SCHAUER, J.
In February, 1944, respondent Board of Medical Examiners (hereinafter termed the board) licensed petitioner James A. Moran (hereinafter called petitioner) to practice medicine and surgery in California. Thereafter petitioner developed a general practice of his profession at Carmel, in Monterey County. In May, 1946, a special agent of the board filed a written accusation charging petitioner with three counts of unprofessional conduct in the prescription of certain narcotics and asking that the board discipline petitioner. Following a hearing the board, on August 16, 1946, filed its written decision and order that petitioner was guilty as charged, that his medical certificate be suspended for one year, that for five years immediately following the year of suspension petitioner be on probation and neither have in possession nor prescribe narcotics, and that the decision “shall be effective immediately upon delivery of a copy thereof” to petitioner.
On September 26, 1946, petitioner filed in the superior court in Los Angeles his petition for a writ of mandate asking that the court review the proceedings before the board, set aside the decision and order of the board, and order that petitioner’s license to practice medicine in this state be re[303]*303stored; an alternative writ was issued the same day. The individual members of the board, as well as the board itself, are named as parties respondent in both the petition and the alternative writ. On October 16, 1946, the board by way of return filed its demurrer and answer to the petition for the writ; and there was also filed in the superior court a transcript of the proceedings before the board. That court, after a hearing but with no evidence other than the transcript of the board proceedings, overruled the demurrer, made findings in favor of petitioner, and ordered that the decision of the board be annulled, that petitioner’s medical certificate be restored, and that petitioner recover his costs. The board has appealed from the judgment annulling its decision (L. A. 20514) and petitioner has appealed from the order of the court taxing his costs at only $31.60 and disallowing an item of $117 paid by him as the cost of the transcript of the proceedings before the board (L. A. 20515). We have concluded that upon the record and the applicable law the judgment of the trial court must be affirmed and that petitioner is entitled to recover the item of costs which was disallowed.
As grounds requiring reversal of the trial court’s judgment in petitioner’s favor, the board contends:
1. That the petition for mandamus was not filed within the time allowed by statute.
2. That the record of the proceedings before the board supported its decision, and the trial court had no power to set aside such decision.
1. Time for Filing Mandamus Petition
Section 11523 of the Government Code provides that judicial review of the board’s decision “may be had by filing a petition for a writ of mandate in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. Except as otherwise provided in this section any such petition shall be filed within 30 days after the last day on which reconsideration can be ordered. . . . The complete record of the proceedings, or such parts thereof as are designated by the petitioner, shall be prepared by the agency and shall be delivered to petitioner, within 30 days
Section 11518 of the same code states that the board’s decision “shall be in writing,” and section 11519 provides that the ‘ ‘ decision shall become effective 30 days after it is delivered or mailed to respondent [petitioner herein] unless: . . . the agency itself [here, the board] orders that the decision shall become effective sooner. ...” Section 11521 provides that the “power to order a reconsideration shall expire 30 days after the delivery or mailing of a decision to respondent [petitioner herein], or on the date set by the agency itself as the effective date of the decision if such date occurs prior to the expiration of the 30-day period. ’ ’
In this case the board ordered that its decision be effective upon delivery of the written decision to petitioner. Delivery took place on August 19, 1946, and consequently the board’s power to order a reconsideration expired on the same date, and the time allowed petitioner to file this mandamus proceeding expired 30 days later unless extended by other provisions of section 11523 of the Government Code. As noted hereinabove, the mandamus petition was filed September 26, 1946, or subsequent to the expiration of such 30-day period. Petitioner urges, however, that within 10 days of August 19, 1946, he “requested the agency to prepare . . . the record” of the proceedings before it, that he filed this petition for mandamus within five days after delivery of the record to him, and that therefore he acted within the time allowed by the provisions of section 11523, quoted hereinabove.
