Moody Institute of Science v. County of Los Angeles

233 P.2d 51, 105 Cal. App. 2d 107, 1951 Cal. App. LEXIS 1435

• Court: California Court of Appeal
• Decided: June 25, 1951
• Docket: Civ. 17249
• Status: Published

Opinions

DRAPEAU, J.

Plaintiff filed its complaint, alleging that it was a religious nonprofit corporation, and, as such, its property was exempt from taxation, under the provisions of section 1c, article XIII of the Constitution of California, and section 214 of the California Revenue and Taxation Code, and that the county tax collector had denied plaintiff’s claim of exemption, requiring plaintiff to pay under protest $1,475.79 taxes for the year 1947.

The case was tried without a jury, resulting in findings of fact and judgment for plaintiff for the recovery of the taxes thus paid.

Prom this judgment the county of Los Angeles and the city of Los Angeles appeal.

Appellants state that the sole question involved is: “Was plaintiff’s property properly taxed where it was not irrevocably dedicated to religious, hospital, or charitable purposes as required, but instead its Articles of Incorporation authorized diversion of its property to non-exempt educational purposes?”

Plaintiff’s articles of incorporation empower it to study the relationship between science and the Bible, and to encourage a faith in and acceptance of that sacred volume; to spread and teach the results of its study and research by classroom instruction, books and pamphlets, by radio, television, and moving and still pictures; to receive and hold money and property for these purposes; “and for other religious, scientific and educational purposes.”

Do the words quoted take this corporation out of the class defined by statute for exemption ?

Constitutional provisions and statutes granting exemption from taxation are strictly construed to the end that such concession will be neither enlarged nor extended beyond the plain meaning of the language of the law. This rule does not require that the narrowest possible meaning be given to words descriptive of the exemption. A fair and reasonable interpretation is all that is required. (Cedars of Lebanon Hospital v. County of Los Angeles, 35 Cal.2d 729 [221 P.2d 31].)

If the articles of incorporation permit not only a present use for but also the ultimate and permanent diversion of its assets to nonexempt purposes no exemption may be allowed. (Pasadena Hospital Assn. v. County of Los Angeles, 35 Cal.2d 779 [221 P.2d 62].)

Property devoted to educational purposes is not exempt from taxation. (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 214(6).)

Respondent contends: (a) That its articles of incorporation are divided into two parts, one, its purposes, and, two, its powers; that its purposes are such as to irrevocably devote its property to religious uses; and that the power to hold property for educational uses is controlled by the purposes. And, (b) in any event, the findings of the trial court are conclusive upon review.

The statutory requirement of irrevocable dedication is determined by the powers of the corporation, as disclosed in its articles of incorporation. (Pasadena Hospital Assn. v. County of Los Angeles, supra.) The cases do not support the proposition that to determine tax exemption there is a distinction between purposes and powers in articles of incorporation.

Turning to plaintiff’s argument with respect to the conelusiveness of the court’s findings. The clerk’s transcript shows that no testimony was presented by defendant, and the case was submitted and decided upon plaintiff’s articles of incorporation, introduced in evidence by plaintiff. In such circumstances the findings are but conclusions of law. From uncontroverted facts a reviewing court may draw its own conclusions. (San Diego Trust & Sav. Bank v. San Diego, 16 Cal.2d 142 [105 P.2d 94, 133 A.L.R. 416]; Richter v. Walker, 36 Cal.2d 634 [226 P.2d 593].)

Applying the foregoing rules to the corporate power of plaintiff to receive and hold money and property for religious purposes, and “for . . . scientific and educational purposes,” it becomes manifest that it was not entitled to exemption from taxation.

The judgment is reversed.