Luigi Malta, Individually and on Behalf of His Minor Child, Giovanni Malta v. Herbert S. Hiller Corporation, Hiller Offshore Services, Inc., the Hiller Companies, Inc., Helis Energy, L.L.C. and Helis Enterprises, Inc.

CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedNovember 25, 2020
Docket2020-CA-0250
StatusPublished

This text of Luigi Malta, Individually and on Behalf of His Minor Child, Giovanni Malta v. Herbert S. Hiller Corporation, Hiller Offshore Services, Inc., the Hiller Companies, Inc., Helis Energy, L.L.C. and Helis Enterprises, Inc. (Luigi Malta, Individually and on Behalf of His Minor Child, Giovanni Malta v. Herbert S. Hiller Corporation, Hiller Offshore Services, Inc., the Hiller Companies, Inc., Helis Energy, L.L.C. and Helis Enterprises, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Luigi Malta, Individually and on Behalf of His Minor Child, Giovanni Malta v. Herbert S. Hiller Corporation, Hiller Offshore Services, Inc., the Hiller Companies, Inc., Helis Energy, L.L.C. and Helis Enterprises, Inc., (La. Ct. App. 2020).

Opinion

LUIGI MALTA, * NO. 2020-CA-0250 INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF HIS MINOR * COURT OF APPEAL CHILD, GIOVANNI MALTA * FOURTH CIRCUIT VERSUS * STATE OF LOUISIANA HERBERT S. HILLER CORPORATION, HILLER * OFFSHORE SERVICES, INC., THE HILLER COMPANIES, * INC., HELIS ENERGY, L.L.C. ******* AND HELIS ENTERPRISES, INC.

DLD DYSART, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART.

I agree with the majority as to the award of damages and the denial of the

Motion to Dismiss the Appeal. I also agree that the language in the amended

judgment is ambiguous with respect to the award for past medical expenses and

should be amended for clarification. I respectfully dissent, however, as to the

assessment of 100% fault for the accident against Hiller, although I agree with the

majority that Helis is without liability in this action. While our jurisprudence

indicates that a trial court’s judgment should not be reversed in the absence of

manifest error, it also reflects that:

“[A] reviewing court may not merely decide if it would have found the facts of the case differently.” [Hall v. Folger Coffee Co., 03-1734, p. 9 (La. 4/14/04), 874 So.2d 90, 98]. “Therefore, the appellate review of facts is not completed by reading so much of the record as will reveal a reasonable factual basis for the finding in the trial court; there must be a further determination that the record establishes that the finding is not clearly wrong (manifestly erroneous).” Arceneaux v. Domingue, 365 So.2d 1330, 1333 (La. 1978). “Accordingly, if an appellate court concludes that the trial court’s factual findings are clearly wrong, the mere fact that some record evidence appears which would furnish a reasonable factual basis for the contested findings does not require affirmance.” Mart v. Hill, 505 So.2d 1120, 1127 (La. 1987).

1 Johnson v. Orleans Par. Sch. Bd., 14-0277, pp. 7-8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/26/17), 219

So.3d 452, 461, writ denied, 17-0907 (La. 9/29/17), 227 So.3d 290. (Emphasis

added). I agree that the record contains some “evidence. . . which would furnish a

reasonable factual basis” for the trial court’s assessment of fault; however, in my

view, the testimony and exhibits, and the totality of the circumstances of this case,

support a finding that Wood Group and Mr. Malta both bear fault. Thus, in my

opinion, the trial court manifestly erred in determining that Hiller was solely at

fault.

Hiller was retained to perform annual inspections of Helis’ Black Bay

facility. Its job was, simply, “[t]o do the inspection;” as James Guidry, Hiller’s

operational manager who arranged inspections, testified, “[Hiller] inspect[s] it, and

it’s up to the customer to maintain it. It’s their . . . equipment; it’s not [Hiller’s]

equipment.” This was also confirmed by Dray Hebert, the Hiller technician who

conducted the inspection. He testified:

. . . we don’t maintain because we go out there once a year. There’s no way for us to maintain it once a year. We inspect it. As far as maintaining it, that’s the platform, that’s whoever’s out there that’s in control of that.