As originally filed on September 26, 1946, the petition for mandamus contained no reference to the facts which petitioner claims establish that the petition was filed in time. The board demurred to the petition on the grounds, among others, that the court “has no jurisdiction of the subject of the purported cause of action set forth or referred to in said petition,” that the petition failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and that the petition was not filed “within the time permitted by law, and, more specifically,” within 30 days after the effective date of the board’s decision. With the demurrer the board filed its answer expressly admitting “the allegations contained in Paragraphs I, III, IV, V and VI” of the petition and denying all other allegations thereof. Thereafter petitioner, with leave of court, filed an amendment to paragraphs VI and VII of his petition. As amended, para[305]*305graph VI alleges, among other things, that the board’s decision “was made effective immediately upon delivery of a copy thereof to petitioner, and that said copy was received by petitioner on August 19, 1946; that on said August 19, 1946, petitioner requested respondent State Board of Medical Examiners, by requesting its duly appointed shorthand reporter, Ralph A. Sollars, to prepare a full and complete record of the proceedings held . . .; that on September 24,1946, petitioner’s attorney . . . received direct from said Ralph A. Sollars, via Railway Express, the record hereinbefore referred to and now on file with the above entitled court. ’ ’
The board filed no answer to the amendment to the petition. Nevertheless, it now asserts that “none of petitioner’s allegations upon this subject [request for the record of the board’s proceedings], denied in the return, were proved. In fact, there was no attempt to prove them.” Apparently the board is suggesting that the denials contained in its answer to the petition as originally filed should be deemed extended to relate also to new matter added by the amendment but that its express admission of the allegations of paragraph VI does not relate to that paragraph as amended. There is no merit in such suggestion. If the denials of the answer be deemed extended (and we are aware of no authority to support such an extension, in the absence, as here, of stipulation to that effect) to new matter pleaded in the amendment to the petition, then the board is in the position of denying not only that petitioner requested a copy of the board proceedings, but of denying also that a copy of its decision was ever delivered to or received by petitioner so as to set running the time allowed to petitioner to file this mandamus proceeding. “Every material allegation of the complaint, not controverted by the answer, must, for the purposes of the action, be taken as true. . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., §462.) We are of the view that the board, by failing to deny the new factual matter contained in the amendment to the petition, must be deemed to have admitted it. (See 21 Cal.Jur. § 106, p. 155, and § 131, p. 188.)
The board urges that in any case a request made of the shorthand reporter to prepare the record of the proceedings before the board is not a request of “the agency” within the provision of section 11523 and did not operate to extend the time within which petitioner might file his mandamus petition. In support of its position the board points to section 1300 of title 16 of the California Administrative Code, by which it has [306]*306established the locations of its offices in Sacramento, Los Angeles, and San Francisco (see also Bus. & Prof. Code, § 2109); and to section 1303 of the same code, by which it delegates (pursuant to the authority of Gov. Code, § 11500) certain of its functions to its secretary-treasurer, 11 or in his absence from the office of the Board, to its Assistant Secretary.” The board argues that its failure in this latter section to expressly delegate the function of receiving a request for a record of disciplinary proceedings before it, establishes that petitioner’s request to the shorthand reporter amounted to no request at all, within the intendment of section 11523 of the Government Code. But the very language used in the last mentioned section carries an implication that it must be liberally, rather than narrowly, construed. The language is that “The complete record of the proceedings, or such parts thereof as are designated by the petitioner, shall be prepared by the agency, ’ ’ etc. It seems obvious that such part of the proceedings as is reflected only by the reporter’s notes can “be prepared by the agency” only as it acts through the reporter. In other words, the reporter is necessarily representative of the agency in preparation of at least a part of the record. There is no denial that in this case Sollars was the agency’s “duly appointed shorthand reporter” nor is there any contention that any person other than the official reporter could have prepared the record. Furthermore, section 11500 of the Administrative Code does expressly provide that “wherever the word ‘agency’ alone is used the power to act may he delegated hy the agency and wherever the words ‘agency itself’ are used the power to act shall not be delegated unless the statutes relating to the particular agency authorize the delegation of the agency’s power to hear and decide.” • (Italics added.) We are of the view that if such quoted section has any significance at all in relation to the proposition for which the board invokes it that it tends to support petitioner’s position rather than that of the board. Certainly the function of making the record in the first place; i. e., of taking the notes in shorthand, was delegated to the official reporter; yet section 1303 is as silent on the delegation of that duty as it is on the function of preparing the transcript or receiving the request for the transcription.
