Monroe v. State

870 S.E.2d 404, 313 Ga. 458
CourtSupreme Court of Georgia
DecidedMarch 8, 2022
DocketS22A0324
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 870 S.E.2d 404 (Monroe v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Monroe v. State, 870 S.E.2d 404, 313 Ga. 458 (Ga. 2022).

Opinion

313 Ga. 458 FINAL COPY

S22A0324, S22I0114. MONROE v. THE STATE.

ORDER OF THE COURT.

Upon review of the full record and the briefs of the parties, this

Court has determined that the application for interlocutory appeal

in this case was improvidently granted. Accordingly, the order

granting the application is vacated, the application is denied, and

the appeal is dismissed.

All the Justices concur.

PETERSON, Justice, concurring.

We granted Monroe’s application for interlocutory appeal to

decide the significant question of whether a competency trial is a

civil proceeding subject to the standard for admission of expert

testimony set forth in OCGA § 24-7-702 (“Rule 702”), which

incorporates into Georgia law for civil cases the holding of Daubert

v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (113 SCt 2786, 125 LE2d 469) (1993). See Rule 702 (a), (b), (f). This remains an

important issue. Unfortunately, we have discovered a defect in this

case that prevents us from reaching its merits here.

“An appellant’s failure to attack alternative bases for a

judgment results in the affirmance of that judgment.” Brown v.

Fokes Props. 2002, Inc., 283 Ga. 231, 233 (2) (657 SE2d 820) (2008)

(citation and punctuation omitted). Here, the trial court resolved

Monroe’s claim that the Daubert standard should apply on both

timeliness and substantive grounds. At trial, it ruled that Monroe

was not entitled to seek a hearing to litigate the expert testimony

under Rule 702 because he did not request one before trial as

required by the trial court’s interpretation of the Rule. In its order

denying Monroe’s motion for new trial, the trial court held that the

Daubert standard does not apply to competency trials because such

proceedings are “quasi-criminal” in nature. But the court also noted

its earlier timeliness ruling and left untouched its prior reasoning,

even though it also provided an alternative ground for its decision.

Because Monroe has not challenged the timeliness rationale in

2 his appeal, he has failed to attack an alternative basis for the

judgment below. As such, this case does not properly present the

merits of either issue, and we correctly dismiss it today as

improvidently granted. See, e.g., Mendez v. Moats, 310 Ga. 114, 114-

15 (852 SE2d 816) (2020) (Nahmias, P. J., concurring) (agreeing with

vacation of writ of certiorari as improvidently granted, despite

important questions presented, due to procedural defects that

prevented resolving them).

This dismissal should not be understood as casting any doubt

on the importance of the Daubert-related question. Indeed, although

not at issue in this case and despite this Court’s holding to the

contrary on at least one potential constitutional ground, serious

questions exist as to whether the United States and Georgia

Constitutions permit the admission of expert testimony in criminal

cases that is deemed insufficiently reliable in civil cases. See, e.g.,

Woods v. State, 310 Ga. 358, 359 (850 SE2d 735) (2020) (Nahmias,

P. J., concurring, joined by Blackwell and Peterson, JJ.) (expressing

inclination in an appropriate case “to grant a petition for certiorari

3 asking this Court to reconsider its equal protection holding in Mason

v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 283 Ga. 271, 273-275 (658 SE2d 603)

(2008), as summarily extended to claims by criminal defendants in

Mitchell v. State, 301 Ga. 563, 571-572 (802 SE2d 217) (2017)”).

I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Nahmias and

Presiding Justice Boggs join in this concurrence.

Ordered March 8, 2022.

Application for interlocutory appeal. Camden Superior Court.

Before Judge Harrison.

Karin Kissiah, Michael A. Schwartz, for appellant.

Keith Higgins, District Attorney, Robert German, Jr., Benjamin

E. Gephardt, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr,

Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney

General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for

appellee.

Mark A. Loudon-Brown, M. Chris Fabricant, amici curiae.

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870 S.E.2d 404, 313 Ga. 458, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/monroe-v-state-ga-2022.