Moore v. Aysen

69 So. 2d 551, 1953 La. App. LEXIS 915
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedDecember 18, 1953
DocketNo. 3773
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 69 So. 2d 551 (Moore v. Aysen) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Moore v. Aysen, 69 So. 2d 551, 1953 La. App. LEXIS 915 (La. Ct. App. 1953).

Opinion

CAVANAUGH, Judge.

This suit is by the plaintiff against the defendant and his compensation insurer under the Workmen’s Compensation Act for the maximum amount of compensation of $30 per week for a period not exceeding 400 weeks during the period of his disability, subject to the payment of 50 weeks’ (compensation at $30 per week by the insurance company.

The defendant is engaged in farming and particularly the growing of sugar cane. In the operation of his plantation of 579 acres in Lafourche Parish, about 60% is used for the planting and cultivation of sugar cane and the other 40% is used for the planting and cultivation of corn, potatoes and other agricultural products. He usually employs approximately twelve laborers to work on his farm or plantation. He is not engaged in the manufacturing of sugar or the processing of other agricultural products, but in connection with his farming operations he uses motor and power driven machinery of the most modern type to carry on his operations. The' plaintiff was employed as a farm laborer and rendered all types of services required of a laborer on a sugar plantation. The defendant harvests his cane crop with a Thompson Hurricane Harvester, which is a mechanical harvester. Two men are used in the operation of this particular machine. The driver, or operator, of the machine who controls its movement and directs its operation -and who is in charge of the machine, is stationed in a position on a seat near the top of the machine, and the other worker is stationed on a seat near the bottom of the machine and is employed in the position known as a “cutterbar operator.” The cutterbar operator raises and lowers the bottom blade of the machine while it is in operation to cut the sugar cane even with the row. The upper blade is operated by the operator of the machine which severs the top of the stalk of cane in its movement. The cane is cut- as the machine moves down the row, and falls on a chain belt used as an elevator and is carried to a platform. If we understand the operations correctly, this platform or bin has a piler gate, and when the bin or receptacle is full, it is tripped to permit the cane to be unloaded. The plaintiff was' employed at the time of the injury on this machine as á cutterbar operator, and, while engaged in oiling its parts, he suffered the loss of two phalanges of his middle finger, two and one-half phalages of his ring, or fourth, finger, and the entire little finger of his right hand. He only has remaining of the fingers on the right hand the thumb, the index finger, the proximal phalange of the middle finger and one-half of the proximal phalange of the ring finger.

The accident and injury to plaintiff’s hand happened on October 26, 1949, and the insurance Company paid him 50 weeks’ compensation at $30 per week and discontinued payments.

The defense to this suit is a general denial and with an admission that the insurance company paid the 50 weeks’ compensation.

The District Judge awarded the plaintiff compensation at the maximum rate of $30 per week for a period not exceeding 100 weeks under the provisions of LSA-R.S., Title 23, Section 1221, subdivision (4) (p).

From this judgment the plaintiff has appealed, and the defendant has answered the appeal, praying that the judgment be reversed and the plaintiff’s suit dismissed, or that the judgment should be amended reducing the award, or, finally, that, only in the alternative, it should be affirmed.

The District Judge in his written reasons for judgment has fully reviewed the evidence and reached the conclusion that the plaintiff was employed as a farm laborer on defendant’s plantation and that during three months of the year he performed the services of a cutterbar operator on the Thompson Hurricane Harvester and that [553]*553■during the other nine months of the year he performed ordinary farm labor such as driving a truck, tractor, cultivator or other farm machinery, or hoeing and doing ordinary manual labor on the farm. He found as a fact that the plaintiff was totally disabled to1 work or perform the duties of ■ a cutterbar operator on the harvesting machine, but that he could do and perform the other work he was accustomed to doing in defendant’s farming operations. He reasoned that since plaintiff’s work as a cutterbar operator was only seasonal, and required services during three months , out of the year, and that he could perform the other .duties and services he was accustomed to performing, he was not totally and permanently disabled, but .was only partially disabled to do the work he w,as accustomed to doing at the time of the accident and injury.

The questions presented by this appeal are:

1. The basis on which the compensation due plaintiff should be predicated, that is, whether on a five or six day per week basis, and his seasonal employment as a cutterbar operator for three months and his regular employment of nine months as a farm laborer;
2. Whether plaintiff’s injuries have produced disability to do work of any reasonable character or whether he is only partially disabled.

We will consider the questions as herein presented.

The plaintiff at the time of the injuries was employed at a daily rate of pay of $8 per day, and the court below stated:

“The .record shows that plaintiff, in pursuing his occupation as a farm worker, was engaged in performing the work required of any farm worker three-fourths of the time, and engaged in seasonal work as a harvester operator one-fourth of the.time. He was injured while engaged in the performance of his seasonal work. We have .found that his disability does not prevent his performing regular farm work, but does prevent his doing the seasonal job of harvester operator satisfactorily, and that as to the latter he is considered totally disabled. We have held that to be a partial disability. Under that holding, we believe he is entitled to one-fourth of the maximum compensation provided by law, or compensation for 100 weeks, which, it may be noted, is also the maximum provided by paragraph (p) of [LSA-] R-Sl 23:1221.
“The general rule seems to be well established in our jurisprudence that disability payments be calculated' at a daily wage rate fór'á five-day week, and undoubtedly that is a reasonable and equitable rule to follow in ordinary cases where the disabled person was engaged in an occupation providing a uniform scale of pay perennially. In this case, plaintiff’s wage was $8.00 a day for his seasonal work of three months and $3.30 a day for regular farm work the remainder of the year. If plaintiff were found unable to do work of any reasonable character and as a consequence totally and permanently disabled and entitled, to compensation for the maximum time provided by law, then the general rule might well be applied, for the reason that the 5-day week is the average throughout the year; ; under [ which plaintiff would receive payments for. three months at a rate less .than the maximum, but at a rate far in exces.5 of his total earning capacity for nine-months of each year during the period. We believe that the finding of partial disability, coupled , with the , circumstance of a seasonal occupation, warrants special consideration, indeed, the same consideration it was given by the-employer’s insurer, who paid plaiptiff the maximum compensation of $30.00 per week for fifty weeks for no other evident reason than that the earnings of plaintiff, in his seasonal occupation justified' the payment of that amount: It seems to us that not only simple, jus

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Bluebook (online)
69 So. 2d 551, 1953 La. App. LEXIS 915, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/moore-v-aysen-lactapp-1953.