The “Certificate of Reporter” attached to the record states •that “the foregoing is a full, true and correct transcript of the shorthand notes taken by me in the above entitled matter, on the dates hereinbefore specified,' and . . . is, a full, [307]*307true and correct statement of the proceedings had in the same matter as directed by the Board of Medical Examiners.” In its answer to the petition for mandamus the board alleges that the record as filed in the trial court is accurate, and adopts into its answer by reference, all of the contents of such record. It also relies upon the same record to support its arguments on other phases of this case, hereinafter discussed. It is to be noted that such record contains not only the oral proceedings before the board, including photostatic copies of exhibits introduced, but also copies of the written accusation before the board, of Notices of Hearing, of petitioner’s Notice of Defense, and of petitions and notices concerning the taking of depositions; in other words, the entire file of the board proceedings is seemingly included. Thus, the authenticity of the record is established; the attack is directed not at the authority of the reporter to have prepared the record for the agency but only at his authority to have received the request for the same on behalf of the agency. Under such circumstances, the holding of the trial court to the effect that petitioner’s request to the reporter constituted substantial compliance with the statutory provisions and amounted to a request to the agency and that the act of the “duly appointed reporter” in furnishing the transcript was the act of the agency, must be sustained.
2. The Evidence Before the Board
Petitioner urges and the trial court found that certain of the findings of the board, upon which its decision rested, were not supported,by the weight of the evidence received by the board, and, therefore, abuse of the board’s discretion was established within the provisions of section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That section, enacted in 1945, treats of court review of administrative orders and decisions. It provides, among other things, that “(a) Where [as here] the writ [of mandamus] is issued for the purpose of inquiring into the validity of any final administrative order or decision made as the result of a proceeding in which by law a hearing is required to be given, evidence is required to be taken and discretion in the determination of facts is vested in the inferior tribunal, corporation, board or officer, the case shall be heard by the court sitting without a jury. All or part of the record of the proceedings before the . . . board . . . may be filed. ... If the expense of preparing all or any part of the record [308]*308has been borne by the.prevailing party, such expense shall be taxable as costs.
“ (b) The inquiry in such a case shall extend to the questions whether . . . there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion is established if . . . the .findings are not supported by the evidence.
“(c) Where it is claimed that the findings are not supported by the evidence, in cases in which the court is authorized by law to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence, abuse of discretion is established if the court determines that the findings are not supported by the weight of the evidence. ’ ’
That the trial court in this' case was “authorized by law to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence” is well established. (See Dare v. Board of Medical Examiners (1943), 21 Cal.2d 790, 795 [136 P.2d 304]; Sipper v. Urban (1943), 22 Cal.2d 138, 141 [137 P.2d 425]; Hohreiter v. Garrison (1947), 81 Cal.App.2d 384, 402 [184 P.2d 323].) As stated in the last cited ease, at page 402, ‘ ‘ Thus, the ultimate power of decision rests with the trial court. ’ ’ And, as declared in Estate of Bristol (1943), 23 Cal.2d 221, 223 [143 P.2d 689], on appeal from the judgment of the trial court,11 The rule as to our province is: ‘In reviewing the evidence ... all conflicts must be resolved in favor of the respondent, and all legitimate and reasonable inferences indulged in to uphold the verdict if possible. It is an elementary . . . principle of law, that when a verdict is attacked as being unsupported, the power of the appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the conclusion reached by the jury. When two or more inferences can be reasonably deduced from the facts, the reviewing court is without power to substitute its-deductions for those of the trial court.”' (Italics added.) (Crawford v. Southern Pacific Co. (1935), 3 Cal.2d 427, 429 [45 P.2d 183].) The rule quoted is as applicable in reviewing the findings of a judge as it is when considering a jury’s verdict. . . . Appellate courts, therefore, if there be any reasonable doubt as to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a finding, should resolve that doubt in favor of the finding.” (See also Estate of Teel (1944), 25 Cal.2d 520, 526 [154 P.2d 384]; Viner v. Untrecht (1945), 26 Cal.2d 261, 267 [158 P.2d 3]; Rice v. California Lutheran Hospital (1945), 27 Cal.2d 296, 301 [163 P.2d 860]; De Young v. De Young [309]*309(1946), 27 Cal.2d 521, 526 [165 P.2d 457].) It follows that the question before us is whether the evidence, viewed in the light -most* favorable to petitioner, sustains the findings of the trial court to the effect that the charges against petitioner were not supported by the weight of the evidence.
