John B. Robbins, Judge.
Appellant William C. Moore was convicted by a jury of aggravated robbery and sentenced to twenty years in prison with five suspended. On appeal, his sole argument is that he was denied an impartial jury because the trial court denied his Batson challenge to the State’s peremptory strike of a juror.
Mr. Moore is white, and during voir dire the State exercised a strike against a black venire person. The following exchange subsequently occurred:
Defense Counsel: Your Honor, Ms.Tillman is African-American and we would object to her being struck — we would object to her being struck. She is African-American.
The Court: The defendant is not African-American.
Defense Counsel: I understand. My understanding is that a public right also of the defendant — he is entitled to an unbiased trial from an unbiased jury, whatever his race is, so we would object to her being struck. We would inquire why the State wishes she be struck.
The Court: What does the State have to say?
Prosecutor: This is absurd. In every criminal case I’ve been involved in — the defense objects to this? It’s absurd.
Defense Counsel: We would make the same —
Prosecutor: I haven’t struck any others. Personally,it’s offensive.
Defense Counsel: Your Honor, there is no personal intent intended in this case. I’ve known Mr. Shue for a number of years. I believe he is a very fair-minded person, but we nevertheless would make that objection. No personal offense intended.
The Court: First, I don’t think it’s applicable; it is not an African-American defendant. Secondly, I would point out there has already been at least one juror seated. Mr. Willis, who is African-American, that was seated without objection.
Prosecutor: We also have Ms. Wofford who was just seated,Your Honor. There’s two African-Americans.1
The Court: And Ms. Wofford who has been seated. That makes two, so I don’t think the State is required to set out a basis when the defendant is not African-American.
In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the State from striking a venire person as a result of racially discriminatory intent. In Mackintrush v. State, 334 Ark. 390, 397, 978 S.W.2d 293, 296 (1998), our supreme court outlined the proper steps for the trial court to follow when a Batson claim is made:
(1) the opponent of a peremptory challenge must make a prima facie case of racial discrimination; (2) the proponent of the strike must come forward with a race-neutral explanation; and (3) the trial court must decide whether the opponent has proven purposeful racial discrimination.
As for the first-step analysis, the Mackintrush court stated;
The strike’s opponent must present facts, at this initial step, to raise an inference of purposeful discrimination. According to the Batson decision, that is done by showing (1) that the strike’s opponent is a member of an identifiable racial group, (2) that the strike is part of a jury-selection process or pattern designed to discriminate, and (3) that the strike was used to exclude jurors because of their race. In deciding whether aprimafacie case has been made, the trial court should consider all relevant circumstances. Should the trial court determine that a. prima facie case has been made, the inquiry proceeds to Step Two. However, if the determination by the trial court is to the contrary, that ends the inquiry.
Id. at 398, 978 S.W.2d at 296.
For reversal of the trial court’s action in this case, Mr. Moore argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law in ruling that he could not make a Batson challenge to a black juror because he himself was not black. Mr. Moore contends that the trial court was required to go through the three-step Batson process, and that its failure to do so constituted reversible error. Mr. Moore notes that in Holder v. State, 354 Ark. 364, 124 S.W.3d 439 (2003), the supreme court held that a Batson error is not subject to harmless-error analysis.
Mr. Moore is indeed correct in asserting that a defendant has the right to object to race-based exclusions of jurors through peremptory challenges whether or not the defendant and excluded jurors share the same race. This was the holding in Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991), where the Supreme Court stated that although a defendant has no right to a jury composed in whole or part of persons of his own race, he does have the right to be tried by a jury whose members are selected by nondiscriminatory criteria. The Powers court further stated that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits the State from using peremptory challenges to exclude otherwise qualified and unbiased jurors solely by reason of race, and that racial discrimination injury selection casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial process, and places the fairness of the proceedings in doubt. Thus, it is clear that in the instant case Mr. Moore did have the constitutional right to bring a Batson challenge against the State’s peremptory strike of Ms. Tillman, and the trial court erred in stating otherwise.
