MACK, Associate Judge:
Appellant seeks reversal of his conviction for possession of marijuana on the ground of insufficient evidence, challenging as legally inconclusive the expert testimony introduced by the government. We affirm.
I.
In the course of a search incident to his arrest on an outstanding bench warrant, appellant was found in possession of two small envelopes, one containing eleven cigarette butts weighing 360 milligrams and the other containing green plant-like material weighing 1350 milligrams. He was found guilty in a nonjury trial of violating D.C. Code 1973, § 33-402,1 and subsequently sentenced. This appeal followed.
At trial, had before the court, the government presented two witnesses — the arresting officer, and Mr. Paul Morgan, an employee of the Drug Enforcement Administration, who was qualified after extensive voir dire (and over the objection of the defense as to his expertise in botany and plant taxonomy) as an expert in analytical chemistry. He testified that the seized substance was, in his opinion, unadulterated marijuana, and he based his opinion on the microscopic examination, Duquenois-Levine test and two thin-layer chromatographies which he performed.2 At the close of the [301]*301government’s evidence, the defense did not move for judgment of acquittal but presented its witness, Dr. Sorrell Schwartz, a professor of pharmacology at the Georgetown University Medical School with impressive credentials. He testified that all the tests .performed by the government’s analyst were screening tests and even in conjunction with one another could not specifically identify marijuana.
At the close of all the evidence, the defense renewed its motion to strike all of the government analyst’s testimony concerning the microscopic (botanical) examination and made two motions for a judgment of acquittal, based upon a lack of proof of a usable quantity, and the government’s failure to prove the substance in question was of the particular species “Cannabis sativa L.” All three motions were denied.3
II.
Appellant has asked this court to rule as a matter of law that positive results in a microscopic examination, a Duquenois-Le-vine test, and a thin-layer chromatography are insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that a particular substance is marijuana and, therefore, there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Appellant bases this argument on testimony 4 of the defense expert witness to [302]*302the effect that the tests performed by the government analyst were screening tests only, and not specific for marijuana; i. e., that the government’s tests cannot conclusively show that a substance is marijuana, but only if it is not. Dr. Schwartz recommended mass spectroscopy as a relatively simple and inexpensive test which is specific; this test is not performed by the government presently. The government analyst agreed in his testimony that the Duquenois-Levine test is a screening test; he was not asked to characterize thin-layer chromatography. The government’s position on appeal is that regardless of how the tests are characterized, in combination with one another they establish with certainty that a substance is marijuana.
Appellant relies for support on dicta from State v. Wind, 60 Wis.2d 267, 208 N.W.2d 357, 361 (1973):
An expert opinion that the substance is probably marijuana even if the test used is not exclusive is probative and admissible, but standing alone is not sufficient to meet the burden of proving the identity of the substance beyond a reasonable doubt. If this were a possession case, the tests would be insufficient.
This dictum does not suggest reversal here. There is no question that the government expert’s testimony was both admissible and probative. Moreover, as in Wind, supra 208 N.W.2d at 361, “we have other facts which particularize and support the opinion of the expert” — namely, the general appearance of the substance in the one bag, and its presence in the form of cigarette butts in the other.5 This evidence is sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant possessed marijuana.6
III.
Appellant also cites as reversible error the trial court’s denial of his motions to strike Mr. Morgan’s testimony regarding his microscopic examination. Appellant argued at trial (and on appeal) that as an analytical chemist, Mr. Morgan was not qualified to testify to the presence of cystolith hairs and the absence of any foreign adulterating substances. According to appellant, only a botanist is qualified to testify to such matters. We do not agree.
Mr. Morgan was employed by the Drug Enforcement Administration as a chemist, whose job it was to analyze seized substances and to testify in court as to his findings. He had a Bachelor of Science (B.S.) degree in chemistry; he had received six months of on-the-job training in the analysis of narcotics, approximately one-half of which was devoted to marijuana; he had received further training in the microscopic analysis of plant substances in a course at the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs; and, at the time of trial, had performed over five hundred analyses and qualified thirty-nine times as an analytical chemistry expert in the Superior Court. The government was willing to stipulate that the witness was not a “botanist” nor qualified to testify “in the classification of plant taxonomy.”