As indicated hereinabove, the only evidence considered by the court was the record of the proceedings before the board, which included a transcript of the oral hearing. The accusation filed with the board charged that petitioner on certain dates in 1945 violated section 2301 of the Business and Professions Code in that at the respectively specified .times, and otherwise than in “emergency treatment ... or required by the presence of incurable disease ... or the infirmities attendant on age,” he prescribed narcotics for three alleged' drug addicts, whom we designate here as Catherine (drugs prescribed between October 15 and December 11,1945); Allan (drugs prescribed between October 22 and November 23, 1945) ; and B. L. (drugs prescribed on September 28 and on November 10, 1945). Petitioner freely admits that he did prescribe certain derivatives of opium to the persons named, but he contends, and the court found, that the weight of the evidence shows that petitioner’s treatment of each patient was “emergency treatment . . . and that their condition at all times was complicated by the presence of an incurable disease,” and that consequently the treatment was lawful and both legally and medically proper. Such contention of the petitioner and the finding and conclusion of the court in his favor are abundantly supported by the evidence.
Section 2391 of the Business and Professions Code provides that “the prescribing, . . . furnishing, ... or administering . . . any of the drugs or compounds mentioned in section 2390 [which includes opium and morphine] to a habitue or addict constitutes unprofessional conduct within the meaning of this chapter [the chapter on medicine].
“If the-drugs . . . are administered ... by a licensed physician and surgeon of this State . . . this section shall not apply to any of the following cases:
“(a) Emergency treatment of a patient whose addiction is complicated by the presence of incurable disease. . . .
“(b) Treatment of habitues or addicts in institutions approved by the board [of Medical Examiners]. ...”
And in section^ 11391 of the Health and Safety Code it is provided that: “No person shall treat an addict, for addiction [310]*310except in one of the following: (a) An institution approved by the Board . . . [Four other types of institutions are here listed]. This section does not apply during emergency treatment or where the patient’s addiction is complicated by the presence of incurable disease. ...”
Petitioner testified that he is a graduate of Tulane University Medical School, served an interneship, and thereafter -served as a medical officer in the United States Navy during World War II; that he had engaged in private practice from September, 1944, to October, 1945; that the alleged addict Catherine first came to his office, at Carmel, on October 13, 1945; that she was “complaining of severe pain in the left side of her face, and headache, and abdominal pain, and she told me that she had previously had trifacial neuralgia, which had been successfully injected, so I attempted to do the same thing over but the first time it did not work very well, so then I gave her some narcotics to take care of the pain”; that he continued treating her until December, 1945, and “prescribed a considerable amount of narcotic” because “it was evidently needed to control her pain”; that after he secured her history he was “treating her for an incurable disease, to-wit, tic douloureux and the trifacial neuralgias. . . . This trifacial, after it exists for some time, is quite difficult to control”; that he wrote to doctors who had previously treated the patient; that one of such doctors replied, under the date of October 24, 1945, that in 1928 he “did a left infra orbital injection for tic in 1928, which she [the patient] says was successful for six years. She now asks that I give you this information in the hope you will make another injection for her. She was then and is still, as far as I know, an addict.” Petitioner further testified that he thereupon attempted (during the latter part of October, 1945) to secure admission to Las Encinas Hospital (which is approved by the board for the treatment of narcotic addiction) for the patient; that Dr. C. W. Thompson, medical director of the hospital, stated that no vacancies were then available, but upon inquiry from petitioner, replied that he (Dr. Thompson) thought that petitioner “would be allowed to give narcotics to this patient . . . as a humanitarian measure pending the time when the patient could be admitted for treatment”; that early in November he again “made a strenuous effort” to have the patient admitted to the same hospital but was again told that no vacancies existed; that he thereupon attempted to secure admission for [311]*311the patient into a different private hospital, also approved by the board for narcotic treatment, and also into the County Hospital; that when he finally “got everything completed she refused to enter the hospital”; that the only money the patient ever paid him was for “her telephone calls”; that he had a well established practice with a reasonable income at the time the patient consulted him. Petitioner stated further that on Catherine’s first visit to his office he injected her face with novocaine and alcohol, and also prescribed morphine sulphate because sometimes such injections do not “stop the pain”; that he had had no previous “experience with narcotics [addicts] ” during his private practice; that on the occasion of Catherine’s first visit to his office he did not know or suspect that she was an addict; that on examining her he observed a “muscular tie” or a “tic douloureux” on the “whole left side of her face” with frequent spasms; that such a tic is associated with a trifacial neuralgia; that his office history of the patient had been inadvertently destroyed by an inexperienced office assistant. Also introduced into evidence was a letter received by petitioner from the patient during the period he was attempting to secure her admission to Las Encinas, in which she described her