Moonbug Entertainment Limited v. Babybus Co., Ltd.
This text of Moonbug Entertainment Limited v. Babybus Co., Ltd. (Moonbug Entertainment Limited v. Babybus Co., Ltd.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 6 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MOONBUG ENTERTAINMENT No. 24-3748; LIMITED; TREASURE STUDIO, INC., 24-6757 D.C. No. Plaintiffs - Appellees, 3:21-cv-06536-EMC v. MEMORANDUM* BABYBUS CO., LTD.; BABYBUS (FUJIAN) NETWORK TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD,
Defendants - Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Edward M. Chen, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted September 17, 2025 San Francisco, California
Before: HAMILTON, R. NELSON, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.**
BabyBus Co. Ltd. and BabyBus (Fujian) Network Technology Co., Ltd.
(collectively, Appellants) appeal the district court’s final judgment for Moonbug
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable David F. Hamilton, United States Circuit Judge for the Court of Appeals, 7th Circuit, sitting by designation. Entertainment Limited and Treasure Studio, Inc. (collectively, Appellees) after a
jury trial, challenging the district court’s jury instructions and verdict form.
Appellants also challenge the district court’s decision granting partial summary
judgment to Moonbug on the copyrightability of the JJ character. The district court
had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338(a), and we have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm the district court.
“We review de novo whether a district court’s jury instructions accurately
state the law, and we review for abuse of discretion a district court’s formulation of
jury instructions.” Hung Lam v. City of San Jose, 869 F.3d 1077, 1085 (9th
Cir. 2017). Instructional error does not require reversal if “the error is more probably
than not harmless.” Swinton v. Potomac Corp., 270 F.3d 794, 805 (9th Cir. 2001)
(cleaned up). The grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. DRK Photo v.
McGraw-Hill Glob. Educ. Holdings, LLC, 870 F.3d 978, 982 (9th Cir. 2017).
1. The district court properly instructed the jury on filtering. The jury
instructions “adequately distinguish[ed]” between protected and unprotected
elements of the CoComelon works by listing the kinds of components that are not
entitled to copyright protection. See Harper House, Inc. v. Thomas Nelson, Inc., 889
F.2d 197, 207–08 (9th Cir. 1989). This court has never required district courts to
identify for the jury specific, unprotected elements in the allegedly infringed work.
Appellants agreed with this very proposition in proposed jury instructions submitted
2 24-3748 before trial. The district court did not err by listing categories of protected and
unprotected material and then tasking the jury with determining which case-specific
elements corresponded to those categories based on testimony elicited at trial. See
Harper House, 889 F.2d at 208.
There was also no error in the district court’s guidance on scenes a faire,
merger, and thick/thin protection. The district court’s instructions on scenes a faire
gave adequate guidance and tracked existing case law. See Swirsky v. Carey, 376
F.3d 841, 850 (9th Cir. 2004). Appellants preferred slightly different language, but
a district court “need not incorporate every proposition of law suggested by counsel
so long as [it] adequately covers the principles necessary for jury guidance.” Van
Cleef v. Aeroflex Corp., 657 F.2d 1094, 1099 (9th Cir. 1981).
Likewise, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it forwent a
merger instruction based on insufficient evidence. The district court determined that
the instruction would be redundant with other instructions explaining which
elements are unprotected. Even if Appellants were correct that the merger doctrine
should apply because there are a “limited number of ways” to express the idea of a
“cartoon baby in a happy family brushing their teeth,” any such error would have
been harmless. See Swinton, 270 F.3d at 805.
The district court also did not err by finding thick protection and applying the
substantial similarity standard. Even if some visual elements are inherent in the
3 24-3748 genre of animated babies, there is still a wide range of possible creative expression.
In any case, the jury found that JoJo was “not only substantially similar[] but also
virtually identical” to JJ. In other words, the jury also found illicit copying under
the thin-protection standard Appellants would have preferred. So even if the district
court had erred in finding broad protection, the error would have been harmless.
2. There was no error in the district court’s selection and arrangement
instruction. Even if we assumed Appellants were correct that filtering is always
required in cases such as this one, the district court’s instructions provided adequate
filtering guidance by distinguishing between the kinds of elements that are typically
protected versus those that are not. See Harper House, 889 F.2d at 208 (finding
error where the district court failed to instruct the jury on general categories of
unprotected elements, like “blank forms” and “utilitarian aspects of useful items”).
Contrary to Appellants’ assertions, Appellees presented sufficient evidence on how
individual unprotected elements were “particularly selected and arranged” to
warrant the instruction. Skidmore as Tr. for Randy Craig Wolfe Tr. v. Led Zeppelin,
952 F.3d 1051, 1075 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc).
3. The district court did not improperly grant partial summary judgment to
Appellees on the copyrightability of the JJ character. JJ has several unique
characteristics that, when viewed in combination, render him “especially
distinctive.” See DC Comics v. Towle, 802 F.3d 1012, 1019 (9th Cir. 2015). The
4 24-3748 best example is his signature “Wow!” gesture, but his clothing, physical features,
character traits, and unique popularity also render him “especially distinctive.”
There is no genuine dispute of material fact that JJ is an especially distinctive
character.
4. The district court did not abuse its discretion in formulating the verdict
form. The form did not request individual findings for each video accused of
infringement. But “the key is not the number of questions on the verdict form, but
whether the jury announces the ultimate legal result of each claim.” Zhang v. Am.
Gem Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d 1020, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003). That standard is satisfied.
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