Mor-Flo Industries, Inc. v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission

817 P.2d 328, 166 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 1991 Utah App. LEXIS 120, 1991 WL 150374
CourtCourt of Appeals of Utah
DecidedAugust 2, 1991
Docket900510-CA
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 817 P.2d 328 (Mor-Flo Industries, Inc. v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Utah primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mor-Flo Industries, Inc. v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission, 817 P.2d 328, 166 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 1991 Utah App. LEXIS 120, 1991 WL 150374 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

Opinion

OPINION

Before BILLINGS, ORME and RUSSON, JJ.

BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge:

Petitioners seek review of a decision of the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission (Commission) upholding an order issued by its safety division requiring the removal of Polaris water heating units. The safety division issued a final removal order on August 30, 1989, claiming the Polaris did not comply with the Utah Boiler Code. Following an evidentiary hearing, an administrative law judge (AU) upheld the removal order. The Commission affirmed and petitioners now seek review in this court. We reverse.

FACTS

A building inspector for the safety division of the Commission visited Arlington Place Condominiums in February 1989 to inspect its Polaris water heating system. The Polaris units at issue are designed like most other water heaters, but utilize an additional pipe loop or coil to provide space heat when a fan blows air across the coil. After the water circulates through the additional loop or coil it is returned to the water heater where it is reheated. This arrangement allows the Polaris to provide both potable water and space heat, but *329 does not substantially modify the water heater. The Polaris is built to specifications required under Utah law for a water heater, but not to specifications required for a boiler.

The inspector determined that because the Polaris system provided both potable water and space heat, the Polaris was a “hot water heating boiler,” covered by the Utah Boiler Code and the Commission’s boiler and pressure vessel regulations. Because the Polaris units did not have the stamp of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) required for boilers under the Utah Boiler Code, he ordered them removed.

In March 1989, the safety division sent a letter to Arlington Place ordering the units removed. The parties then entered into negotiations delaying a final decision. In August 1989, the division sent a final letter ordering the Polaris units removed within thirty days. Petitioner Mor-Flo Industries, Inc. (Mor-Flo), the manufacturer of the Polaris, challenged the order, but it was affirmed after an evidentiary hearing before an AU.

Ultimately, the Commission upheld the safety division’s initial order and denied Mor-Flo’s motion for review stating,

The record clearly demonstrates, and [Mor-Flo] does not contest, that [Mor-Flo’s] device is a functional hybrid. Besides supplying hot water, it is designed to provide heat to raise the air temperature of an enclosed space_ This functionally based categorization subjects a dual-function device to regulation for each function it fulfills.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

On appeal, Mor-Flo contends the Polaris is a hot water heater exempt from regulation under the ASME, incorporated into Utah law through the Utah Boiler Code. Mor-Flo argues that the Polaris complies with the standards required by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and incorporated into the Uniform Plumbing Code which has been statutorily adopted in Utah and which is regulated by the Department of Health. The Commission responds that the Polaris is a functional hybrid used to provide heated potable water and space heating and therefore is subject to regulation as both a water heater and a boiler.

We must decide whether the Commission correctly concluded the Polaris combination unit must meet the requirements for a boiler under the Utah Boiler Code. See Utah Code Ann. § 35-7-5 to -9 (1988 & Supp. 1991). Petitioners contend the issue is one of law and thus we should review the Commission’s determination for correctness without affording any deference. Respondents argue for an intermediate standard of reasonableness and rationality because of the Commission’s special expertise.

Proceedings commenced after January 1, 1988 are governed by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-1 to -22 (1989). In Pro-Benefit Staffing v. Board of Review, 775 P.2d 439, 442 (Utah App.1989), this court held that the intermediate standard of review of reasonableness, previously applied by the Utah Supreme Court to judicial review of an agency’s determination of mixed questions of fact and law or to an agency’s “interpretation of the operative provisions of the statutory law it is empowered to administer,” id. (quoting Utah Dep’t. of Admin. Servs. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 658 P.2d 601, 610 (Utah 1983)), was consistent with section 63-46b-16(4)(d) of the UAPA. 1 However, the Utah Supreme *330 Court recently reached a different conclusion in Morton Int’l, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm’n, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991).

In Morton Int’l, the supreme court conducted an in-depth analysis of the effect of section 63-46b-16(4)(d) of UAPA 2 on the standard of review for administrative interpretations of statutes within an agency’s area of expertise. The court recognized its holding in Savage Industries Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 811 P.2d 664, 668-71 (Utah 1991) that section 63-46b-16(4)(d) suggests a correction of error standard of review when the court reviewing statutory construction is in as good a position as the agency to interpret the statute and indicated that “a court may decide that the agency has erroneously interpreted the law if the court merely disagrees with the agency’s interpretation.” Morton Int’l, 814 P.2d at 587 (quoting Savage Industries, 811 P.2d at 669-70) (quoting Model State Admin.Procedure Act § 5-116, 15 U.L.A. 127-30 (1981)).

In Morton Int’l, the court acknowledged that UAPA did not change the applicable standard of review where the agency has been granted discretion, but the court noted that, “nothing in the language of section 63-46b-16 or its legislative history suggests that an agency’s decision is entitled to deference solely on the basis of agency expertise or experience.” Morton Int’l, 814 P.2d at 587. The court concluded that “absent a grant of discretion, a correction-of-error standard is used in reviewing an agency’s interpretation or application of a statutory term.” Id. at 587-589.

The Morton Int’l

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817 P.2d 328, 166 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 1991 Utah App. LEXIS 120, 1991 WL 150374, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mor-flo-industries-inc-v-board-of-review-of-the-industrial-commission-utahctapp-1991.