Morcos v. EMS, INC.

570 So. 2d 69, 1990 WL 162380
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedOctober 26, 1990
Docket89-CA-1766
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 570 So. 2d 69 (Morcos v. EMS, INC.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Morcos v. EMS, INC., 570 So. 2d 69, 1990 WL 162380 (La. Ct. App. 1990).

Opinion

570 So.2d 69 (1990)

Nicholas MORCOS
v.
EMS, INC. d/b/a American Deck Machinery, Eaton Corporation and International Cargo Gear Bureau, Inc.

No. 89-CA-1766.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.

October 26, 1990.

*70 David B. Bernstein, New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellant.

Robert E. Barkley, Jr., Sessions, Fishman, Boisfontaine, Nathan, Winn, Butler & Barkley, New Orleans, for defendant-appellee, Eaton Corp.

George E. Cain, John J. Hainkel, III, Lemle, Kelleher, Kohlmeyer, Dennery, Hunley, Moss & Frilot, New Orleans, for defendant-appellee, Intern. Cargo Gear Bureau, Inc.

Mary Campbell Hubbard, William L. Stroud, Phelps, Dunbar, Marks, Claverie & Sims, New Orleans, for defendant-appellee, American Deck Machinery, Inc.

Before SCHOTT, C.J., and BARRY and LOBRANO, JJ.

BARRY, Judge.

This personal injury lawsuit involves negligence and strict liability claims which resulted in summary judgments granted to American Deck Machinery [ADM], Eaton Corporation, and International Cargo Gear Bureau [ICGB].

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Nicholas Morcos alleged that while working for International Drilling Fluids, Inc. [IDF] he was told to paint six 20,000 gallon tanks which were horizontal in IDF's boat harbor. Morcos used an ADM diesel hydraulic crane to upright the tanks. After the tanks were vertical Morcos climbed to the top of the last tank to unshackle the slings when the boom slipped 12 to 18 inches. The shackles and sling struck Morcos and he fell and was injured.

Morcos sued Eaton, the distributor of the crane, ADM (formerly EMS, Inc.) which sold the crane to IDF (after buying it from the original owner, Berry Brothers), and ICGB, the company that tested the crane in October, 1985 and certified that it satisfied USDL/OSHA regulations. Morcos alleged that the defendants breached the implied and/or expressed warranties of merchantability and fitness of the crane.

Morcos amended his petition to include IDF and its compensation carrier and they *71 intervened to recover the paid benefits and medical expenses. That claim was compromised. Kathleen Morcos, divorced wife of Nicholas Morcos, intervened for past due child support.

ICGB's motion for summary judgment was denied October 24, 1988. After a hearing on December 5, 1988 the trial court granted summary judgment to Eaton Corporation (signed December 7, 1988) and to ADM (signed December 12, 1988). On December 19, 1988 Morcos filed for a new trial and the motion was denied on March 14, 1989.

On March 20, 1989 Morcos' motion and order for appeal of the March 14 judgment was granted. On March 27, 1989 Morcos filed for re-consideration of the denial of a new trial and the motion was denied June 21, 1989.[1] On July 5, 1989 Morcos' motion and order for appeal of the March 14 denial of his motion for new trial and the June 21 denial of his motion for reconsideration was granted.

On July 19, 1989 the trial court granted summary judgment to ICGB and on August 3, 1989 Morcos' motion and order for appeal was granted.

EATON'S MOTION TO DISMISS

Eaton filed a motion to dismiss the appeal and for sanctions because Morcos' appeal is procedurally deficient and his motion for new trial was untimely. La.C.C.P. Art. 2087 provides that an appeal must be taken within sixty days of the court's refusal to grant a timely application for a new trial. If the motion for new trial was untimely, Morcos' appeal as to Eaton is untimely.

Eaton's summary judgment was signed December 7, 1988 and Morcos filed for a new trial on December 19, 1988. La.C.C.P. Art. 1974 provides:

The delay for applying for a new trial shall be seven days, exclusive of legal holidays. Except as otherwise provided in the second paragraph hereof, this delay commences to run on the day after the judgment was signed.
When notice of the judgment is required under Article 1913, the delay for applying for a new trial commences to run on the day after the clerk has mailed, or the sheriff has served, the notice of judgment as required by Article 1913.

La.C.C.P. Art. 1913 provides in pertinent part:

If, at the conclusion of a trial a case is not taken under advisement but the court does not sign a judgment at the time, a party may make a request of record for notice of the date when the judgment was signed; and when such a request is made, the clerk shall mail such notice to the party requesting it or to his counsel of record.

The matter was not taken under advisement and judgment was granted from the bench on December 5, 1988. Morcos did not file a request for notice of judgment; therefore the delay commenced December 8, 1988. The motion for new trial on December 19, 1988 was untimely, therefore Morcos' appeal as to Eaton was untimely and will not be considered.

Eaton's motion to dismiss is granted. There is no basis to impose sanctions.

THE LAW

Summary judgment is a drastic remedy and should be granted only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to material fact, and the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La.C.C.P. Art. 966; Sanders v. Hercules Sheet Metal, Inc., 385 So.2d 772 (La.1980); Roger v. Dufrene, 553 So.2d 1106 (La.App. 4th Cir.1989), writ denied 559 So.2d 1358 (La.1990).

The party moving for a summary judgment must affirmatively and clearly prove the absence of a genuine issue of material *72 fact. Any doubt must be resolved against summary judgment and in favor of a trial on the merits. Industrial Sand and Abrasives, Inc. v. Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company, 427 So.2d 1152 (La. 1983).

The movants' pleadings, affidavits and documents must be scrutinized closely; those of the opponent are to be indulgently treated. Supporting and opposing affidavits must be made on personal knowledge and set forth facts that would be admissible. La.C.C.P. Art. 967; Barham & Churchill v. Campbell & Associates, 503 So.2d 576 (La.App. 4th Cir.1987), writ denied, 503 So.2d 1018 (La.1987).

THE RECORD

By petition Morcos alleged strict liability and negligence theories as to ADM. He claimed that ICGB did not properly examine the crane and it should not have been certified under USDL/OSHA regulations. Morcos contended that ADM and ICGB breached the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness.

The record contains ICGB's first motion for summary judgment which included a number of exhibits: its contract with IDF to test the crane; certification of the crane; worksheets; IDF's application for certification to ICGB; the January 1, 1986 repair order for the crane; the deposition of Donald Rhea, president of ADM, and the affidavits of Lee Boutte and Rodolfo Mediavilla. Morcos filed a memorandum (and supplemental) in opposition and attached: the crane's act of sale to EMS; the ICGB documentation of testing; certification; a copy of several OSHA regulations; ICGB's contract; 2 ICGB's letters to IDF; pages from his deposition in which Morcos stated he first noticed the hydraulic leak four days after the crane's delivery to IDF and the boom started to slip in March or April, 1986. According to Morcos' brief at the hearing (at which the ICGB summary judgment was denied) he submitted the affidavit of Lubby Lodrigue, an IDF employee for eight and one-half months in 1987 who operated the crane on numerous occasions, in which Lodrigue stated in pertinent part:

4.

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