years of suffering, including a history of pain from “gall bladder, tri facial, and arthritis” and expressed her appreciation for petitioner’s kindness in attempting to help her. Much of petitioner’s testimony as to Catherine’s condition and her statements and appearance of being in great pain, as to petitioner’s efforts to secure her admission to a hospital, and that petitioner was treating her primarily for trifacial neuralgia, was confirmed by his mother, a registered nurse and experienced anesthetist who assisted petitioner in his office. The mother testified further that Catherine “haunted” petitioner’s office seeking'treatment; that he prescribed for her until he “could get her into an institution”; that the patient said “she couldn’t get the money” for hospitalization, and when petitioner ‘ ‘ came to the conclusion that she had tried long enough to get the money he told her he couldn’t treat her any longer, that she would have to go to an institution, and if she couldn’t get the money for a private institution . . . she would have to go to the county, and I called the County Hospital and asked them to receive her and they said they would.” Prescription forms introduced into evidence indicate that on 18 different dates between October 15 and December 11, 1945, petitioner prescribed morphine [312]*312sulphate for Catherine; thereafter petitioner discontinued treating the patient and on or about December 16, 1945, at the direction of another doctor she was “moved to a sanitarium” for treatment for withdrawal of narcotics.
Other prescriptions show that on nine dates between October 22 and November 19,1945, petitioner prescribed morphine sulphate for the alleged addict, Allan. Petitioner testified that when he first examined Allan the latter “was in an acute asthmatic attack . . . choking . . . and I tried adrenalin and that didn’t work. Then I started giving him Vitamin C and morphine and that seemed to hold him—control his symptoms”; that the only way petitioner “could control his symptoms was by the administration of Morphine Sulphate in large quantities”; that Allan was “to take these morphine sulphate tablets whenever he had an attack”; that Allan’s history indicated “that he had had his asthmatic attacks for several years. . . . He told me he had an attack every twelve or twenty-four hours ’ ’; that 11 asthmatics normally have that terrific choking condition” and recurrence “so regularly” is “quite ordinary . . . depends entirely on changes of the weather and diet.” Petitioner’s mother confirmed that Allan first came in the office with an attack of asthma, “Practically choking and couldn’t get his breath. . . . Every occasion he came in the office he was choking. . . This was no simulation.” Dr. Harold E. Fraser, “Medical Examiner of the Courts of San Francisco,” testified that he examined Allan in January, 1946; Allan told him of suffering so severely from chronic asthma that morphine treatment had been given; that he, the witness, believed Allan had asthma; that emergency treatment might require morphine; that morphine sulphate is recognized by some physicians as a proper prescription for chronic asthma.
Prescriptions indicate that on September 28,1945, and again on November 10, 1945, petitioner prescribed pantopon, another opium derivative, for the alleged addict, R. L. Petitioner testified that he saw R. L. “about twice, maybe three times”; that petitioner administered narcotics “because of extreme pain and suffering in connection with a spinal arthritis” with which the patient was afflicted; that he (petitioner) did not consider R. L. an addict at the time but was “suspicious of-him” and therefore inquired of the State Division of Narcotic Enforcement concerning the patient. Petitioner stated further that he believed he was treating all three of the alleged addicts [313]*313“for a pathology rather than addiction.” An inspector from the Division of Narcotic Enforcement confirmed the fact that petitioner had inquired concerning R. L., on September 18, 1945, and had been informed the following day that “there was nothing on file at the office of the Division” concerning the patient. The inspector testified further that on November 13, 1945, petitioner had made a written report to the division concerning his prescription of narcotics for Allan in which petitioner stated Allan to be an addict, and on the same date made a similar report concerning Catherine; that from the reports “there was no indication that there was any dereliction on” petitioner’s part; that in all his “dealings and conversations with” petitioner the inspector found petitioner ‘ ‘ most cooperative. ’ ’
The agent of the board, who filed the accusation against petitioner, also testified that when he questioned petitioner concerning the three alleged addicts petitioner “made a full and complete disclosure” and “did not appear to try to hold anything back. ”
It is apparent that the evidence summarized above amply supports the trial court’s finding that petitioner’s treatment of the three alleged addicts “was emergency treatment . . . and that their condition at all times was complicated by the presence of an incurable disease.” Petitioner testified that in each case his treatment was for the purpose of relieving acute pain and suffering. From the long history of Catherine’s afflictions and the opinion of petitioner the court was warranted in the view that her condition was “complicated by the presence of an incurable disease,” and it is common knowledge that some sufferers from severe cases of asthma and arthritis, the diseases of Allan and R. L., spend many years vainly seeking permanent relief and cure. The board points to evidence in the record which it urges establishes that petitioner was treating none of the three patients as an emergency measure or for a bona fide disease but solely for addiction. Such evidence at the most presents only a conflict with that discussed hereinabove. The trial court has resolved the conflict in petitioner’s favor and under the rules already set forth its decision must stand.