Notwithstanding the trial court’s misunderstanding of the law, we nonetheless cannot conclude that any error was committed in permitting the State to strike Ms. Tillman. This is because Mr. Moore failed to make a prima facie case of racial discrimination. The prosecution’s use of a peremptory challenge to remove the only black prospective juror may establish a prima fade case. Cooper v. State, 324 Ark. 135, 919 S.W.2d 205 (1996). However, one peremptory strike of a minority prospective juror, with no additional facts or context in which it can be evaluated, is not sufficient. Id.
When Mr. Moore made his Batson objection, he inquired as to why the State wished to strike the juror. However, because Mr. Moore offered no additional argument or facts outside of the strike itself, no prima facie case was made and therefore the State was not required to come forward with a race-neutral explanation. Clearly the State did not use a peremptory strike against the only black prospective juror because, as the trial court pointed out, there had already been at least one black juror seated without objection.
In Jackson v. State, 330 Ark. 126, 129, 954 S.W.2d 894, 895 (1997), the supreme court reviewed a Batson challenge and announced: In affirming Mr. Jackson’s conviction, the supreme court reasoned:
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John B. Robbins, Judge.
Appellant William C. Moore was convicted by a jury of aggravated robbery and sentenced to twenty years in prison with five suspended. On appeal, his sole argument is that he was denied an impartial jury because the trial court denied his Batson challenge to the State’s peremptory strike of a juror.
Mr. Moore is white, and during voir dire the State exercised a strike against a black venire person. The following exchange subsequently occurred:
Defense Counsel: Your Honor, Ms.Tillman is African-American and we would object to her being struck — we would object to her being struck. She is African-American.
The Court: The defendant is not African-American.
Defense Counsel: I understand. My understanding is that a public right also of the defendant — he is entitled to an unbiased trial from an unbiased jury, whatever his race is, so we would object to her being struck. We would inquire why the State wishes she be struck.
The Court: What does the State have to say?
Prosecutor: This is absurd. In every criminal case I’ve been involved in — the defense objects to this? It’s absurd.
Defense Counsel: We would make the same —
Prosecutor: I haven’t struck any others. Personally,it’s offensive.
Defense Counsel: Your Honor, there is no personal intent intended in this case. I’ve known Mr. Shue for a number of years. I believe he is a very fair-minded person, but we nevertheless would make that objection. No personal offense intended.
The Court: First, I don’t think it’s applicable; it is not an African-American defendant. Secondly, I would point out there has already been at least one juror seated. Mr. Willis, who is African-American, that was seated without objection.
Prosecutor: We also have Ms. Wofford who was just seated,Your Honor. There’s two African-Americans.1
The Court: And Ms. Wofford who has been seated. That makes two, so I don’t think the State is required to set out a basis when the defendant is not African-American.
In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the State from striking a venire person as a result of racially discriminatory intent. In Mackintrush v. State, 334 Ark. 390, 397, 978 S.W.2d 293, 296 (1998), our supreme court outlined the proper steps for the trial court to follow when a Batson claim is made:
(1) the opponent of a peremptory challenge must make a prima facie case of racial discrimination; (2) the proponent of the strike must come forward with a race-neutral explanation; and (3) the trial court must decide whether the opponent has proven purposeful racial discrimination.
As for the first-step analysis, the Mackintrush court stated;
The strike’s opponent must present facts, at this initial step, to raise an inference of purposeful discrimination. According to the Batson decision, that is done by showing (1) that the strike’s opponent is a member of an identifiable racial group, (2) that the strike is part of a jury-selection process or pattern designed to discriminate, and (3) that the strike was used to exclude jurors because of their race. In deciding whether aprimafacie case has been made, the trial court should consider all relevant circumstances. Should the trial court determine that a. prima facie case has been made, the inquiry proceeds to Step Two. However, if the determination by the trial court is to the contrary, that ends the inquiry.
Id. at 398, 978 S.W.2d at 296.
For reversal of the trial court’s action in this case, Mr. Moore argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law in ruling that he could not make a Batson challenge to a black juror because he himself was not black. Mr. Moore contends that the trial court was required to go through the three-step Batson process, and that its failure to do so constituted reversible error. Mr. Moore notes that in Holder v. State, 354 Ark. 364, 124 S.W.3d 439 (2003), the supreme court held that a Batson error is not subject to harmless-error analysis.
