Moran v. Board of School Trustees

501 N.E.2d 472, 36 Educ. L. Rep. 430, 1986 Ind. App. LEXIS 3246
CourtIndiana Court of Appeals
DecidedDecember 17, 1986
Docket2-585A147
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 501 N.E.2d 472 (Moran v. Board of School Trustees) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Moran v. Board of School Trustees, 501 N.E.2d 472, 36 Educ. L. Rep. 430, 1986 Ind. App. LEXIS 3246 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).

Opinion

SHIELDS, Judge.

Sara Moran appeals a judgment in favor of the Board of School Trustees of Mt. Pleasant Township Community Schools, Delaware County, Indiana (Board).

Moran filed a complaint seeking reinstatement and back pay on the grounds the Board's decision to cancel her contract violated Ind.Code Ann. § 20-6.1-4-14(b)(2) (Burns 1985) because the school principal did not provide her with his personal written evaluation prior to January 1, 1983. 1 *474 She appeals the trial court's adverse judgment.

On appeal, Moran raises two issues, which we state as follows:

1) Whether the trial court erred in concluding she had no right to reinstatement; and

2) Whether she is entitled to any other relief.

We affirm.

FACTS

Moran, a non-permanent 2 teacher at Yorktown High School for the 1982-88 school year, received her assistant principal's written evaluation of her performance on January 12, 1983. On April 20, 1983 the Board notified Moran it was not renewing her contract.

DISCUSSION

Moran's argument is as follows. As an administrative body, a school board must follow a statutorily mandated method of exercising its statutory powers and duties. Necessarily, then, the Board must strictly adhere to all statutory conditions precedent to exercising its power to discharge an employee; otherwise, its act is invalid. Subsection (b)(2) is a statutory condition precedent to the Board's exercise of its power to terminate a nonpermanent teacher's contract because the provision contains the mandatory language "shall". The Board failed to strictly adhere to subsection (b)(2). Therefore, the Board's nonre-newal of Moran's contract is ineffective and she is entitled to reinstatement.

While we agree with many of Moran's tenets, 3 we nevertheless find her argument unavailing because it rests upon an errorneous assumption.

Moran's argument assumes subsection (b)(2) is a condition precedent to the exercise of the Board's right to terminate her contract. However, the plain reading of 1.C. § 20-6.1-4-14 leads to the opposite conclusion. 4 Subsection (a), and not subsection (b)(2), specifically addresses the duration and method of termination of a non-permanent teacher's contract. Subsection (a) provides a nonpermanent teacher's contract:

"continues in force for the next school term.... However, the contract does not continue if
(1) On or before May 1, the school corporation notifies the teacher that the *475 contract will not continue for the next school term; this notification must be:
(A) Written; and
(B) Delivered in person, or mailed by registered or certified mail to the teacher at his last and recognized address...."

The unambiguously expressed intention of this section is a contract does not continue if proper notice is given. There is no exception or further condition for termination of the contract. 5 In contrast, subsection (b)(2) does not address the question of whether a contract continues. In fact, by its language, it is operative only if the nonpermanent teacher has been refused continuation of the contract' Subsection (b)(2) could not and does not impact on the nonrenewal procedure and is not a condition precedent to nonrenewal. Obviously, then, the failure alone to comply with subsection (b)(2) does not entitle Moran to the relief of reinstatement.

II.

Having concluded Moran is not entitled to reinstatement, the question remains whether she is entitled to other relief. Moran's right to other relief depends upon whether she proved her "right" to a written evaluation was breached. Moran argues the Board breached the contract in two respects. First, she contends subsection (b)(2) specifically states the principal must provide her with a written evaluation, and this means he must personally conduct the evaluation and cannot delegate this authority. We disagree.

Subsection (b)(2) states "[the principal ... shall provide the teacher with an annual written evaluation." The common definition of the verb "provide" includes "to make available; supply, afford." Webster's New World Dictionary, p. 1172 (College Ed. 1966). Hence, IC § 20-6.1-4-14(b)(2) directs the principal to supply, afford or make available a written evaluation of the nonpermanent teacher's performance before January 1 of each year. It charges the principal with the responsibility of arranging a written evaluation; it does not require the principal personally to prepare it. The trial court did not err in determining the principal may delegate the responsibility of performing the statutorily required written evaluation of a nonper-manent teacher. Since the principal "provided" Moran with a written evaluation through the vice principal, such action constituted no breach.

Second, Moran argues a breach occurred because she did not receive an eval uation until January 12. Moran's contention the delay in receiving an evaluation constitutes a breach rests upon the assumption strict compliance with subsection (b)(2) is required. Her argument for strict compliance, however, is based upon her previous assertion subsection (b)(2) is a condition precedent to nonrenewal. Since we have found otherwise, and since Moran cites no other reason or authority for requiring strict compliance, we hold the trial court did not err in finding substantial compliance with subsection (b)(2) was sufficient and the Board substantially complied with this provision.

The general rule is, and our courts have held, substantial compliance with a statutory mandate is sufficient if the act of compliance accomplishes the essential purpose of the statute. Beneficial Finance Co. v. Wegmiller Bender Lumber Co. (1980), Ind.App., 402 N.E.2d 41; Taylor v. Burton (1973), 157 Ind.App. 267, 299 N.E.2d 848; Feigel Const. Corp. v. City of Evansville (1958), 128 Ind.App. 698, 150 N.E.2d 263. Moran suggests and we agree the purpose of the written evaluation is to provide a nonpermanent teacher the opportunity to correct deficiencies observed in his or her teaching. Moran received her written evaluation on January 12, while the Board did not make the decision to terminate her contract until mid-April. There is no evidence the delay in receiving a written evaluation impaired or impeded Moran's opportunity to correct the deficiencies observed in her teaching. The trial court did *476 not err in applying the standard of substantial compliance nor in concluding the Board substantially complied with subsection (b)(2).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Vukovits v. BD., ROCKVILLE COMMUNITY SCHOOL
659 N.E.2d 174 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 1995)
Tishey v. Board of School Trustees of North Newton School Corp.
575 N.E.2d 1018 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 1991)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
501 N.E.2d 472, 36 Educ. L. Rep. 430, 1986 Ind. App. LEXIS 3246, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/moran-v-board-of-school-trustees-indctapp-1986.