Attachments. Therefore, these Attachments are not privileged. See, e.g., Pownell, 2011 WL 1045418, at *2. Further, the Court concludes that the Magistrate Judge correctly determined that Attachments 11 and18 are partially privileged, consistent with the Special Master’s Recommendation. The Court need not address the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion regarding Attachment 16 because in a separate

1 The Court agrees with the parties that Colorado law applies in its privilege analysis (See ECF Nos. 159 at 5, 174 at 6 n.5). Order, the Court concluded USOPC waived any privilege attached to this Attachment (See ECF No. 293). B. Factual Materials & Legal Counsel USOPC argues the Magistrate Judge erred in concluding Attachments 3, 7, 13-15, and 39 were not privileged because information from these otherwise privileged Attachments may not be “extracted” by Dr. Moreau (ECF No. 159 at 10). At bottom, Dr. Moreau argues the Magistrate Judge did not err because factual matter communicated between him and counsel is not privileged (See ECF No. 174 at 12). The Court agrees with Dr. Moreau. The attorney-client privilege does not protect the underlying “factual information” contained within communications between clients and attorneys. Iowa Pac. Holdings, LLC v. Nat’l

R.R. Passenger Corp., No. 09-CV-02977-REB-KLM, 2011 WL 1527599, at *2–3 (D. Colo. Apr. 21, 2011) (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395-96 (1981)). For this reason, a document may be only partially privileged if some of its content is based on unprivileged “factual information.” See, e.g., Marianist Province of the U.S., Inc. v. Century Indem. Co., No. 08-CV- 01760-WYD-MEH, 2010 WL 3604388, at *3 (D. Colo. Sept. 7, 2010); see also Gordon, 9 P.3d at 1124 (concluding unprivileged facts cannot become privileged “merely by incorporation” into a communication with counsel). The Court has reviewed Attachments 3, 7, and 13-15. Although USOPC fashions its arguments regarding Attachments 3, 7, 13-15, and 39 as concerning the “legal question” of

“extract[ing]” unprivileged excerpts from the Attachments (ECF No. 159 at 10), basic principles of the attorney-client privilege dispense with USOPC’s arguments. Because underlying factual information is not privileged, and the attorney-client privilege only attaches to communications where legal advice is sought or given, the Magistrate Judge did not err in concluding Attachment 3 was partially privileged (ECF No. 152 at 5-6). Regarding Attachment 7, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that it is not privileged (Id. at 2). Bearing in mind the legal principles governing the attorney-client privilege, see, e.g., Gordon, 9 P.3d at 1123-24, the Magistrate Judge correctly concluded Attachments 13 through 15 were not privileged. Attachments 13 and 15 do not concern legal advice. And Attachment 14 provides a general overview of relevant guidelines that betrays no client confidences. More specificity is required to bring Attachment 14 within the privilege’s ambit. See D.A.S. v. People, 863 P.2d 291, 295 (Colo. 1993) (“A mere showing that the communication was from client to attorney does not suffice, but the circumstances indicating the intention of secrecy must appear.” (quotation omitted)).

Finally, the Court need not address USOPC’s argument regarding Attachment 39 because any privilege attached to Attachment 39 has been waived (See ECF No. 293). C. Corporate Management & Privilege USOPC argues that certain Attachments are privileged because their subject matters trigger the attorney-client privilege (See ECF No.

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Related

Upjohn Co. v. United States
449 U.S. 383 (Supreme Court, 1981)
Allen v. Sybase, Inc.
468 F.3d 642 (Tenth Circuit, 2006)
D.A.S. v. People
863 P.2d 291 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 1993)
Gordon v. Boyles
9 P.3d 1106 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 2000)