Morales v. Gillis

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Mississippi
DecidedNovember 23, 2020
Docket5:20-cv-00181
StatusUnknown

This text of Morales v. Gillis (Morales v. Gillis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Mississippi primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Morales v. Gillis, (S.D. Miss. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI WESTERN DIVISION JUANA GONZALEZ MORALES, et al. PETITIONERS VS. CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:20-CV-181-DCB-MTP SHAWN GILLIS, et al. RESPONDENTS

ORDER This Matter is before the Court on Petitioners’ Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order. [ECF No. 2]. This Motion was filed in Petitioners’ ongoing habeas matter that challenges their continued immigration detention. Petitioners allege their detention violates 28 U.S.C. § 2241. They seek an order to require Respondents (1) to conduct regular widespread testing; (2) to abide by all CDC guidelines; (3) to prohibit transfers into and out of Adams County Detention Center; and (4) to permit a health inspection of ACDC at the earliest possible date. [ECF No. 3]. Having carefully considered the parties’ submissions, the record, and the applicable law, the Court finds as follows: BACKGROUND Petitioners filed their habeas petition alleging that their continued civil immigration detention violates their substantive

due process rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. [ECF No. 1]. They are being held in Adams County Detention Center (“ACDC”). The Habeas Petition describes the four Petitioners as follows:

Juana Gonzalez Morales is 37 years old and suffers from a thyroid disorder and obesity. These conditions qualify as disabilities under the Rehabilitation Act. Abdallah Khamis is 46 years old and suffers from Health Condition A. This condition qualifies as a disability under the Rehabilitation Act. Dwight Mundle is 35 years old and suffers from hypertension, high cholesterol, and psoriasis. Hypertension qualifies as a disability under the Rehabilitation Act. Edinahi Zacarias Cabrera is 32 years old and suffers from asthma, pre-diabetes, and an endocrine disorder. Asthma and the endocrine disorder qualify as disabilities under the Rehabilitation Act. Id. The Petitioners have not included individual medical records. The medical history is provided by declaration they provided. On November 4, 2020, the Court held a telephonic hearing on the Motion. For the reasons discussed below, the Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order will be denied. COVID-19 COVID-19 has been declared a global health pandemic by the World Health Organization. See Williams v. Barr, 2020 WL 2193448, at *1 (M.D. Pa. May 6, 2020). “Humans have no immunity to the virus and, currently, there is no cure, vaccine, or known anti-viral treatment.” Id. The primary method for mitigating the spread of this virus is through social distancing, i.e., breaking the chain of transmission by staying, generally, at least six feet apart. See id.

“Most individuals who are infected develop mild or moderate respiratory symptoms and recover with no medical intervention, but in a minority of cases[,] individuals experience serious illness or death.” Id. However, some populations – the elderly and those with underlying preexisting medical conditions – are more susceptible to developing serious illness or death. Id. Analysis Temporary Restraining Order Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets out the general procedure for injunctive relief in federal courts. If there is an adversary hearing – as there was in this case – a temporary restraining order may be treated as a preliminary injunction.

Courts look to four factors when evaluating whether a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction is appropriate. A temporary restraining order (“TRO”) is an extraordinary remedy. To prevail the party seeking a TRO must establish the following elements: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat of irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted; (3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs any harm to the nonmovant that may result

from the injunction; and (4) the injunction will not undermine the public interest. Beswick v. Barr, No. 5:20-CV-98-DCB-MTP, 2020 WL 3520312 (S.D. Miss. June 29, 2020). The Fifth Circuit has repeatedly warned that “a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy which should not be granted unless the party seeking it has ‘clearly carried the burden of persuasion on all four requirements.’” Lake Charles Diesel, Inc. v. Gen. Motors

Corp., 328 F. 3d 192, 196 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Miss. Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipeline, 760 F. 2d 618, 621 (5th Cir. 1985). Jurisdiction The Court will initially address the Respondents’ claim that the Petitioners may not seek their release from custody through a § 2241 habeas petition relying on Orellana Lluvicura v. Gillis, No. 5:20-CV-128-KS-MTP, 2020 WL 4934260 (S.D. Miss. July 17, 2020). In Orellana Lluvicura, the Court held that an ICE detainee’s habeas petition was not properly before the Court because he did not “challenge[] the cause of his detention” and “merely requesting, as relief, release from custody does not convert the action into one under the habeas statute.” Id. The Court respects District Judge Keith Starrett’s opinion in Orellana Lluvicura; however,

this Court has interpreted this situation differently in Espinoza v. Gillis. See id.; Espinoza, No. 5:20-CV-106-DCB-MTP, 2020 WL 2949779 (S.D. Miss. June 3, 2020). In Espinoza, the Court found “the requested relief, immediate release from detention, permits the petitioners to proceed with their habeas petition.” Id. at *2. As in Espinoza, Petitioners’ requested relief is properly before the Court. Id.

Merits of Petitioners’ Due Process Claims To prevail, Petitioners must prove there is a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. Beswick, 2020 WL 3520312 at *3. “To succeed on their claim that the conditions at ACDC violate the Constitution, petitioners must demonstrate that the conditions of confinement amount to punishment of the detainee.” Espinoza, 2020 WL 2949779, at *3. In making that determination, the Court must consider whether the conditions and restrictions of the detention center are rationally connected to a legitimate governmental objective. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979).

The Supreme Court has recognized that ensuring the presence of detainees at their immigration hearings along with the effective management of a detention facility once an individual is confined, constitutes a legitimate governmental interest. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 836 (2018); Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 520–22; Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690–91 (2001).

Under the standard established in Bell, the detention must be rationally related to a legitimate government interest. Here, the Petitioners’ conditions of confinement do not amount to unconstitutional punishment. See, e.g., Bell, 441 U.S. 520. “First, the Supreme Court has made it clear that the Government has a legitimate interest in preventing the petitioners from absconding and avoiding removal.” Espinoza, 2020 WL 2949779, at *3. “Second, the petitioners’ continued confinement is reasonably related to that legitimate governmental interest as it guarantees

that the petitioners will attend their deportation proceedings.” Id. i. Conditions of Confinement ACDC is governed by national detention standards and is

inspected regularly. [ECF No. 15-1] at 3.

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Bluebook (online)
Morales v. Gillis, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/morales-v-gillis-mssd-2020.