As mentioned hereinabove, both the board and its individual members are named as respondents in the petition for mandamus, and the judgment rendered by the trial court is also directed to the board and to the persons of whom it is [314]*314composed, who are first named and then described as “Members of the State Board of Medical Examiners.” The board contends that the members were improperly joined as parties respondent in that the board itself is the 1 ‘ only agency which may afford any relief or take any action in the 'matter. ’ ’ The board urges also that its membership changes from time to time and that undue labor and confusion will result if substitution of parties must occasionally be made in a court action involving the board. In support of its position on this point the board cites Boland v. Cecil (1944), 65 Cal.App.2d Supp. 832, 840 [150 P.2d 819]; Reed v. Molony (1940), 38 Cal.App.2d 405, 411 [101 P.2d 175]; and Sparks v. Prior (1933), 131 Cal.App. 743, 744 [22 P.2d 233], The first two of these cases are concerned with determining whether certain named defendants were sued as individuals or in their respective official capacities, and the statement in the third case, a proceeding to review an order of the Board of Dental Examiners suspending a dentist’s license to practice, that only the board itself was a proper party defendant, is not accompanied by a citation of authority. It is our view that although the members of a board such as the Board of Medical Examiners need not necessarily (in the absence of special facts requiring their presence) be included as parties, it is not improper to name them in their official capacity, as was done here. As stated at page 857 (§58) of 16 California Jurisprudence, “Where the duty sought to be compelled is enjoined upon a board as such, the proceeding should be against the board, although the better practice seems to be to name the individual members in addition to the board. Moreover, there are exceptional cases in which the disobedience of the board is due to the action of certain individual members, where such members must be expressly made defendants, the reason therefor, appearing in the petition for the writ. Where the duty is enjoined upon particular officials as representatives of a body politic, the more general practice is to proceed against the officials, yet it is held that there is no good reason why their principal, the legal entity which is commonly the real party to be affected by the writ, may not be joined as a defendant in the proceeding; though seldom a necessary party, it may not generally be called an improper one.” (See also Golden Gate Bridge etc. Dist. v. Felt (1931), 214 Cal. 308 [5 P.2d 585]; City and County of San Francisco v. Linares (1940), 16 Cal.2d 441, 448 [106 P.2d 369]; 35 Am.Jur. § 328, p. 80.) We hold that in the ab[315]*315sence of legislative provision to the contrary the members of the board are proper, but not necessary, parties to this proceeding.
The board’s motion to tax costs awarded to petitioner by the trial court was heard by a judge other than the one who rendered judgment in petitioner’s favor; an order was entered taxing petitioner’s costs at only $31.60 and disallowing the sum of $117 paid by petitioner to the reporter as the cost of the transcript of the proceedings before the board; and as stated hereinabove, petitioner has appealed from the order. As already quoted herein, section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that in such a proceeding as this, “If the expense of preparing all or any part of the record has been borne by the prevailing party, such expense shall be taxable as costs. ’ ’
Petitioner is the prevailing party; as appears hereinabove the record filed by him of the board proceedings is an authentic record, adopted by the board as a part of its return to the alternative writ; it is not disputed that' petitioner bore the cost of preparing all of such record or that the amount paid is reasonable; it follows that his expense is taxable as costs and that the order taxing costs must be modified by adding the sum of $117.
In case No. L. A. 20514 the judgment from which the board appeals is affirmed. In case No. L. A. 20515 the order taxing petitioner’s costs at $31.60 is modified by adding to such costs the sum of $117 and as so modified is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Carter, J., concurred.
Prior to the 1947 amendment to section 11523 the period was “20 days. ’'