Morales Yarleque v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: August 21, 2025
• Docket: 24-4911
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 21 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JUNIOR YANCARLOS MORALES No. 24-4911 YARLEQUE, Agency No. A246-428-386 Petitioner,

v. MEMORANDUM*

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted August 19, 2025** San Francisco, California Before: CHRISTEN, BRESS, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.

Junior Yancarlos Morales Yarleque (“Petitioner”), a native and citizen of

Peru, seeks review of a Board of Immigration (“BIA”) decision affirming the

Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of Petitioner’s claims for asylum, withholding of

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). removal, and Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) protection. We have jurisdiction

under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.

When reviewing the BIA’s final orders, we “‘review questions of law de

novo’ and the agency’s ‘factual findings for substantial evidence.’”

Ruiz-Colmenares v. Garland, 25 F.4th 742, 748 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted).

“[U]nder the highly deferential substantial evidence standard,” findings of fact are

“conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to

the contrary.” Rodriguez-Zuniga v. Garland, 69 F.4th 1012, 1016 (9th Cir. 2023)

(citation omitted). “In reviewing the decision of the BIA, we consider only the

grounds relied upon by that agency.” Andia v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th

Cir. 2004).

1. The agency did not err in concluding that Petitioner was not entitled to

asylum or withholding of removal.1 To show entitlement to a presumption of future

persecution, Petitioner must establish that his past “[mis]treatment rises to the level

of persecution.” Antonio v. Garland, 58 F.4th 1067, 1073 (9th Cir. 2023) (citation

omitted). Persecution “is an extreme concept that does not include every sort of

treatment our society regards as offensive.” Nagoulko v. INS, 333 F.3d 1012, 1016

1 Because the relevant standard for withholding of removal is “more stringent” than the standard for asylum, Petitioner’s failure to carry his burden for asylum also forecloses withholding of removal. Hakeem v. INS, 273 F.3d 812, 816 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Pedro-Mateo v. INS, 224 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000).

2 24-4911 (9th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Viewed cumulatively, and

whether reviewed de novo or for substantial evidence, Petitioner’s alleged incidents

of mistreatment were not so extreme as to rise to the level of persecution. Petitioner

was not physically harmed. See Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1060 (9th Cir.

2021); see also Hussain v. Rosen, 985 F.3d 634, 647 (9th Cir. 2021). And the threats

against Petitioner were vague, and there was no follow-through by the perpetrators

when Petitioner refused to pay the extortion money or resign from his security

position. The agency thus did not err in finding that Petitioner had not shown past

persecution.

Absent a showing of past persecution, Petitioner bears the burden to establish

a well-founded fear of future persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2). Substantial

evidence supports the agency’s finding that Petitioner failed to show a well-founded

fear of future persecution because he could reasonably and safely relocate.

Petitioner’s similarly situated family safely relocated elsewhere in Peru, where they

have remained without incident. Petitioner presented no credible evidence that the

criminals who threatened him had national reach or connections. See Hussain, 985

F.3d at 648. And Petitioner’s evidence of general crime in Peru, without more, does

not demonstrate he is unable to relocate, since “[r]elocation is generally not

unreasonable solely because the country at large is subject to generalized violence.”

Id. Considering that Petitioner was unharmed for a significant time period following

3 24-4911 the alleged incidents and the safe relocation of his similarly situated family,

substantial evidence supports the agency’s relocation finding, and thus its denial of

asylum and withholding of removal.

2. Petitioner has waived his CAT protection claim. He failed to challenge

before the BIA the IJ’s dispositive finding that the Peruvian government was not

complicit in any alleged torture. See Shen v. Garland, 109 F.4th 1144, 1157–58 (9th

Cir. 2024). And although Petitioner argues before this court that the agency

improperly rejected his CAT claim, he neither acknowledges the BIA’s waiver

finding nor explains why the BIA’s waiver conclusion was wrong. He has therefore

waived before this court any challenge to the agency’s conclusion that his CAT claim

was waived before the agency.

PETITION DENIED.

4 24-4911