Moran v. Secretary of Health and Human Services

CourtUnited States Court of Federal Claims
DecidedApril 10, 2019
Docket16-538
StatusUnpublished

This text of Moran v. Secretary of Health and Human Services (Moran v. Secretary of Health and Human Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Federal Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Moran v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, (uscfc 2019).

Opinion

In the United States Court of Federal Claims OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS Filed: January 23, 2019 (Not to be published)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * JOSEPH MORAN, * * No. 16-0538V Petitioner, * * v. * Special Master Oler * SECRETARY OF HEALTH * Interim Attorneys’ Fees and Costs; AND HUMAN SERVICES, * Duplicative Billing; * Administrative Tasks; Expert Costs. Respondent. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Andrew Donald Downing, Van Cott & Talamante, PLLC, Phoenix, AZ, for Petitioner.

Althea Walker Davis, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

DECISION AWARDING INTERIM ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS1

Oler, Special Master:

On May 2, 2016, Joseph Moran (“Petitioner”) filed a petition for compensation in the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (“the Program”), 2 alleging that he developed rheumatoid arthritis (“RA”) caused or significantly aggravated by his receipt of an influenza (“flu”) vaccination on October 17, 2013. ECF No. 1 at 1. Petitioner now requests an award of interim attorneys’ fees and costs.

1 Because this unpublished decision contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, I intend to post this decision on the United States Court of Federal Claims’ website, in accordance with the E- Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 205, 116 Stat. 2899, 2913 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012)). In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), a party has 14 days to identify and move to delete medical or other information, that satisfies the criteria in 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(4)(B). Further, consistent with the rule, a motion for redaction must include a proposed redacted decision. If, upon review, I agree that the identified material fits within the requirements of that provision, I will delete such material from public access. 2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 (“Vaccine Act”), Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for ease of citation, all “§” references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. §300aa (2012). 1 I. The Instant Motion

On June 13, 2018, Petitioner filed an application for interim attorneys’ fees and costs (“Interim Motion”), requesting $30,398.00 in attorneys’ fees for her counsel of record, Andrew D. Downing of Van Cott & Talamante, PLLC (“VCT”), and $21,199.68 in attorneys’ costs, for a total of $51,597.68. See Interim Motion, ECF No. 40 at 1; see also Ex. A at 38, 67, attached as ECF No. 40- 1 (hereinafter referred to as “Ex. A”).3 A review of the Interim Motion does not reflect that Petitioner herself has borne any out-of-pocket expenses up to this point in the litigation. See generally Interim Motion.

Respondent filed a response to Petitioner’s Interim Motion on June 27, 2018. Respondent’s Response, ECF No. 41. Respondent argues that “[n]either the Vaccine Act nor Vaccine Rule 13 contemplates any role for [R]espondent in the resolution of a request by a petitioner for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs.” Id. at 1. Respondent adds, however, that he is “satisfied that the statutory requirements for an award of attorney’s fees and costs are met in this case.” Id. at 2. Additionally, he “respectfully recommends that [I] exercise [my] discretion and determine a reasonable award" for interim attorneys’ fees and costs. Id. at 3.

For the reasons discussed below, I hereby GRANT IN PART Petitioner’s Interim Motion, awarding $25,838.30 in attorneys’ fees and $20,153.18 in costs, for a total of $45,991.48.

II. Legal Standard for Interim Attorneys’ Fees and Costs The Federal Circuit has held that an award of interim attorneys’ fees and costs is permissible under the Vaccine Act. Shaw v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 609 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Avera v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 515 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The Federal Circuit has stated, “Congress made clear that denying interim attorneys' fees under the Vaccine Act is contrary to an underlying purpose of the Vaccine Act.” Cloer v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 675 F.3d 1358, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

In Avera, the Federal Circuit stated, “[i]nterim fees are particularly appropriate in cases where proceedings are protracted and costly experts must be retained.” 515 F.3d at 1352. Likewise, in Shaw, the Federal Circuit held that “where the claimant establishes that the cost of litigation has imposed an undue hardship and there exists a good faith basis for the claim, it is proper for the special master to award interim attorneys' fees.” 609 F.3d at 1375. However, Avera did not exclusively define when interim fees are appropriate; rather, it has been interpreted to allow special masters discretion. See Kirk v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 08-241V, 2013 WL 775396, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 13, 2009); Bear v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 11-362V, 2013 WL 691963, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Feb. 4, 2013). Even though it has been argued that a petitioner must meet the three Avera criteria -- protracted proceedings, costly expert testimony, and undue hardship -- special masters have instead treated these criteria as possible factors in a flexible balancing test. Avera, 515 F.3d at 1352; Al-Uffi v. Sec’y of Health

3 Petitioner’s claim originated while Petitioner’s attorney, Mr. Downing, was employed at Hennelly and Steadman (“H&S”). See Interim Motion, ECF No. 40 at 3; see also Ex. A at 67. After the merger of H&S with VCT, VCT continued the invoicing of the matter. As a result, Petitioner has submitted a second invoice from H&S for the initial period during which Mr. Downing was employed by that firm. Id. 2 & Human Servs., No. 13-956V, 2015 WL 6181669, at *7 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 30, 2015).

The undue hardship inquiry looks at more than just financial involvement of a petitioner; it also looks at any money expended by petitioner’s counsel. Kirk, 2013 WL 775396, at *2 (finding “the general principle underlying an award of interim fees was clear: avoid working a substantial financial hardship on petitioners and their counsel.”). As his Interim Motion points out, by the time an entitlement hearing may be scheduled in this case, Petitioner, and his counsel, will have been litigating this claim for more than two years4. ECF No. 40 at 4. Thus, I find it reasonable to award interim attorneys’ fees and costs at this juncture to avoid undue hardship for Petitioner’s counsel.

III. Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees

If interim fees are deemed appropriate, a petitioner is eligible for an interim award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs if the special master finds that a petitioner brought his/her petition in good faith and with a reasonable basis. §15(e)(1); Avera, 515 F.3d at 1352; Shaw, 609 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Woods, 105 Fed. Cl. at 154; Friedman v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 94 Fed. Cl. 323, 334 (Fed. Cl. 2010); Doe 21 v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 89 Fed. Cl. 661, 668 (Fed. Cl. 2009); Bear, 2013 WL 691963, at *5; Lumsden v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 97-588V, 2012 WL 1450520 at *4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. March 28, 2012).

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