The decision as to an expert witness’ qualifications is one left to the trial court’s discretion, reviewable only for abuse. McCormick, Evidence § 13 at 30 (2d ed. 1972). We find no abuse of discretion here. While Mr. Morgan was clearly not a botanist, he was, we think, by virtue of his specialized training and experience, fully qualified to answer the narrow questions addressed to him concerning his microscopic examination. His qualifications satisfied the threshold requirement that “the witness must have sufficient skill, knowledge, or [303]*303experience in that field or calling as to make it appear that his opinion or inference will probably aid the trier in his search for truth.” Id. As the trial judge observed, “The mere fact that he has expertise in analytical chemistry . . . does not mean that he has not learned how to tell when he had a certain plant under the microscope.” Appellant’s objections to the expert’s qualifications in this case were pertinent to the weight to be accorded the testimony, but did not bar its admission.
IV.
Lastly, appellant claims that his motion for judgment of acquittal should have been granted due to failure by the government to prove that he had possession of a “usable” amount. Cf. Payne v. United States, D.C.App., 294 A.2d 501 (1972); Edelin v. United States, D.C.App., 227 A.2d 395 (1967). Specifically, he argues that because the government failed to perform any quantitative tests to measure the amount of THC present in the seized substance, it is possible that the substance was “cut,” and contained only a negligible trace of THC, even though a total of roughly Vis of an ounce was seized.
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MACK, Associate Judge:
Appellant seeks reversal of his conviction for possession of marijuana on the ground of insufficient evidence, challenging as legally inconclusive the expert testimony introduced by the government. We affirm.
I.
In the course of a search incident to his arrest on an outstanding bench warrant, appellant was found in possession of two small envelopes, one containing eleven cigarette butts weighing 360 milligrams and the other containing green plant-like material weighing 1350 milligrams. He was found guilty in a nonjury trial of violating D.C. Code 1973, § 33-402,1 and subsequently sentenced. This appeal followed.
At trial, had before the court, the government presented two witnesses — the arresting officer, and Mr. Paul Morgan, an employee of the Drug Enforcement Administration, who was qualified after extensive voir dire (and over the objection of the defense as to his expertise in botany and plant taxonomy) as an expert in analytical chemistry. He testified that the seized substance was, in his opinion, unadulterated marijuana, and he based his opinion on the microscopic examination, Duquenois-Levine test and two thin-layer chromatographies which he performed.2 At the close of the [301]*301government’s evidence, the defense did not move for judgment of acquittal but presented its witness, Dr. Sorrell Schwartz, a professor of pharmacology at the Georgetown University Medical School with impressive credentials. He testified that all the tests .performed by the government’s analyst were screening tests and even in conjunction with one another could not specifically identify marijuana.
At the close of all the evidence, the defense renewed its motion to strike all of the government analyst’s testimony concerning the microscopic (botanical) examination and made two motions for a judgment of acquittal, based upon a lack of proof of a usable quantity, and the government’s failure to prove the substance in question was of the particular species “Cannabis sativa L.” All three motions were denied.3
II.
Appellant has asked this court to rule as a matter of law that positive results in a microscopic examination, a Duquenois-Le-vine test, and a thin-layer chromatography are insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that a particular substance is marijuana and, therefore, there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Appellant bases this argument on testimony 4 of the defense expert witness to [302]*302the effect that the tests performed by the government analyst were screening tests only, and not specific for marijuana; i. e., that the government’s tests cannot conclusively show that a substance is marijuana, but only if it is not. Dr. Schwartz recommended mass spectroscopy as a relatively simple and inexpensive test which is specific; this test is not performed by the government presently. The government analyst agreed in his testimony that the Duquenois-Levine test is a screening test; he was not asked to characterize thin-layer chromatography. The government’s position on appeal is that regardless of how the tests are characterized, in combination with one another they establish with certainty that a substance is marijuana.
