Monterey Bay Military Housing, LLC v. Ambac Assurance Corporation

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided December 11, 2024·No. 1:19-cv-09193·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

MONTEREY BAY MILITARY HOUSING, LLC, MONTEREY BAY LAND, LLC, MEADE COMMUNITIES LLC, FORT ORDER BLISS/WHITE SANDS MISSILE RANGE HOUSING LP, RILEY COMMUNITIES 19 Civ. 9193 (PGG) LLC, FORT LEAVENWORTH FRONTIER HERITAGE COMMUNITIES, I, LLC, FORT LEAVENWORTH FRONTIER HERITAGE COMMUNITIES, II, LLC, CARLISLE/ PICATINNY FAMILY HOUSING LP, BRAGG COMMUNITIES LLC, FORT DETRICK/WALTER REED ARMY MEDICAL CENTER LLC, PICERNE-FORT POLK FUNDING, LLC, RUCKER COMMUNITIES LLC, STEWART HUNTER HOUSING LLC, SILL HOUSING, LLC, AETC HOUSING LP, AMC WEST HOUSING LP, LACKLAND FAMILY HOUSING, LLC, and VANDENBERG HOUSING LP, Plaintiffs, - against -

AMBAC ASSURANCE CORPORATION, JEFFERIES MORTGAGE FINANCE, INC., JEFFERIES & COMPANY, INC., JEFFERIES LLC, JEFFERIES GROUP LLC, DANNY RAY, and CHETAN MARFATIA,

Defendants.

PAUL G. GARDEPHE, U.S.D.J.: This is a civil RICO action. Plaintiffs are eighteen entities that constructed housing at U.S. military bases nationwide. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants — lenders, loan servicers, and insurers for Plaintiffs’ military housing projects — “formed a RICO enterprise to illegally profit on the financing [of these projects].” The Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) pleads substantive RICO and RICO conspiracy claims, as well as state law claims. (SAC (Dkt. No. 256) ¶¶ 4, 251-307) In July and August 2024, each Defendant moved for summary judgment. (See Jefferies Mot. for Sum. J. (Dkt. No. 858); Ray Mot. for Sum. J. (Dkt. No. 874); Ambac

Assurance Co. Mot. for Sum. J. (Dkt. No. 880); Marfatia Mot. for Sum. J. (Dkt. No. 909)) Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on July 31, 2024. (See Pltfs. Mot. for Partial Sum. J. (Dkt. No. 867)) In connection with these motions and related briefs, supporting declarations, and Local Rule 56.1 statements, Plaintiffs and two non-parties have moved to seal more than 1,000 documents that are part of the summary judgment record. (See Pltfs. First Mot. to Seal (Dkt. No. 965); Pltfs. Second Mot. to Seal (Dkt. No. 1005); Pltfs. Third Mot. to Seal (Dkt. No. 1009); JLL First Mot. to Seal (Dkt. No. 958); JLL Second Mot. to Seal (Dkt. No. 999); NYL Mot. to Seal (Dkt. No. 1000)) Defendants have also filed motions to seal. In their motions, Defendants say that

Plaintiffs and third parties have designated certain documents as confidential, and Defendants have therefore filed these documents in redacted form or under seal. Defendants do not take a position as to whether these documents are properly redacted or sealed, however. (See Jeffries Sealing Ltr. (Dkt. No. 857) at 1; Ray Sealing Ltr. (Dkt. No. 873) at 1; First Ambac Sealing Ltr. (Dkt. No. 876) at 1; First Marfatia Sealing Ltr. (Dkt. No. 908) at 2; Second Ambac Sealing Ltr. (Dkt. No. 934) at 2; Third Ambac Sealing Ltr. (Dkt. No. 955) at 1; Second Marfatia Sealing Ltr. (Dkt. No. 964) at 2) Defendant Ambac further states that it has filed certain documents with redactions in order to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(a) and Rule II(A) of this Court’s Individual Rules of Practice, which require redaction of personal identification information, financial account numbers, and information regarding minors. (See First Ambac Sealing Ltr. (Dkt. No. 876) at 1; Second Ambac Sealing Ltr. (Dkt. No. 934) at 1; Third Ambac Sealing Ltr. (Dkt. No. 955) at 1) I. LEGAL STANDARDS

As a general matter, documents filed in connection with a motion “are judicial documents to which a presumption of immediate public access attaches under both the common law and the First Amendment.” Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 126 (2d Cir. 2006). This “presumption of access . . . can be overcome only by specific, on-the-record findings that higher values necessitate a narrowly tailored sealing.” Id. The Second Circuit has articulated a three-step process for determining whether documents should be placed under seal. A court must first determine whether the presumption of access attaches. A presumption of access attaches to any item that constitutes a “judicial document” — i.e., an “‘item . . . relevant to the performance of the judicial function and useful in the judicial process.’” Id. at 115 (quoting United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir.

1995) (“Amodeo I”)). If the court determines that the item to be sealed is a judicial document, the court must then determine the weight of the presumption of access. “‘[T]he weight to be given the presumption of access must be governed by the role of the material at issue in the exercise of Article III judicial power and the resultant value of such information to those monitoring the federal courts.’” Id. at 119 (quoting United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Amodeo II”)). “‘Generally, the information will fall somewhere on a continuum from matters that directly affect an adjudication to matters that come within a court’s purview solely to insure their irrelevance.’” Id. (quoting Amodeo II at 1049). After determining the weight of the presumption of access, the court must “‘balance competing considerations against it.’” Id. at 120 (quoting Amodeo II at 1050). “Such countervailing factors include but are not limited to ‘the danger of impairing law enforcement or judicial efficiency’ and ‘the privacy interests of those resisting disclosure.’” Id. (quoting

Amodeo II at 1050). II. ANALYSIS

Here, the materials at issue were submitted in connection with the parties’ cross- motions for summary judgment, and are clearly “judicial documents.” There is thus a strong presumption of access to these documents, because they will “directly affect” this Court’s adjudication of this case. See, e.g., Standard Inv. Chartered, Inc. v. Nat’l Assn. of Sec. Dealers, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 2014, 2008 WL 199537, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2008) (“Motion papers are judicial documents and are thus subject to a strong presumption of access under the First Amendment.”). To rebut the strong presumption of public access that applies here, the parties must offer specific facts “‘demonstrating that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.’” Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 120 (quoting In re New York Times Co., 828 F.2d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 1987)). The Court considers below whether the parties have made the showing necessary to justify their sealing requests. A. Plaintiffs’ Sealing Requests Plaintiffs seek to seal three categories of documents that Plaintiffs describe as (1) “Sensitive Business Documents”; (2) “Military Base Parcel Descriptions”; and (3) “Materials Related to Internal Investigations.” (Pltfs. First Mot. to Seal (Dkt. No. 965) at 2-5) 1. “Sensitive Business Documents” As to the alleged “sensitive business documents,” Plaintiffs seek to seal or redact hundreds of documents, including loan agreements, loan origination agreements, commitment letters (in draft and final form), project funding draw requests, developer responses to requests

for qualifications, project debt proposal comparison analyses, limited partnership agreements, operating agreements, community development and management plans, master development and management agreements, property management agreements, servicing and lockbox agreements, cost data, and documents discussing estimated financial returns. (Id. at 2-3) In arguing that these hundreds of documents should either be redacted or sealed in their entirety, Plaintiffs offer two and a half pages of argument.

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