Mr. Hebert clarified that, while Hiller conducted annual inspections, if a

technician “write[s] up some equipment,” as needing attention, and the customer

“calls [Hiller] and say[s], hey, we want y’all to come fix this, then it’s not a

problem. We go out there and fix it.” Here, according to Mr. Guidry, the work

order for Hiller’s work at the Black Bay facility in April, 2012, was limited to an

“annual firefighting safety inspection.” While Hiller is capable of performing

maintenance work on equipment, there was no request for it to do so at that time.

A request would have resulted in a separate work order for work outside the scope

of the annual inspection.

2 It is clear that Wood Group intended that Hiller’s sole job was to perform an

annual inspection, as Mr. Harvey testified as follows:

Q. And what does an annual inspection entail?

A. They come out and check all of our fire and safety equipment to make sure we’re in compliance.

Q. And other than check that equipment, do they do anything else? Are they supposed to do anything else, from your perspective?

A. Not at that time.

Austin R. Pitre, Wood Group’s account manager, too, confirmed that

Hiller’s sole responsibility was to inspect all of the safety equipment. Hiller would

“go around and tag equipment that needed to be serviced.” He agreed that that was

what “what they’re supposed to do.”

It is clear that Hiller was only retained to perform an inspection of the safety

equipment. It is equally clear that Wood Group, which undertook the

responsibility of servicing or removing equipment needing service, was (or should

have been) familiar with the equipment at the facility over which it had sole

operating authority. The testimony at trial did, in fact, indicate that Wood Group

was familiar with the cylinder at issue, as Lilton Harvey, Wood Group’s

production foreman, testified that it had been removed in the past by Wood Group

employees.

While Wood Group clearly took responsibility for the cylinder and had

handled it in the past, the record clearly reflects that Wood Group did not train its

employees, and particularly, those tasked with handling the cylinder in the instant

case. In my opinion, and as is discussed more fully below, this failure was the

most significant factor in the events which led to the incident.

The cylinder at issue is a Siemens Sinorex clean-agent system which

discharges its fire-suppressant agent to fully extinguish a fire, leaving no residue.

3 As David Stahl, Mr. Malta’s expert explained, the cylinder has a high-flow nozzle,

designed to completely discharge its contents within thirty seconds. Thus, as Mr.

Harvey testified, cylinders can accidentally malfunction and discharge their

content; however, there would be no evidence that it had discharged as it dissipates

entirely. Here, although Dray Hebert noted that the cylinder “has 0 PSI,” there was

sufficient other evidence, obvious to all parties, that the cylinder had not

accidentally discharged.

Mr. Hebert noted in his report that the cylinder was full, with a weight of

245 pounds. The cylinder, when it is empty, weighs 110 pounds. It is considered

full when it is filled with 134 pounds of fire-suppressant agent.1 In his report, Mr.

Hebert indicated the cylinder’s weight to be “stamped full” with a weight of 245

pounds, a significant difference from an empty 110 pound cylinder. This, alone,

would indicate to anyone with any knowledge of these cylinders that it had not

accidentally discharged and was not empty. While Mr. Harvey “read [Mr.

Hebert’s] report” and “understood” (i.e. assumed) that it had discharged

erroneously because of the 0 PSI reading, a proper reading of the report would

have alerted him to the fact that the cylinder was, in fact, full of the fire-

suppressant agent. Having signed off on all of Mr. Hebert’s reports, Mr. Harvey is

legally presumed to have read and understood its contents. See, e.g., Brown v.

Simoneaux, 593 So.2d 939, 941 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1992)(“[a]n individual who signs

a written instrument is charged with the responsibility of having read it and is

presumed to know and understand its contents”); Guimmo v. Albarado, 99-286, p.

7 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/27/99), 739 So.2d 973, 976 (“when a party signs papers they

are presumed to know the contents of those papers.”).

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Related

Brown v. Simoneaux
593 So. 2d 939 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1992)
Guimmo v. Albarado
739 So. 2d 973 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1999)
Arceneaux v. Domingue
365 So. 2d 1330 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1978)
Hall v. Folger Coffee Co.
874 So. 2d 90 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 2004)
Mart v. Hill
505 So. 2d 1120 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1987)
Johnson v. Orleans Parish School Board
219 So. 3d 452 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2017)

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Luigi Malta, Individually and on Behalf of His Minor Child, Giovanni Malta v. Herbert S. Hiller Corporation, Hiller Offshore Services, Inc., the Hiller Companies, Inc., Helis Energy, L.L.C. and Helis Enterprises, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/luigi-malta-individually-and-on-behalf-of-his-minor-child-giovanni-malta-lactapp-2020.