Appellant relies for support on dicta from State v. Wind, 60 Wis.2d 267, 208 N.W.2d 357, 361 (1973):
An expert opinion that the substance is probably marijuana even if the test used is not exclusive is probative and admissible, but standing alone is not sufficient to meet the burden of proving the identity of the substance beyond a reasonable doubt. If this were a possession case, the tests would be insufficient.
This dictum does not suggest reversal here. There is no question that the government expert’s testimony was both admissible and probative. Moreover, as in Wind, supra 208 N.W.2d at 361, “we have other facts which particularize and support the opinion of the expert” — namely, the general appearance of the substance in the one bag, and its presence in the form of cigarette butts in the other.5 This evidence is sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant possessed marijuana.6
III.
Appellant also cites as reversible error the trial court’s denial of his motions to strike Mr. Morgan’s testimony regarding his microscopic examination. Appellant argued at trial (and on appeal) that as an analytical chemist, Mr. Morgan was not qualified to testify to the presence of cystolith hairs and the absence of any foreign adulterating substances. According to appellant, only a botanist is qualified to testify to such matters. We do not agree.
Mr. Morgan was employed by the Drug Enforcement Administration as a chemist, whose job it was to analyze seized substances and to testify in court as to his findings. He had a Bachelor of Science (B.S.) degree in chemistry; he had received six months of on-the-job training in the analysis of narcotics, approximately one-half of which was devoted to marijuana; he had received further training in the microscopic analysis of plant substances in a course at the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs; and, at the time of trial, had performed over five hundred analyses and qualified thirty-nine times as an analytical chemistry expert in the Superior Court. The government was willing to stipulate that the witness was not a “botanist” nor qualified to testify “in the classification of plant taxonomy.”
The decision as to an expert witness’ qualifications is one left to the trial court’s discretion, reviewable only for abuse. McCormick, Evidence § 13 at 30 (2d ed. 1972). We find no abuse of discretion here. While Mr. Morgan was clearly not a botanist, he was, we think, by virtue of his specialized training and experience, fully qualified to answer the narrow questions addressed to him concerning his microscopic examination. His qualifications satisfied the threshold requirement that “the witness must have sufficient skill, knowledge, or [303]*303experience in that field or calling as to make it appear that his opinion or inference will probably aid the trier in his search for truth.” Id. As the trial judge observed, “The mere fact that he has expertise in analytical chemistry . . . does not mean that he has not learned how to tell when he had a certain plant under the microscope.” Appellant’s objections to the expert’s qualifications in this case were pertinent to the weight to be accorded the testimony, but did not bar its admission.
IV.
Lastly, appellant claims that his motion for judgment of acquittal should have been granted due to failure by the government to prove that he had possession of a “usable” amount. Cf. Payne v. United States, D.C.App., 294 A.2d 501 (1972); Edelin v. United States, D.C.App., 227 A.2d 395 (1967). Specifically, he argues that because the government failed to perform any quantitative tests to measure the amount of THC present in the seized substance, it is possible that the substance was “cut,” and contained only a negligible trace of THC, even though a total of roughly Vis of an ounce was seized.
This court recently addressed the issue of whether “usable” amount refers to THC specifically or to the proscribed plant substance as a whole. In Blakeney v. United States, D.C.App., 366 A.2d 447, 449 (1976), we observed that:
Although we have held that where possession of marijuana is charged the government must prove the presence of THC to establish that the seized substance is from the portion of the plant proscribed by statute, we have not stepped beyond the holding in Edelin to require that the government directly prove the seized substance's ability to produce a meaningful narcotic influence upon the user by evidence quantifying the presence of its active agents. To the contrary, we have reviewed the government’s quantitative evidence in cases of this kind solely to determine whether the record allowed a conclusion that the substance itself was present in a ‘usable amount.’ [Footnote omitted.]
Thus the strength of purity of the substance is of no consequence, so long as it is identifiable as marijuana, contains THC, and consists of more than a mere trace. Appellant’s argument must be rejected.
The conviction is
Affirmed.