Morales v. United States
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Morales v. United States, (1st Cir. 1992).
Opinion
USCA1 Opinion
October 1, 1992 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
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No. 92-1157
RAFAEL MORENO MORALES,
Petitioner, Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent, Appellee.
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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Carmen C. Cerezo, U.S. District Judge]
___________________
___________________
Before
Breyer, Chief Judge,
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Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
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and Boudin, Circuit Judge.
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Rafael Moreno Morales on brief pro se.
_____________________
Daniel F. Lopez Romo, United States Attorney, Jose A.
______________________ ________
Quiles-Espinosa, Assistant United States Attorney, and Jeanette
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Mercado-Rios, Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for
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appellee.
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___
Per Curiam. In 1985, in connection with his involvement
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in the infamous Cerro Maravilla incident, Rafael Moreno-
Morales was convicted of six federal offenses: one count of
conspiring to obstruct justice, give false testimony and
suborn perjury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371, and five
substantive counts of perjury, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
1621 & 1623. After his convictions were affirmed on appeal,
United States v. Moreno Morales, 815 F.2d 725 (1st Cir.),
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cert. denied, 484 U.S. 966 (1987), he filed the instant pro
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se petition under 28 U.S.C. 2255 for post-judgment relief.
Of the various claims presented in his petition, he has
preserved three for appeal: (1) that two of the perjury
convictions involved multiplicitous counts and thereby
violated Double Jeopardy; (2) that another of the perjury
convictions was invalid because his testimony was literally
true; and (3) that his attorney rendered ineffective
assistance on the direct appeal. We find each of these
contentions to be without merit, and therefore affirm.
I.
The multiplicity argument need not detain us. In Count
14, petitioner was charged with a violation of 18 U.S.C.
1623 for testifying falsely before a federal grand jury on
January 9, 1980. And in Count 18, he was charged with a
violation of 18 U.S.C. 1621 for testifying falsely in a
civil deposition on March 26, 1980, conducted as part of a
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federal civil rights action. Petitioner contends that the
two counts involved the same testimony and therefore did not
charge separate offenses. In Quiles-Hernandez v. United
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States, No. 90-1804 (1st Cir. 1991), we rejected an identical
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argument advanced by one of petitioner's codefendants. We
first noted that such a challenge had not been raised prior
to trial, as required under Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2), and
therefore had been waived. Id. at 4-5. We also determined
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that the claim was in any event meritless: since one count
involved statements made to the grand jury, while the other
involved statements offered at the civil deposition three
months later, separate offenses had been committed. Id. at
___
6-8. The same analysis controls here.
II.
Petitioner's "literal truth" claim involves the
following exchange which occurred during the deposition on
March 26, 1980:
Q. What was the first contact on July 25th with
other persons, other than the ones that were
stationed at Toro Negro?
A. Well, at almost twelve noon Commander Perez and
Lieutenant Quiles and agents from Ponce and other
personnel arrived there.
Q. How many agents from Ponce?
A. I think two.
Q. What other personnel?
A. Perez, Quiles, Carmelo Cruz and two other
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agents from Ponce. I do not recall if there was
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anyone else.
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The indictment charged, in Count 17, that the underlined
answer was perjurious, in that "Carmelo Cruz did not come
from Ponce to Toro Negro with [Perez and Quiles], but that
Nelson Gonzalez-Perez and Jose Montanez-Ortiz came to Toro
Negro with [Perez and Quiles]." Petitioner contends that he
reasonably understood the final question as asking--not what
personnel arrived from Ponce at noon with Perez and Quiles--
but rather what personnel were present at Toro Negro at that
time. And since the evidence established the presence of
Carmelo Cruz at that place and time, he argues that his
response was literally true, even if misleading, and thus not
perjurious. See, e.g., Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S.
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