Montville v. Hamblin

77 A.2d 113, 96 N.H. 356, 1950 N.H. LEXIS 191

• Court: Supreme Court of New Hampshire
• Decided: December 5, 1950
• Docket: 3946
• Status: Published

Opinions

Johnston, C. J.

The defendants correctly argue that the issue of their legitimacy was actually litigated in the first proceeding and that the plaintiff is precluded by it. A decree of a Probate Court cannot be attacked collaterally. McInnes v. Goldthwaite, 94 N. H. 331, 336, and cases cited. This conclusiveness of a probate decree applies to a judgment of the Superior Court sitting as an appellate court of probate.

It is true that the cause of action of the second petition was not the same as that of the first. The purpose of the second is to disqualify the defendants as heirs of George E. Hamblin, while the object of the first was to remove Nellie M. Hamblin as administratrix.

But the issue of the legitimacy of the defendants which determines the result of the present petition was actually decided in the earlier proceeding. The plaintiff concedes in his brief that that proceeding “involved the question of whether or not under the law of New Hampshire Nellie M. Hamblin was the legal wife of George E. Hamblin.” It was adjudicated that she was. From this adjudication it necessarily follows as a matter of law and of definition that the issue of the marriage of George E. Hamblin and Nellie M. Hamblin are legitimate. To hold otherwise would be a contradiction in terms.

“Where a question of fact essential to the judgment is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, the determination is conclusive between the parties in a subsequent action on a different cause of action. . . .” Restatement, Judgments, 293. This same principle is recognized in Lovejoy v. Ashworth, 94 N. H. 8, and cases cited.

It would be vain and to no purpose to consider what another jurisdiction might hold respecting the legality of this marriage and the legitimacy of its issue, because this court is bound by the judgment already entered in this jurisdiction concerning these matters.

The plaintiff suggests that the parties in the present proceeding are different from those in the prior proceeding. Just what is meant is not further specified. “It is essential only that the persons between whom the rules of res judicata are claimed to be effective should be the same in the two actions.” Restatement, Judgments, 359. The excepting party does not establish that the present parties were not adversaries in the first action. The fact that there are now fewer parties is immaterial.

Exception overruled.

Duncan, J. dissented: the others concurred.