Mr. Moore is indeed correct in asserting that a defendant has the right to object to race-based exclusions of jurors through peremptory challenges whether or not the defendant and excluded jurors share the same race. This was the holding in Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991), where the Supreme Court stated that although a defendant has no right to a jury composed in whole or part of persons of his own race, he does have the right to be tried by a jury whose members are selected by nondiscriminatory criteria. The Powers court further stated that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits the State from using peremptory challenges to exclude otherwise qualified and unbiased jurors solely by reason of race, and that racial discrimination injury selection casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial process, and places the fairness of the proceedings in doubt. Thus, it is clear that in the instant case Mr. Moore did have the constitutional right to bring a Batson challenge against the State’s peremptory strike of Ms. Tillman, and the trial court erred in stating otherwise.
Notwithstanding the trial court’s misunderstanding of the law, we nonetheless cannot conclude that any error was committed in permitting the State to strike Ms. Tillman. This is because Mr. Moore failed to make a prima facie case of racial discrimination. The prosecution’s use of a peremptory challenge to remove the only black prospective juror may establish a prima fade case. Cooper v. State, 324 Ark. 135, 919 S.W.2d 205 (1996). However, one peremptory strike of a minority prospective juror, with no additional facts or context in which it can be evaluated, is not sufficient. Id.
When Mr. Moore made his Batson objection, he inquired as to why the State wished to strike the juror. However, because Mr. Moore offered no additional argument or facts outside of the strike itself, no prima facie case was made and therefore the State was not required to come forward with a race-neutral explanation. Clearly the State did not use a peremptory strike against the only black prospective juror because, as the trial court pointed out, there had already been at least one black juror seated without objection.
In Jackson v. State, 330 Ark. 126, 129, 954 S.W.2d 894, 895 (1997), the supreme court reviewed a Batson challenge and announced: In affirming Mr. Jackson’s conviction, the supreme court reasoned:
The first of the three-step analysis above requires us to determine whether Jackson proved a prima facie case of discrimination which may be established by (1) showing that the totality of the relevant facts give rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose, (2) demonstrating total or seriously disproportional exclusion of blacks from the jury, or (3) showing a pattern of strikes, questions or statements by a prosecuting attorney during voir dire.
In the present case, Jackson made no effort to show a disproportionate exclusion of blacks from the jury, nor did he show a pattern of strikes evidencing a discriminatory purpose. In fact, two black males were seated on the jury, and as this court has previously stated, the best answer the State can have to a charge of discrimination is to point to a jury which has black members. In this respect, we also note that, while the State was entitled to ten peremptory challenges, it used only six. Additionally, Jackson presented no evidence that the prosecutor made any racial statements or asked any racial questions. In sum, Jackson failed to show a prima facie case.
Id. at 129-130, 954 S.W.2d at 895 (citations omitted).
As in Jackson v. State, supra, the appellant in the instant case failed to present any factors to carry his burden of making a prima facie case of discrimination. While the trial court was wrong in asserting that Mr. Moore could not make a Batson challenge because he did not share the same race as the struck juror, the result reached by the trial court was correct given that it is not even arguable that Mr. Moore made, or even attempted to make, a. prima facie case as required by Batson v. Kentucky, supra. We will affirm the trial court if it reaches the right result for the wrong reason. See Hagen v. State, 315 Ark. 20, 864 S.W.2d 856 (1993); Stewart v. State, 59 Ark. App. 77, 953 S.W.2d 599 (1997); Pyles v. State, 55 Ark. App. 201, 935 S.W.2d 570 (1996).
In reaching our decision we emphasize that we are in no way holding that the existence of one black juror on the jury gives the State any right to strike another black venire person for a racially motivated reason. Rather, we simply hold that there was no evidence of any racial motivation in this case, and this fact was in part demonstrated by the State’s failure to strike the prior African-American juror or jurors.
Affirmed.
Hart, Vaught, and Crabtree, JJ., agree. Griffen and Neal, JJ., dissent.