Montgomery v. Dawson

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedJune 27, 2022
Docket2:22-cv-11416
StatusUnknown

This text of Montgomery v. Dawson (Montgomery v. Dawson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Montgomery v. Dawson, (E.D. Mich. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

JAYVON MONTGOMERY,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Case No. 22-11416 Honorable Linda V. Parker DARRELL DAWSON, DETROIT RECEIVING HOSPITAL DMC, DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLE, and 36TH DISTRICT COURT,

Defendants. _______________________________/

ORDER (1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS, (2) PARTIALLY DISMISSING CLAIMS AND PARTIES, AND (3) REQUIRING FILING OF AMENDMENT COMPLAINT

Plaintiff initiated this pro se action against Defendants on June 23, 2022, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.) On the same date, he filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 2.) In his Complaint, Plaintiff claims that he has suffered injury due to a “refusal to blow” placed on his driving record after being involved in a motor vehicle accident in Detroit at some unidentified date and time. (See ECF No. 1.) Defendant Detroit Police Officer Darrell Dawson, who responded to the accident scene, allegedly was dissatisfied with Plaintiff’s performance on a breathalyzer test and obtained a warrant for a blood test from the 36th District Court, which was drawn at Detroit Receiving Hospital. (Id.) The results came back “clean.” (Id.)

District courts are required by statute to dismiss any action brought under federal law in forma pauperis if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a

defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608-09 (6th Cir. 2007). Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint set forth a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court’s jurisdiction depends, a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and a demand for judgment for the relief sought. A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, that when accepted as true, “state[s] a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 555, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when a plaintiff pleads factual content that permits a court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at

556). Generally, a less stringent standard is applied when construing the allegations pleaded in a pro se complaint. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21,

92 S. Ct. 594, 596 (1972). Even when held to a less stringent standard, however, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to satisfy Rule 8 with respect to his claim(s) against Detroit Receiving Hospital (“Hospital”). Moreover, his claims against the 36th

District Court and “Department of Motor Vehicles” (“DMV”) are subject to summary dismissal because these State of Michigan entities are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.

First, Plaintiff does not allege any facts to establish the Hospital’s liability. While he states that his blood was drawn there, he does not explain how the Hospital or any Hospital employee violated his rights. Plaintiff, therefore, is being ordered to file an amended complaint explaining the basis of his claims against this

defendant. Any amended pleading should provide date(s) of when the alleged misconduct occurred, including the alleged violations of Plaintiff’s rights by any remaining defendants.

Eleventh Amendment immunity bars Plaintiff’s claims against the “DMV” and 36th District Court.1 It is well-established that the Eleventh Amendment bars any suit, absent consent, against a State by its own citizens. See Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001) (observing that “[t]he ultimate

guarantee of the Eleventh Amendment is that non-consenting States may not be

1 The Court presumes that Plaintiff is referring to the Michigan Secretary of State as it manages driving licenses and records, vehicle registration, etc. The State does not have a “Department of Motor Vehicles.” Nevertheless, the Court refers to the agency as Plaintiff does. sued by private individuals in federal court.”). It also is well settled that the Eleventh Amendment bars federal court actions against State agencies and

departments. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1983); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (per curiam )). The Eleventh Amendment additionally bars claims against state employees in their official

capacities because “a suit against a state officer in his or her official capacity is tantamount to a suit against the state itself.” Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471- 72 (1985). Congress has not abrogated the Eleventh Amendment immunity of States with regard to suits under §§ 1983 or 1985. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S.

332, 339-42 (1979); Boler v. Earley, 865 F.3d 391, 409-10 (6th Cir. 2017) (“Section 1983 does not abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity.”). Nor has the State of Michigan waived its immunity. Abick v. Michigan, 803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th

Cir. 1986). The DMV is a state agency. Under the Michigan Constitution, the judiciary is a separate and independent branch of state government and thus the district and circuit courts of the State of Michigan are arms of the State. See Judicial Attorneys

Ass’n v. Mich., 586 N.W.2d 894, 897-98 (Mich. 1998); Pucci v. Ninteenth District Ct., 628 F.3d 752, 762-63 (6th Cir. 2010). Each state court is part of the “one court of justice” established by the Michigan Constitution. Mich. Const. art. VI, § 1

(“The judicial power of the state is vested exclusively in one court of justice which shall be divided into one supreme court, one court of appeals, one trial court of general jurisdiction known as the circuit court, one probate court, and courts of

limited jurisdiction that the legislature may establish by a two-thirds vote of the members elected to and serving in each house”); see Smith v. Oakland Cnty. Cir. Ct., 344 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1055 (E.D. Mich. 2004). In short, Eleventh

Amendment immunity bars Plaintiff’s claim(s) against the “DMV” and 36th District Court. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis

is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s claims against the 36th District Court and DMV are DISMISSED and these parties are terminated.

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Related

Haines v. Kerner
404 U.S. 519 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Alabama v. Pugh
438 U.S. 781 (Supreme Court, 1978)
Quern v. Jordan
440 U.S. 332 (Supreme Court, 1979)
Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman
465 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 1984)
Brandon v. Holt
469 U.S. 464 (Supreme Court, 1985)
Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett
531 U.S. 356 (Supreme Court, 2001)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Pucci v. Nineteenth District Court
628 F.3d 752 (Sixth Circuit, 2010)
Abick v. State Of Michigan
803 F.2d 874 (Sixth Circuit, 1986)
Judicial Attorneys Ass'n v. State
586 N.W.2d 894 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1998)
Smith v. Oakland County Circuit Court
344 F. Supp. 2d 1030 (E.D. Michigan, 2004)
Boler v. Earley
865 F.3d 391 (Sixth Circuit, 2017)

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Montgomery v. Dawson, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/montgomery-v-dawson-mied-2022.